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Income inequalities and subjective well-being have been increasingly
identiﬁed in the literature as important measures of socio-economic cohe-
sion. This is particularly relevant for developing economies that are typi-
cally characterised by strong population growth and relatively low incomes
per head. Although in those economies a considerable share of resources is
derived from rural areas, data availability for these regions is often an issue
which precludes important insights into the overall socio-economic tissue
of the developing world. This dissertation seeks to advance our knowledge
on various aspects of inequalities and well-being with particular emphasis
on rural Pakistan. At the core of the present monograph lie three chapters
that deal with income inequality, subjective well-being as well as physical
well-being (i.e. health). The empirical analysis is based on a unique survey
dataset that covers the four provinces of rural Pakistan. The dissertation
seeks to contribute to the existing literature in several dimensions. We
decompose overall income inequality by its diﬀerent types to disentangle
which sources of income are inequality-increasing and which ones reduce
socio-economic divergence. The empirical measurement and assessment of
both subjective and physical well-being in rural Pakistan is a rather novel
aspect. We introduce and examine diﬀerent well-being measures as indica-
tors of (subjective) poverty and ﬁnd that well-being in rural areas is largely
driven by ﬁnancial factors. When it comes to health, however, overall re-
sults are less clear-cut. The thesis is therefore able to oﬀer several policy
recommendations for important socio-economic factors in rural Pakistan.
On a more general note, some of the results discussed might also illuminate
the policy debate in other geographic areas with similar characteristics.Contents
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xiiChapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
This thesis investigates the determinants of inequalities and well-being in ru-
ral Pakistan using unique survey data for the year 2008; henceforth referred
to as (Survey 2008). The data has been collected by means of household
surveys for the special purpose of this research (see Chapter 2 for details)
and focuses on rural areas that, despite being truly representative for the
Pakistani economy, have received only little attention in the literature thus
far. The notion of inequalities and well-being in this dissertation is coined
in terms of three topics that are at the core of the following chapters: in-
come inequalities, (subjective) well-being poverty and health inequalities.
An important aim of this work is to highlight to what extent these aspects
overlap (say, are relatively rich people also relatively more healthy?), whilst
at the same time investigating somewhat novel linkages in the development
economics literature (say, how does poverty in subjective terms relate to
household’s well-being?).
The analysis is motivated by the case of rural Pakistan but we seek to
benchmark our ﬁndings in the light of results for other (both developing and
industrialised) nations throughout. The dissertation comprises three core
chapters which we succinctly want to motivate in this introductory chapter
in turn.
The ﬁrst core chapter, Chapter 3, is concerned with income inequalities
– arguably the most common type of inequality considered in the literature.
Income inequality has always been a major issue for emerging economies like
Pakistan.1 According to the World Bank (2005), Pakistan’s Gini coeﬃcient
(G) as natural measure of income inequality amounts to G = 0.33. A more
1It should be noted, however, that economic inequalities have increasingly been iden-
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recent study by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2007),
on the other hand, provides a Gini coeﬃcient of G = 0.31, which seems to
suggest an (albeit slight) downward trend in income inequality for Pakistan
over the past few years.
In the present monograph, we do not just seek to measure overall in-
equalities but also aim to disentangle their sources with special reference
to the rural parts of Pakistan, one of the world’s most populous countries.
More speciﬁcally, we decompose total income inequality in rural Pakistan
by its various components. This permits analysing both the contribution
and the eﬀect of each source of income on overall income inequality. All
income ﬁgures are based on our ﬁeld survey conducted in 2008 which allows
for unique insights into geographic areas that have been hitherto largely
neglected.
There exists a number of empirical studies for developing countries that
have measured the contribution of diﬀerent factors contributing to total
income inequality, using various statistical techniques. On Pakistan see,
amongst others, Kruijk (1987), Mohammad and Badar (1985) and Ercelawn
(1984). On other developing countries such as Sri Lanka and India, see
Glewwe (1986) and Nugent and Walther (1982), respectively. Also, see for
example Pyatt et al. (1980) for a methodological overview.
Studies like these can yield important policy implications. For instance,
they may assist policymakers in identifying structure and character of in-
come inequalities but also reveal how those potentially change over time.2
Policymakers with such information at their disposal should (at least in
theory) be able to make better informed decisions when it comes to design-
ing welfare programmes or introducing redistribution measures that seek to
alter the economy-wide income distribution. This thesis intends to make
several contributions in that dimension. First, it advances our knowledge
about the sources of income inequality in the developing world by examin-
ing the sources of such inequalities in rural Pakistan. Second, it employs
various statistical techniques to identify the contribution of diﬀerent sources
of income – agricultural, livestock, rental, non-farm and transfer – to overall
income inequality in rural areas. Third, it provides a correlation analysis
tiﬁed as important measure of overall coherence in developed economies as well. Indeed,
there is currently a rather active literature on aspects pertaining to social mobility, sub-
prime lending, wage dumping due to globalisation, etc. – all of which are believed to
lead to or are causal for rising divergence within societies.
2Against the backdrop of non-negligible costs in obtaining and validating the data
used in this study, we can unfortunately only provide limited indications as to that latter
aspect.Chapter 1. Introduction and Motivation 15
between income inequalities and the shares of the diﬀerent income sources
across the districts in order to distinguish between inequality-increasing and
inequality-decreasing sources of income. Fourth, the analysis in Chapter 3
provides several policy implications and suggests ways to narrow disparities
in the income distribution.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we turn to the rather novel aspect of measuring
and assessing well-being. Indeed, there is an ongoing political debate to
what extent somewhat crude activity measures such as real GDP are able
to accurately reﬂect the state of an economy. The growing desire in the eco-
nomic literature to look beyond the optimising rationale of economic agents
might also explain the increasing importance of behavioural economics; a
ﬁeld that essentially incorporates psychological aspects into the analysis.
We investigate well-being as economic concept in the present study in dif-
ferent contexts.
In Chapter 4, we analyse subjective well-being in relation to poverty
from two angles (i) overall well-being and (ii) ﬁnancial well-being. Thus,
on a methodological level, the dissertation makes an attempt to link the
emerging ﬁeld of happiness economics with development studies. In partic-
ular, we integrate subjective poverty indicators with the so-called happiness
function. Much of the work in that area has been done on subjective well-
being for developed countries. Recently, there have been ﬁrst applications
to emerging economies such as Kingdon and Knight (2006) for South Africa
and Knight et al. (2007) for rural China. The thesis adds to this strand of
the literature on subjective well-being for the developing world by investi-
gating subjective well-being poverty in rural Pakistan. Indeed, to the best
of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study on that matter for rural Pakistan.
We introduce and compare diﬀerent measures of subjective well-being as
means of capturing poverty. Unlike Kingdon and Knight (2006), we do not
only resort to overall well-being and thus an indirect approach to subjec-
tive well-being measurement in relation to poverty. Instead, we additionally
consider ﬁnancial well-being that arguably corresponds more closely to the
“usual” connotation of poverty as development problem and thus provide a
more direct and general approach to subjective well-being measurement in
this context.
We explicitly test for physical well-being (i.e. health) in relation to ab-
solute as well as relative income standards in Chapter 5. The underlying
motivation is to investigate to what extent health inequalities are driven
by income diﬀerentials. There is increasing (both anecdotal and empirical)
evidence to suggest that all over the world individual health is more andChapter 1. Introduction and Motivation 16
more linked to personal wealth and the individual income status. We test
in particular two key hypotheses in that regard: the Absolute Income Hy-
pothesis (AIH) and the Relative Income Hypothesis (RIH). The AIH states
that the household’s health status improves with higher income. According
to the RIH, the household’s health is determined by its income relative to
society. This implies that a relatively higher social status should ensure a
better health status. For the RIH, also the distribution of income matters
such that living in a society with relatively high income inequality may have
a detrimental impact on the health status. The health literature captures
this in a further hypothesis that is obviously closely related to the RIH, the
so-called Income Inequality Hypothesis (IIH). The IIH seeks to answer the
question whether inequality aﬀects everybody in society equally or whether
it is only harmful to the health of the least well-oﬀ. The former idea de-
scribes the strong version of the IIH, whereas the latter aspect would imply
that the IIH only holds in the weak form.
Studies using large international datasets strongly support the AIH
but provide no support for the RIH and little or no support for the IIH
(see, amongst others, Wagstaﬀ and Doorslaer (2000); Lindley and Lorgelly
(2005); Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004); Lobmayer and Wilkinson (2000)).
Marmot et al. (1991), in contrast, analysing health inequalities among
British civil servants found that it is relative rather than absolute income
that is important for health – such that a lower relative income increases
the chances of ending up in a lower health category. Li and Zhu (2006)
tested the two versions of the IIH for China. Their results provide evidence
in favour of the strong version of the IIH, however they failed to conﬁrm
the weak version of the hypothesis.
Previewing the main results of our study for rural Pakistan, we ﬁnd
stronger empirical support in favour of the RIH compared to the AIH but
no evidence for the validity of the IIH. We also ﬁnd evidence for income
inequality being beneﬁcial for reported health in a developing economy like
rural Pakistan. We furthermore observe that high income inequality par-
ticularly beneﬁts the richer segment of society in this context.
Every researcher is confronted with a whole variety of methodological
approaches to seek answers to her research questions. We believe that
in many cases a “simple hammer is suﬃcient to hit the nail on its head”.
This general approach is reﬂected in the present monograph. Our analysis
therefore contains descriptive as well as more formal methods throughout.
We believe it is important to have a solid understanding of the overall
picture to begin with and thus analyse the survey results ﬁrst for diﬀerentChapter 1. Introduction and Motivation 17
levels of aggregation (i.e. both on the province and the district level). Our
analysis proceeds in steps. Most of our results are based on regression
models following a particular weighting scheme to ensure representativeness.
We typically consider ordered probit models based on Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimators. In some instances, we also resort to Poisson regressions
and more conventional least squares estimators.
In a nutshell, the remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 provides background information on Pakistan in general and par-
ticularly its rural parts and puts the study in context with the prevailing
institutional environment. The chapter also contains a detailed description
of the survey design, gives further details on data collection and outlines the
weighting scheme that has been used for the econometric analysis. Chapter
3 deals with income inequalities. This chapter contains a review of the lit-
erature on the decomposition of income inequality by income sources. The
data suggests that in particular non-farm income and transfer income are
inequality increasing and inequality decreasing sources of income, respec-
tively. Chapter 4 focuses on diﬀerent approaches to well-being measurement
as subjective poverty indicators. We apply several approaches and propose
an appealing and original interpretation of poverty in a socio-economic con-
text. Chapter 5 focuses on the socio-economic determinants of health. We
ﬁnd that two factors play an important role in determining a household’s
health: income and the family size of a household. However, we argue that
in fact it is relative income rather than absolute income that inﬂuences a
household’s health status. Chapter 6 summarises the main ﬁndings and
highlights important contributions of the study. Finally, we suggest various
policy implications and hint at potential avenues for further research.Chapter 2
Country context and research
design
This Chapter serves two purposes. First, it provides general background
information (Section 2.1) on rural Pakistan to put the study in the appro-
priate context. Second, it outlines in detail the research design (Section
2.2) which should facilitate understanding the econometric analysis in the
subsequent core chapters.
2.1 Country context
2.1.1 Geographic and macroeconomic background
Our study of income inequalities and well-being in rural Pakistan obviously
needs to take the country’s geographic and demographic features into ac-
count.1 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is located in southern Asia and
borders the Arabian Sea, India in the east, Iran and Afghanistan in the west
and China to the north. According to the most recent oﬃcial data provided
by the Population Census Organization, Pakistan has a land area of 796,096
km2 and a population of approximately 132 million (Government of Pak-
istan, Statistics Division, 1998). Excluding the national capital Islamabad,
there are in total 105 districts within the four provinces of Baluchistan, the
North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), Sind and Punjab. Table 2.1
1The following country context and anthropologic background draws upon Mailk
(2005).
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gives an overview of population and area ﬁgures in Pakistan.2 We observe
that Punjab is the major province in Pakistan with an overall population
of more than 50%, followed by Sind and NWFP accordingly. Baluchistan,
on the other hand, covers the largest area of Pakistan but has the lowest
population density.
Province Area Population Population Population Population density
(km2) total (%) rural (per km2)
Punjab 206,251 74,426,525 57.6 50,854,022 361
Sind 140,914 30,439,893 23.6 15,585,225 216
NWFP 47,521 17,743,645 13.8 14,744,969 238
Baluchistan 374,190 6,565,885 5.1 4,996,638 19
Pakistan 768,876 129,175,948 100.0 86,180,855 168
Table 2.1: Area and population of Pakistan.
Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division (1998).
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix report several key development in-
dicators for Pakistan and its neighbours over the course of previous three
years prior to our survey in 2008. Both Tables reveal stability in terms of
the evolution of the macroeconomy in Pakistan as well as its relative posi-
tion compared to neighbouring countries. We see that at the time of the
survey, the Pakistani economy was on a relatively stable path. Unemploy-
ment, inﬂation and GPD per capita were hardly ﬂuctuating. In comparison
to India and Bangladesh, poverty in Pakistan was about three times lower.
The degree of income inequality was of comparable magnitude. Thus, data
obtained at time of the survey reﬂects a situation in the absence of major
macroeconomic shocks. It can be conjectured, however, that global eco-
nomic shocks after the survey may have also changed the picture even on a
micro level.
2.1.2 Cultural and socio-economic background
2.1.2.1 Religion
Pakistan was formed as an Islamic nation and Islam continues to be the
religion of approximately 95 percent of the population. The vast majority
of the households lead a life in line with their religious and cultural values.
There are also small groups of Buddhists, Christians, Parsis, and Hindus.
2We exclude the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA).Chapter 2. Country context and research design 20
2.1.2.2 Family setup
In a typical Pakistani family setup, the head of the household is usually con-
sidered to be the father who is the major decision-maker for the household
in various economic and non-economic aspects. Furthermore, the repre-
sentative Pakistani family is set up in a joint way, in which all the family
members pool their resources for the mutual economic support of the entity
as a whole. Therefore, in general, Pakistani households have a preference
for a family structure with many children. This ensures a suﬃcient amount
of working and earning hands for their families. Indeed, we may say that
in developing countries like Pakistan children are used as insurance mecha-
nism. According to (CIA, 2008), the average family size in Pakistan is 4-5
children per household and it is the 6th most populous country in the world.
A representative family in Pakistan is characterised by the following
gender roles and statuses. The majority of Pakistani women are homemak-
ers, and men are generally referred to as the breadwinners. The largest
percentage of working women in Pakistan are nurses or teachers. There are
growing numbers of violent crimes against or involving women and the gov-
ernment has introduced the concept of women police stations, which have
been opened in major cities like Rawalpindi in Punjab, Karachi in Sind and
Abbottabad in NWFP.
2.1.2.3 Social stratiﬁcation
There is no caste system in Pakistan, unlike for instance India. There
are high-income, middle-income and a large number of low-income persons
throughout the country. Locale makes an important diﬀerence in the quality
of life; a low-income person in an urban area typically is confronted with
higher levels of inequalities and thus faces more social problems compared
to rural, tribal or mountainous areas.
2.1.2.4 Typical lifestyle in a Pakistani village
Pakistan is an agricultural country where the two thirds of the population
living in rural areas depend mostly on the agriculture sector. Village life in
Pakistan depicts a true picture of our culture. Villagers are very traditional
people who are hard workers. They wake up early in the morning with the
Fajar prayers and start working in the ﬁelds. They work all day long in
the ﬁeld under the sun without caring about the harsh weather. This is the
only way for them to earn their livelihood.Chapter 2. Country context and research design 21
Most villages in Pakistan are situated away from the noise of the city
life. They are peaceful and silent places. A typical Pakistani village consists
of unpaved paths and streets. Its houses are made of mud. However, with
lot of young members from rural families which moved to the urban sector
(as part of internal migration) and to the Gulf (external migration) as part
of the Dubai Chalo notion have beneﬁted from the petro dollars. As a result,
the villagers now build their houses from bricks and concrete though most
of the village people have simple habits and limited needs.
There are green trees, vast meadows and ﬂowery bushes in every village.
In the summer they rest under shady trees, and take bath in cool water.
Women also help their men in their work along with their household. They
moreover take care of their domestic animals such as cows, goats, hens etc.
Many small villages are still void of the facilities like safe drinking water
and electricity, even hospitals and schools are typically at long distances,
such that life in the village entails more struggle than the relatively modern
lifestyles in the cities.
2.1.2.5 Healthcare
At a seminar at Aga Khan Medical University in 1998, medical experts
reported that perinatal mortality rates in Pakistan were alarmingly high
with an estimated 54 deaths per thousand births. A 1990-1994 national
health survey3 reported that 89 children per thousand under age ﬁve died
in Pakistan from pneumonia, diarrhea, vaccine prevention diseases, or a
combination of them, with most of these deaths occurring in the ﬁrst week
after birth.
A number of programs have been undertaken to attack polio; the World
Health Organisation and Japan, amongst others, have participated. At the
end of the twentieth century, there were one hundred thousand deaths from
and at least twenty thousand new cases of paralytic polio each year.
A survey by the Federal Bureau of Statistics in Pakistan indicated that
about 50 percent of the basic health units were without doctors and that
about 70 percent of government health facilities are without any female
staﬀ. Only about 56 percent of the country’s people have safe drinking
water and just 24 percent have good sanitation.
Programs are underway to expand basic health services for women,
trying to develop a women-friendly district health system, and both to
3More recent survey data of this scope unfortunately was not available.Chapter 2. Country context and research design 22
strengthen and to improve human resource capacity to sustain women’s
health development.
2.1.2.6 Land Tenure and Property
An estimated 54.69 million acres (22.14 million hectares) of land are used
for agriculture. The land is usually held by the private sector. The major
crops are cotton, wheat, rice and sugarcane. A large amount of land in
Pakistan has archaeological sites such as Moenjo Daro, Harappa, Taxila,
Kot Dijji and Mehr Garh.
2.1.3 Commercial activities and taxation
2.1.3.1 Trade and labour
A large percentage of the commercial activities include the sale of handicraft
items such as the carpets for which Pakistan is well known. Major industries
of Pakistan are textiles, cement, fertilizer, steel, sugar, electric goods and
shipbuilding. Pakistan’s major exports include cotton, textile goods, rice,
leather items, carpets, sports goods, fruit and handicrafts. Major imports
are industrial equipment, vehicles, iron ore, petroleum and edible oil. Main
trade partners include the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. With regards to the
division of labour, 48 percent of workers are in the service sector, 27 percent
are in industry, and 25 percent are in agriculture.
2.1.3.2 Types of taxes in Pakistan
Federal taxes in Pakistan like most of the taxation systems in the world are
classiﬁed into two broad categories, i.e. direct and indirect taxes.4 Direct
taxes primarily comprise income tax along with a supplementary role for
wealth tax. For the purpose of the charge of tax and the computation of
total income, all income is classiﬁed under the following headings: Salaries,
interest on securities, income from property, income from business or pro-
fessions, capital gains and income from other sources. Indirect taxes relate
to custom duties and general sales tax. A broad description regarding the
nature of the administration of these taxes is explained in the following:
Personal tax applies to all individuals, unregistered ﬁrms, associations
of persons, etc., that are liable to tax, at the rates ranging from 10 to 35
4The subsequent discussion of Pakistan’s tax system is based upon Kausar (2001).Chapter 2. Country context and research design 23
per cent. Tax on companies applies to all public companies (other than
banking companies) incorporated in Pakistan that are assessed for tax at
a corporate rate of 39%. However, the eﬀective rate is likely to diﬀer on
account of allowances and exemptions related to industry, location, exports,
etc.
Unilateral Relief: A person resident in Pakistan is entitled to a relief in
tax on any income earned abroad, if such income has already been subjected
to tax outside Pakistan. Proportionate relief is allowed on such income at
an average rate of tax in Pakistan or abroad, whichever is lower. The Gov-
ernment of Pakistan has so far signed agreements to avoid double taxation
with several countries including almost all of the developed countries of the
world. These agreements lay down the ceilings on tax rates applicable to
diﬀerent types of income arising in Pakistan. They also lay down some basic
principles of taxation which cannot be modiﬁed unilaterally.
Goods imported and exported from Pakistan are liable to rates of cus-
toms duties as prescribed in the Pakistan Customs Tariﬀ. Customs duties
in the form of import duties and export duties constitute about 37% of
the total tax receipts. The rate structure of customs duty is determined
by a large number of socio-economic factors. However, the general scheme
envisages higher rates on luxury items as well as on less essential goods.
The import tariﬀ has been given an industrial bias by keeping the duties
on industrial plants and machinery and raw material lower than those on
consumer goods.
Central Excise duties are leviable on a limited number of goods produced
or manufactured and services provided or rendered in Pakistan. On most of
the items Central Excise duty is charged on the basis of value or the retail
price. Some items are, however, chargeable to duty on the basis of weight or
quantity. Classiﬁcation of goods is done in accordance with the Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding system which is being used all over the
world. All exports are exempted from Central Excise Duty.
Sales Tax is levied at various stages of economic activity at the rate of 15
per cent on all goods imported into Pakistan, payable by the importers as
well as all supplies made in Pakistan by a registered person in the course of
furtherance of any business carried on by him. There is an in-built system
of input tax adjustment and a registered person can make adjustment of
tax paid at earlier stages against the tax payable by him on his supplies.
Thus, the tax paid at any stage does not exceed 15% of the total sales price
of the supplies.Chapter 2. Country context and research design 24
2.1.3.3 Tax evasion in Pakistan
For income tax purposes, the population of the country may be categorised
as: (1) cases with no incomes or whose incomes are below the income tax
threshold, (2) cases which fall within the taxable bracket but are exempt
from payment of income tax under Schedule II of ITO, 1979, (3) cases which
fall within the taxable bracket but have successfully avoided entering the tax
net, (4) cases which are within the tax net but under-report their incomes,
(5) cases which are within the tax net and correctly report their incomes but
where there is the possibility of diﬀerences with the tax department on the
extent of their taxable income. A measure of the extent of tax evasion is pro-
vided by the value of assets declared under the current tax amnesty scheme.
Under this scheme, assets of PKR 120 billion were declared, which could
not be explained through known income sources. Property and commercial
surveys, if conducted frequently can identify individuals and businesses that
are outside the tax net and can also limit the scope of tax evasion. Thus,
further eﬀorts might be needed to improve the existing tax administrative
structure that can put tax policies into practice and simplify the process.
2.1.3.4 Social transfers
With regards to tax credits, or social transfers, the social security legislation
in Pakistan includes:
• The Workmen’s compensation Act,1923
• The Sindh Maternity Beneﬁt Act, 1929
• The Punjab Maternity beneﬁt Act, 1943
• The West Pakistan Maternity Beneﬁt Ordinance, 1958
• The Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965
• The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment Ordi-
nance, 1968
• Workers Shares in Companies proﬁts, 1968
• Workers Welfare Fund, 1969
• Workers Children Education Scheme, 1972
• The Employees Old-Age Beneﬁts Act, (EOBI) 1976Chapter 2. Country context and research design 25
The employees old-age beneﬁts scheme includes old age pension, survivor
pension and old age grants. Apart from that, there are also private pension
funds and social welfare schemes e.g. zakat or similar private social charity
schemes.
2.2 Research design
2.2.1 Data and sampling procedure
The data have been collected by means of a survey. Households living in
rural Pakistan were interviewed in the year 2008. Our dataset comprises
all four provinces of Pakistan. To ensure representativeness, we decided to
sample households in 10 districts (i.e. roughly one tenth of the total number
of districts) across the country (stratiﬁed sampling). Based on the ﬁgures
given in Table 2.1, we could come up with the following allocation, tak-
ing population proportions into account: four districts from Punjab, three
from Sind, two from NWFP and the remaining district could be assigned to
Baluchistan. The selected districts in Punjab are Attock, Layyah, Rahim-
yarkhan and Sahiwal; Badin, Mirpurkhas and Thatta in Sind; Dir and
Malakand in NWFP and Kalat from Baluchistan. The selected districts
were chosen for various reasons. First, these districts are geographically in
a range that oﬀered easy access without raising security concerns for the
interviewers compared to further remote areas. Second, these districts pro-
vide a representative socio-economic picture of rural Pakistan. Due to the
geographic scope of the districts, great care has been taken, where necessary,
in sampling households from villages which are reasonably far away from
major cities such as Lahore in Punjab, Karachi in Sind, Peshawar in NWFP
and Quetta in Baluchistan. Two villages were chosen from each district.5
Within these predeﬁned strata, households have been selected randomly.
Our target was to achieve a total of 30 responses per village, that is 60
households per district, yielding an overall sample size of N = 600.
Summing up, we have sampled a total of 240 households from Punjab,
180 households from Sind, 120 households from NWFP and 60 households
from Baluchistan. However, to ensure a good representation for rural Pak-
istan, we assign weights to each household with respect to the district it
belongs to as shown below in Table 2.2. Our results from the econometric
analysis that follows are based on that weighting scheme.
5Table A.3 contains a list of the selected villages.C
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Census 1998 Rural Survey 2008
District No. of Total Rural Sample pweights pweights-normalized
households Population Population Population [(RP)0
j/(SP)j] [(pw)j/Σ(pw)j]
(j) (hh)0
j (TP)0
j (RP)0
j (SP)j (pw)j (pw)∗j
Attock 206678 1274935 1003843 266 3773.8459 0.10
Layyah 152050 1120951 976748 289 3379.7509 0.09
RahimyarKhan 3141053 17,743,645 2524471 246 10262.0772 0.27
Sahiwal n.a 1843194 1541204 269 5729.3829 0.15
Badin 211354 1136044 949556 267 3556.3895 0.09
Mirpurkhas 148470 905935 605760 251 2413.3865 0.06
Thatta 220068 1113194 988455 259 3816.4286 0.10
Lower Dir 76531 717649 673314 241 2793.8340 0.07
Malakand 49330 452291 409112 234 1748.3419 0.05
Kalat 34410 237834 204040 215 949.0233 0.02
Total - 11943080 9876503 2537 38422.4606 1.00
Table 2.2: Weighting scheme (using pweights) of sample households. The relevant weights are reported in the last column.Chapter 2. Country context and research design 27
Given Pakistan’s cultural and social background, it goes without saying
that obtaining data from such a conservative society was a rather diﬃcult
and challenging task. Without the active support of my friends and family
who helped me in data collection, conducting the survey would not have
been possible.
In each of the selected villages we were guided by the locals to visit
diﬀerent households as we were quite new to some of the places and the
villages. In addition, it was also very important for us to have some lo-
cals around during the interview process for two reasons: ﬁrst, to gain the
respondents’ support and trust, and second, to help us in translating the
questionnaire to the interviewees in their local languages.
The questions were asked from the head of the household in order to
collect ﬁrst-hand data on key variables such as the household’s income and
the sources of income, where all income ﬁgures have been measured in
Pakistani Rupees (PKR).6 Additional household characteristics have also
been obtained such as gender, age, education, marital status, employment
status, total family size (children and adults) as well as insights into the
household’s well-being including information on overall satisfaction with
life and health in terms of relative and absolute poverty measures (see Ap-
pendix B for the sample questionnaire). As mentioned before, the questions
were asked directly from the head (or the father) of a household, however,
in some cases when the head was away from home or in the case of a
widow/separated/divorced the questions were asked from the wife/mother
inside her house. After each interview, sweets were given to the household
as a thank-you gesture.
We have come across various constraints throughout the process of data
collection. For example, interviewees were shy and felt insecure about re-
vealing their personal information, especially regarding their family income
and wealth position for tax evasion reasons. At times, the head of the in-
terviewed household found it diﬃcult to disclose any sort of information
about their children and especially their daughters because of cultural and
religious reasons. About 10% of the households refused to be surveyed.
Keeping these constraints in mind, we have deliberately sought to keep the
interviews brief as well as to stick to the necessary research requirements as
closely as possible.
Furthermore, the cross-sectional nature of our data lends itself quite well
to a close, detailed analysis of inequalities and well-being over a short time
6Note that all results that follow refer to monthly income ﬁgures.Chapter 2. Country context and research design 28
period. By the study’s very nature, however, our approach is not suitable for
tackling matters on a broader national scale that are for instance associated
with urban life. Also, given the scope of the study design, considering a
dynamic perspective is hardly feasible. In the remainder, all results are
based on our unique dataset, henceforth referred to as Survey 2008.Chapter 3
Income inequality in rural
Pakistan – sources and
decompositions
Chapter Summary
This Chapter analyses income inequalities in rural Pakistan. Us-
ing micro data (Survey 2008) allows us to decompose income inequal-
ity according to its diﬀerent sources. We calculate Gini coeﬃcients
and Theil indices both within and across provinces and districts. A
partial correlation analysis extends our descriptive investigation to
reveal the diﬀerent impacts of the various income sources on overall
income inequalities. The unique focus on rural areas and the more
disaggregated (district level) approach permits more nuanced policy
implications. We ﬁnd that inequality between districts is higher than
within districts. Non-farm and transfer income have the strongest
impact on income inequality across districts both in economic and
econometric terms. While the former source of income is inequality
increasing, transfer income tends to reduce inequalities. Our analysis
suggests important policy implications. It emphasises in particular
the need for factor mobility to facilitate transfer income.
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3.1 Introduction
All over the developing world policymakers are interested in devising new
strategies for rebalancing skewed income distributions and reducing poverty.
The choice of such strategies crucially hinges on an improved understanding
of the sources of income inequality. Why do certain types of incomes go to
particular groups of people? And what roles do variables such as land-
ownership, migration and education play in improving income distribution
and in lifting people out of poverty?
Using primary household survey data (see Chapter 2 for details), we
identify diﬀerent types of income to disentangle each sources’ impact on
overall income inequality in Pakistan’s four provinces. Given that almost
two thirds of Pakistan’s population live in rural areas we conﬁne ourselves to
those households (Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, 1998). Our
dataset is wide-ranging, providing rather detailed information on diﬀerent
districts across the country. Other authors such as Adams and Alderman
(1992) and Glewwe (1986) use panel data which covers up to three years,
but are less detailed on the household level. We resort to a cross-sectional,
yet well-designed, framework.
In comparison to similar studies conducted for countries in the region,
our paper diﬀers in two aspects. Regarding methodology, we decompose
overall income inequality both by region and income sources. Furthermore,
we exploit our rather detailed dataset fully, considering additional sources
of income such as rental and livestock income. Our cross-sectional analysis
suggests that while livestock income does not aﬀect overall income inequal-
ity in rural Pakistan whatsoever, other types of income such as transfer,
agricultural, nonfarm and rental contribute equally. A similar study has
been conducted by Glewwe (1986) who ﬁnds that non-labour income (de-
ﬁned as the income derived from crop production by the landowners) is
largely responsible for overall income inequality in rural areas.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 brieﬂy discusses the
related literature. In Section 3.3, we ﬁrst identify the diﬀerent income
sources and then decompose them accordingly. We decompose inequality
by income sources in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides a decomposition
of inequality by regions. We conduct a correlation analysis between the
diﬀerent income sources in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes and outlines
potential policy implications.Chapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 31
3.2 Related literature
Adams (1994) uses three year panel data to analyse the impact of non-farm
income on income inequality in rural Pakistan. He describes the importance
of rural non-farm income for the poor by decomposing total rural income
into the following ﬁve sources: non-farm, agricultural, livestock, rental and
transfer income. The decomposition shows that non-farm income represents
an inequality-decreasing source of income. The study then decomposes
the sources of non-farm income. This analysis reveals that while non-farm
unskilled labour income has an equalising eﬀect on the income distribution,
non-farm government income has a disequalising eﬀect.
Ahmad (2000) uses micro data based on the Household Integrated Eco-
nomic Survey (HIES) from 1992-93 to calculate the distribution of income
in rural and urban areas of Pakistan. He ﬁnds that Gini coeﬃcients show a
more favourable distribution in rural areas compared to urban areas. The
analysis moreover suggests that moving from household-level to individual
data leads to a further improvement in the distribution of income.
In a related study, using the same HIES from 1992-93, Ahmad (2002) ex-
amines income inequality among various occupations in Pakistan such as (i)
legislators/oﬃcials, (ii) teaching/health and other professionals, (iii) skilled
construction, manufacturing, craft and related trades workers, and (iv) un-
skilled agricultural, ﬁshing and related workers. Ahmad (2002) ﬁnds that
within the given occupational groups in the four provinces of Pakistan, the
highest level of inequality is observed among skilled workers (Gini coeﬃcient
of 0.299), followed by inequalities amongst the group of legislators/oﬃcials
(Gini coeﬃcient of 0.273). In contrast to that, the Gini coeﬃcient among
unskilled workers is 0.180 and is the lowest within the professional class
(Gini coeﬃcient of only 0.136). This may have been due to the fact that
many of them were government employees and the wage structure was more
equal in the government sector.
Anwar (2005) provides a series of Gini coeﬃcients based on a consistent
methodology using grouped household income data over 17 HIES conducted
by the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) during 1963 to 2002.1
The calculated Gini coeﬃcients are generally higher in the urban than in the
rural areas. Anwar (2005) conjectures that this was because of the urban
labour force being more diversiﬁed in terms of skills and education and
1The household survey years are 1963-64, 1966-67, 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-
72, 1979, 1984-85, 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1990-91, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1996-97, 1998-99
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therefore the wage incomes being more unevenly distributed than in rural
areas. Moreover, income from self-employment was more deviated in urban
areas than in rural areas as urban self-employment ranged from wealthy
businessmen to poor workers, whereas the bulk of the rural self-employed
were a rather homogeneous group being mostly employed in informal sector
enterprises.
Nugent and Walther (1982) use panel data in ungrouped (i.e. disaggre-
gated) form to examine the sources of income inequality in India. The study
is based on only three sources (agricultural, nonagricultural and transfer).
The paper examines the dramatic decline in income inequality observed in
rural India between 1968-69 and 1970-71. The authors describe the eﬀects
of changes in weather, technology and other factors on the distribution of in-
comes, which indirectly inﬂuences the labour market. Nugent and Walther
(1982) ﬁnd that periods of bad weather crowd out workers from the low-
income group and increase inequality. Good weather, on the other hand,
opens up more job opportunities for the workers from the low-income group
and hence reduces imbalances in the income distribution.
Glewwe (1986)’s decomposition analysis is based on only two income
sources (labour and non-labour) in Sri Lanka. It is assumed that all proﬁts
and non-monetary income are non-labor income. Speciﬁcally, non-monetary
income is mainly agricultural produce consumed in the household. Addi-
tionally, incomes of those who are self-employed are counted as proﬁts. The
results suggest that labor income inequality accounts for slightly more than
half of overall inequality in urban and estate sectors but not in the rural
sector, where total inequality attributes largely to non-labor income and
income from the sale of agricultural products (accounted for as proﬁts).
The conclusions drawn relate non-labor income inequality to an unequal
distribution of land and capital in rural areas. Labor income inequality is
explained by education and high wages that are paid to government em-
ployees in urban and estate sectors.
Adams and Alderman (1992) use a decomposition analysis to estimate
sources of agricultural income inequality in rural Pakistan. They ﬁnd that
imbalances in land ownership are not the main drivers behind inequality
in agricultural income. Instead, income from returns to labor and crop
proﬁts contribute the most. According to their analysis, policy makers
concerned about inequality in rural Pakistan should pay attention to ﬁnd
ways to reduce the disparities between abilities, for instance by teaching
agriculturalists managerial and technical skills.
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most important causes of poverty and inequality in rural Pakistan as land is
the principal asset in an agrarian economy. Numbers of landless households
are substantially high in Pakistan. About 67% of households do not own
any land. About 18% of the households own less than 5 acres of land
and about 10% of the households own 5 to 12.5 acres of land, which merely
provides a subsistence level of living. A very small proportion of households
holds large farms. Strikingly, barely 1% of the households owns more than
35 acres of land suggesting a highly skewed landownership pattern (Anwar
et al., 2004).
Overall, the various studies appear to highlight the importance of a
meaningful land reform in order to tackle the poverty and inequality issues
in rural Pakistan. Policies that stress labour income and advocate education
and training as the main means for addressing inequality show only half of
the picture. After all, how is inequality supposed to be improved through
education, if access to quality education is dependent on asset and ownership
inequality? Can a child coming from a landless household access a top school
whose graduates enjoy high income and other privileges? In fact, this kind
of purely education-focused policy may even trigger inequality in the ﬁrst
place. Therefore, any resulting policy implications appear only meaningful
when related to land reforms. The experience of Taiwan and South Korea
clearly shows that land reforms even at the early stage of development
contribute to shared economic growth which does not add to inequality.
3.3 Income sources
3.3.1 Overall income shares
As laid out in the questionnaire (see Appendix B), individual households’
total income may stem from up to ﬁve sources, yi:
• Transfer income (yt) includes internal and international remittances,
government pensions and zakat (payments to the poor). Transfer in-
come includes income earned from migration, both within and out-
side of Pakistan. Income earned from the ﬁrst kind of migration is
treated as internal remittances; income from the latter as external
remittances.
• Agricultural income (ya) includes net income (cash as well as in
kind) from all crop production plus wage earnings from agricultural
labour.Chapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 34
• Nonfarm income (ynf) includes wage earnings from nonfarm labour
including self employment, government and private-sector employ-
ment.
• Rental income (yr) includes rents received from ownership of assets
including land, machinery (tractors, threshers), buildings, and water.
• Livestock income (yl) includes net returns from traded livestock
(cattle, poultry) plus imputed values of home-consumed livestock.
The rather detailed data set allows for this diﬀerentiation between the var-
ious income types. Moreover, we can identify the impact of each of the
diﬀerent sources of income on income inequality at diﬀerent levels of aggre-
gation.
On a purely descriptive level, we can calculate each income source’s share
in total monthly household income data, denoted by Si. According to Table
3.1, transfer income is the most important source of income, accounting
for nearly one third of mean monthly household income. This seems to
suggest that much of transfer income may come from migration to urban
areas. Migration hence seems to have an important eﬀect. In addition,
the households may also tend to rely on help both from the government
but especially from within their own families, neighbours and other peers.
Since we are exclusively looking at rural backgrounds, agricultural income
obviously is the major source of labour income. Nonfarm, livestock and
rental income are of roughly equally (low) importance.
yi Si
ynf 18%
ya 23%
yt 30%
yl 15%
yr 14%
Table 3.1: Monthly income shares. N = 600 households.
Source: Survey 2008.
3.3.2 Distribution of sample households by income quin-
tiles
The distribution of the sample households by income quintiles is shown
in Table 3.2. Two points are worthwhile noticing: First, the shares ofChapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 35
transfer, agricultural and livestock income are relatively higher in lower
income quintiles as compared to the higher income quintiles and may be
considered as major sources of income for the households belonging to lower
income quintiles. In contrast to that, the shares of rental and nonfarm
income tend to be higher in higher income quintiles. Second, the share of
livestock income is lowest in the monthly income of the households reported
in the top income quintile, whereas the share of rental income is lowest in
the bottom quintile. Overall, we may say that the distribution is actually
very similar for the bottom 4 quintiles and the diﬀerences really come with
the richest quintile.
Sample Income Groups Snf St Sa Sr Sl
Distribution (%) (in PKR)
Bottom quintile 1596-2526 16.4 31.9 23.9 9.0 18.8
2nd quintile 2550-3116 16.4 30.6 23.2 10.2 19.6
3rd quintile 3136-3359 13.2 33.1 23.6 10.3 19.8
4rth quintile 3365-4298 16.6 30.8 22.3 13.5 16.8
Top quintile 4371-6938 22.8 27.1 21.7 21.2 7.2
Table 3.2: Distribution of sample households by income quintiles.
Source: Survey 2008.
Note: All income shares are expressed in percentages.
3.3.3 Income shares by district
Table 3.3 breaks down total monthly household income y into the diﬀerent
shares S
j
i by the j districts surveyed. Compared with Table 3.1 which
provides a more aggregate perspective, we see that the same ranking of
shares applies on the district level as well.
According to Table 3.3, the share of transfer income is the highest in all
the districts. Agricultural income and nonfarm income are other signiﬁcant
sources of income for Pakistan’s rural population. Rental and livestock
income contribute the least.Chapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 36
District St Sa Snf Sr Sl
Attock 26.94 22.00 26.11 18.85 6.10
Sahiwal 27.99 22.08 23.31 11.56 15.06
Layyah 28.50 22.65 20.33 10.43 18.09
Rahimyarkhan 29.56 23.30 18.33 10.49 18.32
Thatta 33.69 25.22 14.23 07.46 19.40
Badin 32.76 22.89 16.82 10.48 17.05
MirpurKhas 27.89 21.14 17.02 25.94 08.01
Malakand 29.38 21.84 12.66 16.10 20.02
Dir 34.01 24.05 12.06 08.84 21.04
Kalat 33.77 24.08 11.99 09.04 21.12
Table 3.3: Share of diﬀerent income sources; by district.
Source: Survey 2008.
Note: All income shares are expressed in percentages.
3.4 Inequality decomposition by income sources
3.4.1 Decomposing overall income inequality
While calculating the shares of the diﬀerent income types provides insights
in the allocation of income, it does not make any statement about distribu-
tional aspects. The most common measure of income inequality is arguably
the Gini coeﬃcient G, ranging from 0 to 1, where a higher number indi-
cates more inequality. In the extreme case of G = 1, the entire income goes
to a single economic unit. The Gini coeﬃcient allows for quick and easy
comparison across countries, or in our case, provinces and districts. Accord-
ing to the World Bank (2005), Pakistan’s overall Gini coeﬃcient amounts
to 0.33. More recent data suggests a downward trend.2 In comparison to
Pakistan’s geographic neighbours Bangladesh and India, we ﬁnd that the
entire subcontinent is characterised by a similar degree of income inequality
(World Bank, 2005).3 Yet, numbers in developed economies such as the UK
(G = 0.36) and the US (G = 0.41) are higher and, in contrast to Pakistan,
seem to stagnate.4
2In its latest Human Development Report, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) provides a Gini coeﬃcient of G = 0.31 for Pakistan (UNDP, 2007).
3Table A.2 in Appendix, gives an overview of poverty and income inequality across
the neighbouring countries.
4The more recent study by UNDP (2007) reports identical coeﬃcients for relevant
benchmark countries such as the UK and the US. Figures for Bangladesh (G = 0.33)
and India (G = 0.37), in comparison to Pakistan, seem to be on the rise which may beChapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 37
Based on our sample data, we obtain the following Gini coeﬃcient for
rural Pakistan (rPk), denoted by GrPk:
GrPk =
5 X
i=1
wiRiGi = 0.189. (3.1)
Comparing GrPk with Pakistan’s overall Gini coeﬃcient, GPk= 0.306 (CIA,
2008); we may say that rural inequality is lower than overall inequality,
which is expected as we don’t have the inequality coming from rural-urban
diﬀerences. But cities (or the urban areas) themselves may have low in-
equality. Ahmad (2000) ﬁnds that income inequality in rural areas tends
to be lower compared with urban areas. Furthermore, it appears that there
is a positive relationship between the level of skilled labour and income
inequality (Ahmad, 2002). The more equitable distribution of income on
the countryside may hence be explained by the lower level of skilled labour
there.
We need to decompose the Gini coeﬃcient G to measure how much each
particular income source contributes to overall income inequality in rural
Pakistan (and also at the district and provincial level, accordingly). For
that matter we break-down each household’s total monthly income in the
same n sources as before:
y =
n=5 X
i=1
yi,
where y is the total monthly household income and yi represents the income
type i.
Decomposing the Gini coeﬃcient rests on three elements: First, the
weight of income source i, wi, deﬁned as
wi =
µi
µ
,
where µi represents the mean monthly income of source i and µ is the
mean of total monthly household income. Second, the correlation ratio
between income source and total income Ri deﬁned by the following ratio
of covariances
Ri =
cov(yi,r)
cov(yi,ri)
,
where r is the ranking of total income such that higher income receives a
higher rank and ri expresses the corresponding ranking of income sources.
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Both r and ri follow a dense ranking from 1, 2, and so on.5 The third part
is the Gini coeﬃcient associated with yi given by
Gi =
2
µi
cov(yi,ri).
The relative concentration coeﬃcient is given by
gi = Ri
Gi
GrPk
.
This decomposition procedure further allows us to determine the indi-
vidual contribution of each income source to overall income inequality. The
contribution of income source i to overall income inequality in rural areas,
ci, is easily calculated by
ci = wiRi
Gi
GrPk
= wigi, (3.2)
where obviously all individual shares sum up to 1.
yi wi Ri Gi ci
ya 0.23 0.99 0.17 0.21
yl 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.02
ynf 0.18 0.88 0.31 0.26
yr 0.14 0.97 0.37 0.27
yt 0.30 0.95 0.17 0.26
Table 3.4: Contribution to overall income inequality by income source.
Source: Survey 2008.
Table 3.4 shows that agricultural, nonfarm, rental and transfer income
each account for about one quarter of total income inequality. Livestock
income accounts for hardly any inequality at all. Looking at the correlation
ratios (Ri) for agricultural, rental and transfer income, we can conclude
that all these sources have a strong positive relationship with the total
income rank, followed by nonfarm income. In contrast, the correlation ratio
between livestock income and total income is small and positive. This is
the result of a low covariance between livestock income and corresponding
total income rank.
5In dense rankings, items that compare equally receive the same ranking number, and
the next item(s) receive the immediately following ranking number. Equivalently, each
item’s ranking number is 1 plus the number of items ranked above it that are distinct
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According to the individual Gini coeﬃcients Gi, rental and nonfarm in-
comes are the most unequally distributed income sources. Agricultural and
transfer income are relatively equally distributed. Inequality in livestock
income is relatively small. A similar result is obtained by Ahmad (2002).
3.4.2 Decomposition of overall income inequality by province
Disaggregating the data further, we calculate in the following the Gini co-
eﬃcients for the k = 4 provinces using the procedure outlined above. We
see that the level of income inequality in Sind represents closest the overall
situation in rural Pakistan. Yet, for the other provinces there is a consid-
erable degree of dispersion. While the plain Gini index suggest hardly any
income inequality in the relatively poor provinces of NWFP and Baluchis-
tan, Punjab’s coeﬃcient is quite high considering that we only look at the
rural sector.
Given our results in Table 3.5, we observe that in Punjab and Sind;
nonfarm, agricultural, transfer and rental each contribute for about one
fourth of overall income inequality. Livestock income hardly contribute to
the overall income inequality, in both provinces. This suggests an important
policy conclusion; policy makers who are concerned with income inequality
in Punjab and Sind provinces, would be well-advised to pay more attention
to livestock- As it has the smallest share of total income and hardly con-
tribute to overall income inequality in the two provinces. However in NWFP
and Baluchistan the situation is quite opposite. For instance, in NWFP the
rental income has the largest share (that is around 50%) in overall income
inequality; followed by livestock, agricultural and nonfarm income. On the
other hand, the transfer income represents an inequality decreasing source
of income. The inequality in rental, livestock and agricultural income may
be attributed to unequal landownership in NWFP. On the other hand, in
Baluchistan rental income makes the smallest contribution to the overall
income inequality- While livestock and transfer income make the largest
share (that is around 40% each) and nonfarm income accounts for 20% of
the overall income inequality of the province. Surprisingly, agricultural in-
come appears as inequality decreasing source of income. Which may suggest
that bringing more land under cultivation may improve the distribution of
income in Baluchistan.Chapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 40
Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan
Gini index 0.24 0.18 0.04 0.02
Income source share (wi)
Nonfarm 0.232 0.164 0.123 0.120
Agricultural 0.223 0.226 0.229 0.241
Transfer 0.279 0.308 0.316 0.338
Livestock 0.123 0.136 0.205 0.211
Rental 0.143 0.166 0.127 0.090
Concentration index (gi)
Nonfarm 0.304 0.199 0.043 0.029
Agricultural 0.230 0.136 0.025 -0.005
Transfer 0.217 0.145 -0.002 0.022
Livestock 0.016 0.011 0.046 0.035
Rental 0.368 0.394 0.182 0.011
Relative contribution (ci)
Nonfarm 0.298 0.187 0.124 0.190
Agricultural 0.217 0.175 0.134 -0.070
Transfer 0.255 0.255 -0.017 0.409
Livestock 0.008 0.009 0.221 0.414
Rental 0.222 0.374 0.538 0.056
Table 3.5: Inter-provincial rural household income disparities.
Source: Survey 2008.
3.4.3 Decomposition of overall income inequality by dis-
trict
We cannot dismiss a priori the possibility of considerable disparities at dis-
trict/tehsil levels compared to a pure province perspective. Although ev-
idence for spatial diﬀerences at a disaggregated level is rather scanty, this
may be an issue for the data at hand. This impression is endorsed by Pasha
and Hasan (1982) who observe that statements about inter-provincial levels
of development tend to hide major intra-provincial disparities.6 We there-
fore calculate Gini coeﬃcients for each district to clarify the contribution
of each income source to overall income inequality within districts. This
also allows us to draw important conclusions about the provinces. Indeed,
according to our results in Table 3.5 income inequality in Punjab is much
higher as compared to NWFP, but still both provinces experience similar
6The mean monthly income ﬂuctuates quite strongly across the 10 districts (standard
deviation of 1238.14) which could conceivably aﬀect any decomposition eﬀort that is
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levels of inequality in some of their districts such as Attock and Layyah
in Punjab and Malakand in NWFP. Although the aforementioned districts
share the same overall inequality, the income sources contribute diﬀerently
to overall inequality within each district (see Table 3.6).
According to Table 3.6, Sahiwal and Thatta have relatively higher in-
equality in terms of overall monthly household income. In Sahiwal, nonfarm
income is the most unequally distributed source of income and contributes
the most to overall income inequality in rural Pakistan. This may be due
to a rather low literacy rate (only 40%) of the population which is the main
reason of highest income inequality in the nonfarm sector. Rental income
contributes the least to overall income inequality. Similarly the table indi-
cates that in Thatta, agriculture is the most unequal source of income and
contributes to 38.4% to overall income inequality, which is highest among
the other income sources. According to our sample survey, 70% of the pop-
ulation in Thatta are small farmers (having land between one or two acres)
and their livelihood continues to revolve around farm activities like agricul-
ture and livestock. Some of these farmers are making best use of their land,
while others are still using old and primitive techniques for production (as
revealed by personal communication with the respondents), which may be
one of the main reasons for higher income inequality in the farm sector.
The ﬁeld study also provides a socio-economic proﬁle of each district.
According to the survey, the average monthly household income of Rahim-
yar Khan district is the lowest among all the districts analysed. Livestock
income is the most unequal source of income in Rahimyar Khan as well
as in Kalat district and contributes most strongly to an increasing overall
income inequality in both districts (Table 3.6).Attock Sahiwal Layyah Rahimyar- Badin Thatta Mirpur- Dir Mala- Kalat
Khan Khas (lower) Kand
Overall Gini coeﬃcient of
monthly household income (G) 0.049 0.081 0.048 0.053 0.016 0.075 0.033 0.024 0.043 0.020
Source income weight(wi)
Nonfarm 0.261 0.233 0.203 0.183 0.142 0.168 0.170 0.127 0.121 0.120
Agricultural 0.220 0.221 0.227 0.233 0.252 0.229 0.211 0.218 0.241 0.241
Transfer 0.269 0.279 0.285 0.296 0.337 0.328 0.279 0.294 0.340 0.338
Livestock 0.061 0.151 0.181 0.183 0.194 0.170 0.080 0.200 0.210 0.211
Rental 0.188 0.116 0.104 0.105 0.080 0.105 0.260 0.161 0.088 0.090
Relative concentration coeﬃcients
of income sources(gi)
Nonfarm 0.605 1.916 0.415 1.131 2.129 0.851 0.055 -1.623 1.246 1.595
Agricultural 1.262 1.222 1.246 0.773 -1.738 1.524 -0.051 1.586 1.040 -0.294
Transfer 0.987 0.704 0.979 0.727 3.807 0.655 1.982 1.604 -0.328 1.214
Livestock 0.349 0.423 0.660 1.546 0.530 1.266 1.999 1.371 1.553 1.964
Rental 1.469 0.179 2.242 1.113 -3.034 0.340 1.091 -0.254 2.517 0.633
Source income contribution to
overall income inequality(ci)
Nonfarm 0.158 0.447 0.084 0.207 0.358 0.121 0.009 -0.196 0.158 0.191
Agricultural 0.278 0.270 0.283 0.180 -0.398 0.384 -0.011 0.381 0.227 -0.071
Transfer 0.265 0.197 0.280 0.215 1.249 0.221 0.553 0.545 -0.096 0.410
Livestock 0.021 0.064 0.120 0.283 0.090 0.246 0.160 0.288 0.310 0.414
Rental 0.278 0.022 0.233 0.117 -0.319 0.026 0.284 -0.023 0.405 0.057
Table 3.6: Decomposition of overall income inequality by district using the Gini coeﬃcient.
The more unequally distributed the income source, the higher the coeﬃcient of concentration. The concentration coeﬃcient
shows how much a given income source "pushes" up the overall income inequality. The relative concentration coeﬃcient is
given by gi = Ri
Gi
GrPk.The "negative" sign indicates that the source income decreases as the total income increases and thus
"pushes" down the overall income inequality . The contribution of each income source (ci) to overall income inequality is
determined by wigi, where wi =
µi
µ and gi = Ri
Gi
GrPk.
Source: Survey 2008.
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Similarly Table 3.6 shows that in Attock and Layyah, agricultural in-
come has maximum contribution to overall income inequality due to the
uneven distribution of land in favour of the rich, while livestock income
contributes the least to income inequality in the two districts. Table 3.6
indicates that transfer income is the most unequally distributed income
source in Badin, Mirpurkhas and Dir and is mainly responsible for pushing
up overall income inequality. Furthermore inequality in transfer income is
the result of internal and external remittances (according to personal com-
munication with the respondents). Evidently, the uneven land distribution
in rural Pakistan forces the poor to seek the bulk of their livelihood by
migrating within Pakistan or even by emigrating away from the country.
The study reveals that 60% of the households in Malakand are landless
which may explain why rental income is the most unequally distributed
income source. Rental income contributes with 40.5% to overall income
inequality in the district which is the highest contribution as compared to
the other income sources (see Table 3.6).
3.5 Inequality decomposition by regions
3.5.1 Decomposition of income inequality within and be-
tween provinces
Although the Gini index provides a transparent and easy way of comparing
income inequality across regions, it is ﬂawed in that it is not perfectly de-
composable in some situations (Shorrocks, 1982). One should therefore be
careful in interpreting this index in empirical studies. Other inequality mea-
sures seem more suitable for inequality decompositions. Shorrocks (1980)
derives an entire class of measures which are additively decomposable under
relatively weak restrictions on the form of the index. The subclass of mean
independent measures turns out to be a single parameter family which in-
volves the square of the coeﬃcient of variation and two entropy formulae
proposed by Theil.
In the context of additive decomposability, the generalised entropy (GE)
class of inequality indices is a good alternative to the Gini index. Unlike
the Gini coeﬃcient, the members of this class are perfectly decomposable
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the Theil Index (I) as introduced in Equation 3.3:
I =
1
N
N X y
¯ y
ln
 
y
¯ y
!
= 0.055, (3.3)
where, as above, N is the sample size, y is the individual household’s
monthly income (summable over N) and ¯ y the corresponding mean. Given
the design of our survey, the sample is readily partitioned to diﬀerentiate
between inequality within (Iw) and between (Ib) regions where it obviously
holds that I = Ib + Iw.
Using this methodology we can ﬁrst decompose the Theil Index on a
more aggregate province level as follows:
I =
K=4 X
k=1
Nk
N
 
¯ yk
¯ y
!
ln
 
¯ yk
¯ y
!
| {z }
Between
+
K=4 X
k=1
 
Nk
N
¯ yk
¯ y
!
Ik
| {z }
Within
(3.4)
= 0.0016 + 0.0534 = 0.055.
The results of Equation 3.4 suggest that inequality on this level of aggrega-
tion is almost exclusively driven within rather than between the provinces.
3.5.2 Decomposition of income inequality within and be-
tween districts
We can decompose the Theil Index for the district level in a similar fash-
ion. Decomposing income inequality within and between districts helps to
further disentangle total inequality in the given sample.
On the more disaggregated level we have J = 10 districts. The Theil
Index decomposition hence takes the following form:
I =
J=10 X
j=1
Nj
N
 
¯ yj
¯ y
!
ln
 
¯ yj
¯ y
!
| {z }
Between
+
J=10 X
j=1
 
Nj
N
¯ yj
¯ y
!
Ij
| {z }
Within
(3.5)
= 0.0535 + 0.0013 = 0.055,
where Nj is the number of households in district j, ¯ yj is mean monthly
household income in district j and Ij is the resulting Theil Index in district
j.
Results are summarised in Table 3.7. We ﬁnd that between-district
inequality is greater than within-district inequality. This may seem at odds
with the results for the province level, where exactly the opposite eﬀectChapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 45
Ib Iw I
Overall – – 0.055
Provinces 0.002 0.053 0.055
Districts 0.054 0.001 0.055
Table 3.7: Regional comparison of Theil indices
occurs. Yet, as Table 3.7 illustrates, if the entire degree of inequality is
determined within the provinces on a more macro level, this necessarily
implies that the “whole action” occurs between the districts which are nested
within the provinces. Therefore, while overall measures are obviously the
same (up to some rounding margin) regardless of the level of aggregation,
it appears much more meaningful to look at the district level rather than
comparing between provinces as commonly done. We may also suggest that
on the whole, all the rural Pakistan gives the same picture irrespective of
which province is chosen as its sample representation.
To substantiate this point further, we can easily determine how much
total inequality is explained by between-district inequality by looking at the
following ratio Rb:
Rb =
Ib
I
(3.6)
=
0.0535
0.0550
= 0.97.
According to Equation 3.6, 97% of total inequality is explained by inequality
between the districts. The remaining 3% is explained by inequality within
the districts. In the remainder we therefore exclusively consider inequality
on a district level.
3.6 Partial correlation analysis
In this Section, we consider partial correlation coeﬃcients to measure the
statistical relationship between income inequality (Gj) and the shares of
diﬀerent income sources (Si,j) across the districts, where all variables are
expressed in terms of percentages and Gj represents the Gini coeﬃcient as
measure of overall income inequality in the jth district and the share Si,j
is deﬁned as the ratio of average income of type i in district j over totalChapter 3. Income inequality in rural Pakistan 46
average income in district j:
Sa,j =
¯ ya,j
¯ yj
× 100
St,j =
¯ yt,j
¯ yj
× 100
Snf,j =
¯ ynf,j
¯ yj
× 100
Sr,j =
¯ yr,j
¯ yj
× 100
Sl,j =
¯ yl,j
¯ yj
× 100
Similar to a regression analysis, partial correlation seeks to measure a
relationship between dependent and independent variable, whilst eliminat-
ing potential eﬀects of a third variable. The partial correlation coeﬃcients
measure in this case the degree of statistical association between income
source and district-wide Gini coeﬃcient, where the latter one is considered
as the dependent variable. Results are shown in Tables 3.8. Columns two
and three report the partial correlation coeﬃcient and the corresponding
signiﬁcance level, respectively. We ﬁnd a strong positive and statistically
signiﬁcant correlation of 0.74 between the share of nonfarm income and
income inequality across the districts. Thus, nonfarm income appears as
inequality increasing source of income. In contrast to this, we detect a
similarly strong (and also statistically signiﬁcant) but negative correlation
(-0.74) between the share of transfer income and income inequality. Unlike
nonfarm income, transfer income is a source of income that is capable of
reducing income inequalities in rural Pakistan.
Partial Correlation of Gj with
Variable Corr. Sig.
Sa,j 0.6494 0.114
St,j -0.7354* 0.060
Snf,j 0.7354* 0.060
Sr,j 0.6291 0.130
Sl,j 0.6517 0.113
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3.7 Conclusion and Policy implications
This Chapter analysed the impact of various sources of income on income
inequality in Pakistan. Unlike other studies, we exclusively focus on the
rural sector. Our unique survey dataset allows for detailed comparisons and
decompositions at diﬀerent levels of aggregation. The descriptive analysis
suggests that it is much more meaningful to analyse income inequalities
in rural Pakistan at a district rather than province level. We ﬁnd that
transfer income is the most important source of total monthly household
income, accounting for almost 30%. Shares of rental and livestock income
are the lowest in the sample. Shares of transfer, agricultural and livestock
income are relatively higher in lower income quintiles as compared to higher
income quintiles. Shares of rental and nonfarm income tend to be higher in
higher income quintiles.
We consider both Gini coeﬃcients and Theil indices to measure income
inequality and the corresponding contributions of the various sources of in-
come. Agricultural, nonfarm, rental and transfer income each contribute
to income inequality in the sample area to a similar degree. Livestock
income hardly aﬀects the results. Decomposing overall income inequality
within and between districts implies that inequality between the districts
is greater than within the districts. The Theil index decomposition sug-
gests that almost the entire degree of inequality (97%) can be explained by
inequality between the districts.
The correlation analysis conﬁrms the conjectured importance of transfer
income in reducing income inequalities. While the derived coeﬃcient for
transfer income is negative, nonfarm income is found to be an inequality-
increasing source of income. Considering both eﬀects together appears to
neutralise each other’s role in driving income inequalities.
With regards to policy implications, given that agricultural income and
rental income each contribute one fourth to overall income inequality in
rural Pakistan, the policies should aim ﬁrst to correct both of these sources
of inequality. It is well known that addressing these inequality sources
requires addressing asset inequality. Land is the main source of agricultural
and rental income, and Pakistan is characterised by high land ownership
inequality as identiﬁed by Anwar et al. (2004) and one of the main causes
of poverty and inequality in rural Pakistan. Therefore, the policy makers
should seriously consider land reforms in rural Pakistan in order to enhance
pro-poor growth.
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should also put more emphasis on transfer income in ﬁghting inequalities
across the districts. They should try to foster its ﬂows both within Pakistan
and from abroad but particularly try to increase factor mobility within the
country’s urban sector.
In order to reduce spatial imbalances, policy makers should try to pro-
vide stronger technical education for the rural (and often poor) unskilled
labour force so as to increase mobility and to improve job opportunities
within Pakistan and abroad. To raise the overall income level, policy mak-
ers should take steps to help poorer households send migrants abroad. One
supporting measure that may be considered in that regard is the establish-
ment of “rural migration centers” to process visas, work contracts and loan
arrangements for prospective external migrants.Chapter 4
Well-being and poverty in rural
Pakistan: a subjective approach
Chapter Summary
This Chapter uses our dataset (Survey 2008) to estimate well-
being functions in rural Pakistan using regressions with categorical
variables. We investigate the impact of socio-demographic factors
on life satisfaction with particular emphasis on subjective well-being
measurement to evaluate poverty and its diﬀerent components. We
present a happiness model which is general enough to use diﬀerent po-
tential measures, highlighting their similarities and diﬀerences. Con-
trary to much of the literature, we ﬁnd eﬀects that are positive and of
considerable economic magnitude. In particular the number of chil-
dren seems to matter for the household’s life satisfaction. We show,
however, that all eﬀects crucially hinge on individual household-
speciﬁc characteristics. This Chapter’s main contributions are as
follows. First, we link the emerging ﬁeld of happiness economics with
development studies. Second, we intend to challenge the view that
poverty is best understood from a more macro-level without properly
accounting for individuals’ own valuation of their well-being.
4.1 Introduction
The analysis of life satisfaction is a relatively new but rapidly emerging topic
in economics. While much of the literature surveys evidence for developed
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countries, little economic research has been carried out thus far for the
developing world – notable exceptions are Kingdon and Knight (2006) on
South Africa and Knight et al. (2007) on rural China. Using our household
survey data (2008) for rural Pakistan, we investigate subjective well-being
poverty. By that, we refer to poverty evaluated using happiness functions
to measure the household’s life satisfaction in subjective terms. Subjec-
tive well-being refers in this context to the life satisfaction as declared by
the household. Poverty measurement is stated here exclusively in terms of
households’ views without demarcating a standard poverty threshold.
This methodological twist obviously raises the question whether subjec-
tive well-being can be used as measure of poverty. Conventional poverty
measures are typically deﬁned by minimum income or consumption levels.
We instead intend to explore the subjective well-being approach to poverty.
We do so because in a liberal and democratic spirit, we place a value on the
individuals’ own valuation of their welfare such that subjective well-being
is based on value judgment, which underlies much of the personal judgment
of the respondents about what we call well-being poverty.
Elaborating on Kingdon and Knight (2006), we introduce and compare
diﬀerent measures of well-being poverty based on self-assessments. Unlike
them, however, we do not only resort to the holistic (and thus indirect)
concept of overall happiness to measure well-being poverty but also intro-
duce more direct measures for poverty that focus on monetary terms; for
instance, income satisfaction and satisfaction with expenditures.1 The eco-
nomic analysis of psychological aspects such as happiness has increasingly
received attention in the recent literature.2 There are several studies which
try to establish a relationship between happiness and diﬀerent socioeco-
nomic variables such as age, gender, income, employment, marital status,
etc. to investigate the degree of households’ satisfaction with their status
quo.3
Several studies on the economics of happiness add the number of children
to the list of explanatory variables in a so-called happiness equation as done
for instance by Angeles (2009), Blanchﬂower (2008) and Clark et al. (2008).
However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. While some authors (Tella
et al. (2003); Alesina et al. (2004)) ﬁnd a negative or, respectively, no eﬀect
1The convention in the happiness literature is to deﬁne happiness as the overall
satisfaction with the socio-economic status quo. We elaborate on this idea in Section
4.2.
2We shall use the terms happiness and life satisfaction interchangeably in the re-
mainder.
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(Clark (2006)), others (Stutzer and Frey (2006)) detect a positive eﬀect of
having children at home on overall household’s happiness.
None of these studies, however, tries to relate the impact of children on
happiness to the speciﬁc characteristics of the individuals such as gender,
age, marital status, income and education. Only few papers account for
the individual characteristics of the households. For instance, Frey and
Stutzer (2000) using Swiss household survey data of 1992, ﬁnd that having
children has no eﬀect on the happiness of married couples but a sizable (and
negative) impact on single parents.
The purpose of this Chapter is to link both overall satisfaction (cap-
turing both monetary and non-monetary factors) and ﬁnancial satisfaction
with demographic as well as socio-economic variables (which we may sum-
marise as social well-being).4 In particular, we want to investigate whether
concepts of the economics of happiness can indeed be used in development
economics to employ the subjective well-being approach to poverty as sug-
gested by Kingdon and Knight (2006). We shall do so by estimating a com-
prehensive model for rural Pakistan, using highly correlated but alternative
poverty measures. Comparing results, we shall argue that while subjective
approaches indeed oﬀer a viable alternative to conventional measurement
techniques in development economics, distinguishing between direct and in-
direct measures of poverty may matter and should always be considered to
ensure robustness, given the self-assessment nature of such a metric.
To our knowledge there is no comparable adaption of the economics of
happiness to exclusively rural areas. We therefore believe that this Chapter
ﬁlls an important gap in the literature and may well serve as blueprint for
the analysis of other developing countries with similar demographic features
both from a time series and cross-sectional perspective.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 lays the necessary
ground for the further analysis. We develop the notion of life satisfaction
in terms of overall satisfaction and ﬁnancial satisfaction and also present
some stylised facts. Section 4.3 investigates the correlation between the al-
ternative measures of subjective well-being poverty. It furthermore provides
additional descriptive statistics for the poverty measures both from an in-
direct and a direct angle. Section 4.4 analyses the diﬀerent measurement
approaches applied to data on rural Pakistan, accounting particularly for its
demographic features. In so doing, we investigate the link between children
and household’s special characteristics such as family type, age, income and
4Financial satisfaction is measured by reported satisfaction with income and expen-
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education using our baseline model. We moreover investigate alternative
poverty measurement approaches in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Some stylised facts and basic concepts
There are numerous conventional measures of poverty in monetary terms.
One may construct a so-called poverty line and then measure the distance
of a household’s income from a certain reference threshold, typically deﬁned
in a particular social context. The World Bank, on the other hand, deﬁnes
poverty in absolute terms suggesting that any income in terms of Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) below a certain subsistence level classiﬁes households
as being “poor”. Rather than considering income, one may also categorise
poverty by the uses of income, particularly focusing on consumption. Either
way, the conventional poverty metric in the development studies literature
suggests an easily quantiﬁable way of assessing a households’ economic sit-
uation. We believe, however, that the issue of poverty has more dimensions
to it: what really matters is not how households may be classiﬁed in mon-
etary or purchasing power terms but rather the household’s self-reported
degree of well-being.
The measurement of subjective well-being poverty is by its very nature
closely related to the assessment of happiness as also brought forward by
Kingdon and Knight (2006). Well-being is typically measured by means of
an ordinal scale, where a higher value indicates a higher level of individual
satisfaction (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2004). Studies on happiness are
usually based on micro data and ﬁndings by and large seem to be materially
robust regardless of whether estimation is done in an ordered logit model
or by employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with categorical
dependent variables.
Subjective well-being poverty can be measured along two dimensions.
First, one may simply resort to the more holistic notion of happiness which
encompasses both monetary and non-monetary, that is socio-economic, fac-
tors. Ceteris paribus (i.e. keeping everything else constant), higher income
(and hence less poverty in the conventional sense) should induce households
to feel happier; although eﬀects are likely to be disproportional and at a
diminishing rate (Frey and Stutzer, 2002b). Analysing happiness may thus
be considered an indirect method of assessing poverty. This approach is
ﬂexible enough to also measure poverty in more broader terms for instance
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ther details.5 Second, one may take a more direct route and assess the
household’s subjective well-being poverty directly in ﬁnancial terms – such
that it simply asks how satisﬁed households feel about their incomes and
expenditures.
To appreciate the subsequent estimation results in a broader context,
it may be helpful to ﬁrst discuss some stylised facts from the happiness
economics literature. Based on US and European panel data, those may be
summarised as follows (Blanchﬂower, 2008):
• well-being depends positively on these controls:
– being female
– married couples
– age (U-shaped behaviour!)
– level of education
– active religious involvement
– level of health
– level of income
– regular sexual engagement
– monogamy
– being childless
• well-being is decreasing among people with the following characteris-
tics:
– newly divorced (or separated)
– adults in their mid to late 40s
– unemployed
– immigrants and minorities
– commuters
– people with poor health (e.g. high blood pressure)
5Sen introduced the capabilities approach to well-being and poverty. He suggested
that the capabilities approach to a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it
in terms of his or her ability to achieve various valuable functions as part of living. Sen
claimed that absolute deprivation in terms of a person’s capabilities relates to relative
deprivation in terms of commodities, income and resources. Thus, happiness is more
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– less educated
– poor
– sexually inactive
– parents (having children)
As this list reveals, both macroeconomic factors but also subjective assess-
ments play a role in the perception of happiness. To take an example,
the general unemployment rate has a depressing eﬀect, suggesting that a
higher risk of becoming laid oﬀ and the associated economic uncertainty
reduce happiness. At the same time, subjective well-being is also inﬂuenced
by several factors that are non-economic such as age, sex, marital status,
health status, education, social capital, religion, as well as social and polit-
ical institutions (Helliwell, 2002).
Psychologists and sociologists thus seem to rightly focus on the possible
inﬂuence of personality-related factors (such as optimism, self-esteem and
perceived personal control) in conjunction with socio-demographic factors
(e.g. gender, age, education, health, family size, income, marital status,
employment status etc.) when studying why people are happy or unhappy.
As Frey and Stutzer (2002a) argue, happiness from an economist’s per-
spective is best measured in terms of health and wealth. Age is an important
third variable in that it is likely to determine both these factors’ impacts
on happiness. However, the role of age is not so straightforward to assess
for several reasons. The notion of well-being, after all, may change its con-
notation with varying age depending on the level of ﬁnancial and physical
well-being.
Life satisfaction, as the list of stylised facts reveals, may be best thought
of as some “umbrella concept” capturing various aspects of a person’s life,
including both social and ﬁnancial satisfaction. Given that in the devel-
oping world poverty generally encompasses all these aspects, we feel it is
reasonable to use those insights from this strand of the literature to con-
struct an alternative, more subjective poverty metric which more closely
reﬂects the speciﬁc socio-economic context.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
The relevant endogenous variables are all constructed by means of an ordinal
scale. The measure of overall satisfaction is based on the following question:
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were recorded on a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 is coded
as “Not at all satisﬁed’’, 2 as “Less than satisﬁed”, 3 as “Rather satisﬁed”
and 4 as “Fully satisﬁed” to capture overall subjective well-being poverty.
The more direct approach to poverty (in terms of income and expendi-
ture exclusively) was constructed using the same scale to ensure compara-
bility. We distinguish between two alternatives: satisfaction with income
and satisfaction with expenditure; responses for each of the two alternatives
were described according to the the 1-4 scale, such that 1 is recorded as “Not
at all satisﬁed’’, 2 as “Less than satisﬁed”, 3 as “Rather satisﬁed” and 4 as
“Fully satisﬁed”. These measures refer to subjective well-being poverty in
its monetary terms.
Table 4.1 reports some summary statistics for each of the subjective
well-being poverty measures mentioned.6
Subjective well-being poverty measure in terms of
overall satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction
with with with
socio-economic status income expenditure
(1-4) (1-4) (1-4)
Mean 2.11 2.40 2.37
Standard deviation 1.41 0.61 0.58
Frequency of value:
4 33.67% 4.50% 2.33%
3 5.50% 30.50% 32.67%
2 4.00% 63.33% 62.50%
1 56.83% 1.67% 2.50%
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of subjective well-being poverty measures.
Source: Survey 2008.
The distribution of the satisfaction variables in terms of income and
expenditure are rather similar with the ﬁrst two moments of both measures
being nearly identical. We see that only few people report very high or
very low values of the satisfaction index. With regards to satisfaction with
6Table C.1 reports additional background data on the given poverty measures. The
Table consistently ranks Punjab as being the most prosperous province in subjective
terms independent of the measure used. We may consider overall satisfaction an en-
compassing concept which not only covers monetary aspects but also considers other
socio-demographic factors and may thus be treated as the most comprehensive approach
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current socio-economic status (i.e. overall satisfaction), we notice that the
answers are more dispersed. Most of the responses lie between the two
extremes: 56.83% of the respondents are “not at all satisﬁed” and one third
of the respondents are on the other extreme of the scale.
Overall satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction
with with with
socio-economic status income expenditure
(1-4) (1-4) (1-4)
Overall satisfaction
with socio-economic status 1
Satisfaction
with income 0.81*** 1
Satisfaction
with expenditure 0.81*** 0.94*** 1
Table 4.2: Correlation matrix.
N = 600 households. *, **, *** indicates signiﬁcance level of 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
Given that the subjective poverty measures in terms of income and ex-
penditure are not only based on the same scale but also seem to point in a
similar direction, it may be worthwhile to further investigate their potential
interrelationships. Bruni and Porta (2007), after all, suggest the presence of
such linkages in that they argue that certain approaches in the happiness lit-
erature could not be dealt with adequately without employing insights from
economics, psychology, sociology and philosophy. Table 4.2 reports correla-
tion coeﬃcients between the subjective well-being poverty variables. Indeed,
the three measures we consider are strongly and positively correlated. We
see that a high degree of income satisfaction goes hand in hand with high
expenditure satisfaction (correlation of 0.94). Both measures correlate with
the overall satisfaction level essentially in the same way (correlations of 0.81,
each).7 We therefore consider both income and expenditure approaches as
alternatives for measuring subjective poverty directly in monetary terms.
7The correlation matrix clearly supports Easterlin’s micro approach towards happi-Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 57
4.4 Determinants of overall satisfaction
4.4.1 The model
The model we use to evaluate subjective well-being poverty is a straightfor-
ward application from the happiness literature. As the ﬁndings summarised
in Section 4.2 suggest, happiness is best thought of as a function of various
factors. We follow the common approach and estimate a happiness function
for rural Pakistan of the following form:
happiness = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) + β3(age)
2 + β4(educ) +
β5(numberofchildren) + β6(unemployment) +
β7ln(income) + β8ln(relativeincome) +
β9(maritalstatus) + β10(health) + β11(region) + ε. (4.1)
The regression model (4.1) implies that happiness is not simply a binary
case but is measured in terms of the ordered categories (1-4) introduced
above. We employ a standard ordered probit (oprobit) model that is widely
used to analyse discrete data of this variety. Our framework is based on an
underlying latent model with single index function and constant thresholds.
The control variables included are sex, age, education, number of children,
employment status, the household’s monthly nominal income (both in ab-
solute and relative terms) expressed in natural logs, marital status, overall
family’s health position and regional allocation of household i, where the
corresponding β represents the vector of coeﬃcients of the dummy variables.
We moreover restructure model (4.1) by imposing dummies on the re-
spective number of children per household instead of using the actual num-
ber of children per household:
happiness = β0 + β1(sex) + β2(age) + β3(age)
2 + β4(educ) +
β5(numberofchildrendummy) + β6(unemployment) +
β7ln(income) + β8ln(relativeincome) +
β9(maritalstatus) + β10(health) + β11(region) + ε. (4.2)
ness, which conﬁrms the positive correlation between individual income and individual
measures of subjective well-being. The so-called Easterlin Paradox suggests that within
a society rich people tend to be happier than poor people, whereas on a more macro
level, relatively rich societies tend not to be happier (or not by much) than relatively
poor societies (Easterlin, 2001).Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 58
Potential gender diﬀerences are captured by means of a dummy, where
sex is 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise. Similarly, employment
and marital status take the value 1 when the head of the household is
unemployed or living as a couple and 0 otherwise. Age eﬀects, as usual, are
allowed to be non-linear. All the remaining variables, except for income,
are dummy variables. We therefore use matrix notation to remind ourselves
that these coeﬃcients are really expressed in terms of vectors relating to
diﬀerent household groupings. More speciﬁcally, the impact of the number
of children on happiness in (4.2) is captured by β5.8 We created six dummies
in total to separate the cases when one, two, three, four, ﬁve, six, seven or
more children are present in a household.9 We chose households with seven
(or more) number of children as the reference group. Note that children
are here deﬁned as individuals aged less than 16 years who live with their
parents.
We moreover constructed a health index to evaluate the general health
status, where a higher value refers to a higher level of health. The index
is based on the following response from the household’s head: “During the
last 12 months, how many times has someone in your household visited
a doctor?” The answer options: none, once, twice, three times and four
times or more were then mapped correspondingly onto dummy variables
which may be translated into the health index as follows: 4, 3, 2, 1 and
0 for excellent, good, fair, poor and very poor health status, respectively.
The excluded category is being in excellent health condition indicated by an
index value of 4 – our baseline case. In a similar fashion, the region refers to
three mutually exclusive dummies for respondents living in Punjab, NWFP
and those who live in Sind. The baseline category here corresponds to
households living in Baluchistan.
We may furthermore classify households by their speciﬁc characteris-
tics such as their family structure (dual/single parent family), age, educa-
tional or ﬁnancial background to analyse if and how happiness functions
diﬀer across various socio-economic groups.10 Therefore, the third latent
regression model used to develop a happiness function for the households
belonging to diﬀerent socio-economic backgrounds is given as:
8It might be interesting to explore how results diﬀer across the children’s gender; an
issue we do not tackle here for data reasons.
9There is no childless household in the sample.
10This approach is line with Kahneman and Krueger (2006) who, using data from
diﬀerent countries, investigate how individual responses to subjective well-being questions
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happiness = β0 + β1(educ) + β2(unemployment) +
β3ln(relativeincome) +
β4(numberofchildrendummy) + β5(region) + ε. (4.3)
Regression model (4.3) is general enough to address all the various sub-
groupings among the sample population based on the respective household’s
characteristics.
Results for all three models are discussed in the subsequent Sections.
Seeking to ensure that all models are properly speciﬁed, we moreover con-
ducted the linktest (or speciﬁcation error test) for each of the ordered probit
regressions.11
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male* 558 0.93 0.26 0 1
Age 600 52.97 8.88 30.00 70.00
Education 600 7.71 3.39 2.00 16.00
Number of Children 600 4.24 1.04 1.00 8.00
Unemployed* 187 0.31 0.46 0 1
Total monthly income (in PKR) 600 3515.58 1207.88 1596 6938
Relative income 600 1.24 0.39 0.79 1.68
Couple* 471 0.79 0.41 0 1
Health Satisfaction index 600 2.26 1.01 0.00 4.00
Province:
Punjab* 240 0.4 0.49 0 1
NWFP* 180 0.2 0.40 0 1
Sind* 120 0.3 0.46 0 1
Baluchistan* 60 0.1 0.30 0 1
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of socio-economic determinants of happiness.
Note: (*) stands for a dummy variable.
Source: Survey 2008.
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics of the given controls, where all the
variables with asterisks (*) refer to dummies. For instance, as mentioned
above, sex is 1 if the respondent is male and 0 otherwise. According to
11The logic of these type of model misspeciﬁcation tests is discussed in more detail in
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Table 4.3, the mean for male is 0.93, which implies that 93% of the sam-
ple observations comprise men. With regards to unemployment, the mean
amounts to 0.31 or we may say that about 31% of the sample households
are unemployed. The average for the variable couple is approximately 0.79;
in other words, 79% of the interviewed households were living as a couple.
By the same token, 40% of the sample observations live in Punjab (mean
of 0.4), 30% in Sind, 20% in NWFP and 10% in Baluchistan. As far as
the other controls are concerned, the average age is 53 years, the average
education level in rural Pakistan is about 7 to 8 years of schooling, the av-
erage number of children is about 4 per household, and the average relative
income amounts to 1.24 with an average monthly income of PKR 3515.58.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 61
4.4.2 Baseline results
Ordered probit regression
Number of obs = 600
Wald χ2(18) = 4962.88
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1471
Log pseudolikelihood = -537.14467
Dependent variable: Overall satisfaction
Independent coef. Robust
Variable Std. Err.
Male -0.6588*** 0.17902
Age 0.0131 0.0702
AgeSquared -0.0001 0.0007
Years of Education 0.0402** 0.0190
No. of children 0.1290** 0.0628
Unemployed -0.2958** 0.1535
Log of household’s income 0.0373 0.1649
Log of relative income -0.0271 0.7456
Couple .1591 0.1727
Health Satisfaction index:
4 Reference Group
3 -0.3250 0.2076
2 -0.2625 0.2077
1 -0.5792** 0.2279
0 -9.9443*** 0.2724
Region:
Punjab 1.5061*** 0.1805
NWFP 0.1397 0.2080
Sind 0.5689*** 0.1953
Baluchistan Reference Group
/cut1 1.7275 2.1887
/cut2 1.8541 2.1865
/cut3 2.1074 2.1861
Table 4.4: Baseline results. *,**,*** denote statistical
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Speciﬁcation error test
Number of obs = 600
Wald χ2(2) = 127.59
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1474
Log pseudolikelihood = -536.96266
Dependent variable: Overall satisfaction
Independent coef. Robust
Variable Std. Err.
-hat 0.7766***[0.000] 0.1397
-hatsq 0.0646[0.126] 0.0423
/cut1 1.5637 0.1620
/cut2 1.6903 0.1653
/cut3 1.9438 0.1735
Table 4.5: Speciﬁcation error test: Baseline Model (4.1).
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
2. Figure in brackets[ ] are p values.
The convention in the happiness economics literature is to deﬁne hap-
piness as the overall satisfaction with the current socio-economic status.
Therefore, we ﬁrst estimate the model with the described happiness index
(that is overall satisfaction) as dependent variable and use those results as
benchmark. Table 4.4 gives an overview of the results which may be con-
sidered the relevant baseline. Our ﬁndings largely conﬁrm the literature
on the determinants of happiness. As expected, happiness depends on gen-
der, education, family size, unemployment, health and region. For instance,
the probability of being happy increases with an increasing family size or
educational achievements. On the other hand, being a male, unemployed
or having a low health proﬁle lowers one’s chance of being satisﬁed. We
furthermore observe that happiness is region-dependent. Relatively speak-
ing, living in Punjab indicates an elevated chance of being happy compared
to Sind. The linktest (_hatsq) for the baseline model (4.1) is statistically
insigniﬁcant as shown in Table 4.5. This means that we have no omitted
relevant variable(s) and our link function is correctly speciﬁed.C
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Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.50403465
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= .05032489
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= .09738449
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= .34825596
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
Male* 0.2492*** 0.0619 0.0064 0.0042 0.0011 0.0054 -0.2567*** 0.0690
Age -0.0052 0.0280 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0018 0.0048 0.0260
AgeSquared 0.00003 0.00028 -2.44E-07 0.0000 -1.69E-06 0.00002 -2.5E-05 0.00026
Education -0.0161** 0.0076 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 0.0006 0.0149** 0.0071
No. of children -0.0515** 0.0251 0.0005 0.0005 0.0033* 0.0019 0.0477** 0.0232
Unemployed* 0.1173** 0.0602 -0.0019 0.0017 -0.0089* 0.0058 -0.1065** 0.0538
Log of household’s income -0.0149 0.0658 0.0001 0.0006 0.0010 0.0042 0.0138 0.0610
Log of relative income 0.0108 0.2974 -0.0001 0.0028 -0.0007 0.0190 -0.0100 0.2757
Couple* -0.0633 0.0684 0.0010 0.0016 0.0047 0.0060 0.0576 0.0610
Health Satisfaction Index:
3* 0.1288 0.0812 -0.0021 0.0023 -0.0099 0.0078 -0.1168 0.0720
2* 0.1042 0.0818 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0077 0.0073 -0.0950 0.0732
1* 0.2249*** 0.0839 -0.0062 0.0045 -0.0213* 0.0119 -0.1974*** 0.0696
0* 0.5517*** 0.0256 -0.0503*** 0.0134 -0.1000*** 0.0188 -0.4013*** 0.0271
Region:
Punjab* -0.5416*** 0.0541 0.0134*** 0.0050 0.0454*** 0.0110 0.4829*** 0.0522
NWFP* -0.0556 0.0825 0.0002 0.0006 0.0029 0.0034 0.0525 0.0796
Sind* -0.2215** 0.0720 -0.0024 0.0030 0.0057 0.0040 0.2182*** 0.0763
Table 4.6: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit regression of baseline model (4.1). Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 64
The marginal eﬀects for model (4.1) are given in Table 4.6. According
to Table 4.6, being a male increases the probability of being observed in
a lower happiness category, say (1), and decreases its chance of being in
higher outcomes such as (4). Similarly, unemployed people and people with
low health status, poor or very poor (1 and 0) are usually observed in a
lower happiness category (1) compared to the higher category (4). With
increasing education and family size, on the other hand, the probability of
being observed in the higher happiness category (4) increases and at the
same time it decreases the chance to be observed in the lower happiness
category (1). Our results also support regional eﬀects. For example, people
living in Punjab and Sind are most likely to be observed in higher happiness
categories compared to the lower happiness outcomes.
Our results with respect to gender, marital status and health are sup-
ported by several other studies of comparable scope. Knight et al. (2007),
for instance, analyse national household survey data for subjective well-
being in rural China and also ﬁnd that men report lower happiness than
women. Taking singles as reference category, married couples are relatively
more blissful according to their study, whereas divorced couples or widow-
hood dampen happiness. They furthermore suggest that happiness increases
with a higher level of education, income or health respectively. They sug-
gest that happiness is U-shaped in age which is somewhat surprising, given
that for developing countries one may suspect an inverted shape due to poor
social security systems in place especially for older citizens.
It is generally believed in the developing world that old people become
increasingly less happy “by nature” not only because their physical and
cognitive capacities deteriorate, but also because of psychological factors
such as the increasing likelihood of suﬀering from depression. From a socio-
economic point of view, older people tend to be in poorer health and have
lower income which makes them less happier indeed (Frey and Stutzer,
2002a). The situation may be fundamentally diﬀerent in developed coun-
tries. Easterlin (2006), for instance, based on data from General Social
surveys from 1973-1994, ﬁnds that both health and ﬁnancial satisfaction in
the US follow a U-shaped pattern in age. This would imply that well-being
falls with rising age, reaching a particular turning point and then starts
rising again. Contrary to the results for rural China, the US or many EU
countries, our results, however, seem to support the idea of an inverted
U-shaped relatioship between age and happiness with a theoretical turning
point of 65.5 years of age. On purely statistical grounds, however, it is not
obvious per se whether any relationship exists at all.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 65
While one might expect happiness to be of inverted-U shape in age,
a general relationship between age and happiness seems to be diﬃcult to
establish. A U-shaped age eﬀect on happiness has been challenged on empir-
ical grounds.12 The age-happiness pattern is found to diﬀer across countries
and time periods. The overall empirical evidence appears blurred at best
and it is thus diﬃcult to draw any robust conclusion.
We further extend the baseline results by using dummies for the diﬀer-
ent number of children per household rather than using the actual number
of children per household, using the regression model (4.2). The results are
given in Table 4.7 and suggest that the probability of being happy is low
for the households with a small number of children and a low health status.
Similarly, being male and being unemployed reduces the chances of report-
ing happiness. On the other hand, the likelihood of happiness increases in
the level of education. One possible explanation for this positive association
may be that higher education increases the chances of employability. As far
as regional eﬀects are concerned, in Punjab the probability of being happy
is about thrice as high compared to the likelihood feeling satisﬁed in Sind.
The linktest for the model (4.2) appears to be statistically insigniﬁcant
as shown in Table 4.8. The variable _hatsq is statistically insigniﬁcant
which indicates that the model is properly speciﬁed. There are no omit-
ted relevant variables and one should not be able to ﬁnd any additional
predictors that are statistically signiﬁcant except by chance. Apart from
assessing the model speciﬁcation, we also test for the joint signiﬁcance of
the dummies used on the number of children (one, two, three, four, ﬁve and
six). We use the test command in STATA as shown in Table 4.9 for this
purpose, where 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 corresponds to the coeﬃcients when one,
two, three, four, ﬁve and six children are present in the household, respec-
tively. Amid a highly signiﬁcant test statistic (χ2(6) = 917.84) with six
degrees of freedom, we reject the null hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being
equal to zero, and accept the alternative hypothesis that at lease one of the
coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero instead. In other words, we
may say that the given coeﬃcients for the number of children per household
are not jointly signiﬁcant.
12See Horley and Lavery (1995) and the references therein for details.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 66
Ordered probit regression
Number of obs = 600
Wald χ2(18) = 5420.19
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1482
Log pseudolikelihood = -536.45646
Dependent variable: Overall satisfaction
Independent coef. Robust
Variable Std. Err.
Male -0.6865*** 0.1903
Age 0.0095 0.0718
AgeSquared -3.2E-05 0.0007
Years of Education 0.0418** 0.0192
No. of children:
1 -7.6685*** 0.4249
2 -0.9727** 0.4857
3 -0.5966 0.3836
4 -0.5308 0.3603
5 -0.3789 0.3704
6 -0.2798 0.3896
7 or more Reference Group
Unemployed -0.2897* 0.1538
Log of household’s income 0.0434 0.1659
Log of relative income -0.0689 0.7494
Couple 0.1716 0.1731
Health Satisfaction index:
4 Reference Group
3 -0.3362 0.2082
2 -0.2554 0.2097
1 -0.5889*** 0.2287
0 -8.8264*** 0.2889
Region:
Punjab 1.5068*** 0.1822
NWFP 0.1442 0.2107
Sind 0.5766*** 0.1990
Baluchistan Reference Group
/cut1 0.6481 2.2762
/cut2 0.7749 2.2734
/cut3 1.0287 2.2730
Table 4.7: Baseline results; using dummies for number of children. *,**,***
denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 67
Speciﬁcation error test
Number of obs = 600
Wald χ2(2) = 125.50
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1483
Log pseudolikelihood = -536.3563
Dependent variable: Overall satisfaction
Independent coef. Robust
Variable Std. Err.
-hat 0.9316***[0.000] 0.1763
-hatsq 0.0520[0.693] 0.1318
/cut1 0.6490 0.0865
/cut2 0.7759 0.0902
/cut3 1.0298 0.0983
Table 4.8: Speciﬁcation error test: Model (4.2) using dummies for number
of children.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
2. Figure in brackets [] are p-values.
. test 1 2 3 4 5 6
( 1) [Overall satisfaction]1 = 0
( 2) [Overall satisfaction]2 = 0
( 3) [Overall satisfaction]3 = 0
( 4) [Overall satisfaction]4 = 0
( 5) [Overall satisfaction]5 = 0
( 6) [Overall satisfaction]6 = 0
χ2(6) = 917.84***
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Table 4.9: Joint hypothesis testing; using the dummies for the number of
children.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.C
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Table 4.10: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit regression of
model (4.2).
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.50649323
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.05041426
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.09737584
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.34571666
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
Male* 0.2589*** 0.0650 0.0068 0.0045 0.0015 0.0059 -0.2672*** 0.0731
Age -0.0038 0.0287 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0019 0.0035 0.0265
AgeSquared 0.00001 0.00028 -1.28E-07 0.00000 -8.36E-07 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00026
Education -0.0167** 0.0077 0.0002 0.0002 0.0011* 0.0006 0.0154** 0.0071
No. of children:
1* 0.4966*** 0.0257 -0.0504*** 0.0134 -0.0976*** 0.0183 -0.3486*** 0.0259C
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Table 4.10: (continued)
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
2* 0.3346*** 0.1220 -0.0209 0.0161 -0.0500* 0.0296 -0.2637*** 0.0802
3* 0.2298* 0.1379 -0.0075 0.0082 -0.0238 0.0200 -0.1985* 0.1112
4* 0.2089 0.1381 -0.0032 0.0034 -0.0154 0.0120 -0.1903 0.1242
5* 0.1491 0.1420 -0.0035 0.0055 -0.0132 0.0161 -0.1324 0.1210
6* 0.1105 0.1511 -0.0025 0.0054 -0.0096 0.0165 -0.0984 0.1295
Unemployed* 0.1149* 0.0604 -0.0019 0.0017 -0.0089 0.0058 -0.1041* 0.0538
Log of household’s income -0.0173 0.0662 0.0002 0.0007 0.0011 0.0043 0.0160 0.0612
Log of relative income 0.0275 0.2989 -0.0003 0.0030 -0.0018 0.0196 -0.0254 0.2763
Couple* -0.0682 0.0684 0.0011 0.0017 0.0052 0.0063 0.0618 0.0607
Health Satisfaction Index:
3* 0.1331 0.0812 -0.0023 0.0024 -0.0105 0.0080 -0.1203* 0.0717
2* 0.1014 0.0826 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0076 0.0074 -0.0922 0.0738
1* 0.2283*** 0.0838 -0.0065 0.0047 -0.0221* 0.0121 -0.1996*** 0.0693
0* 0.5494*** 0.0255 -0.0505*** 0.0134 -0.1001*** 0.0188 -0.3988*** 0.0271
Region:
Punjab* -0.5413*** 0.0546 0.0137*** 0.0051 0.0461*** 0.0112 0.4816*** 0.0526
NWFP* -0.0574 0.0836 0.0002 0.0006 0.0031 0.0035 0.0541 0.0806
Sind* -0.2246*** 0.0734 -0.0023 0.0031 0.0060 0.0041 0.2208*** 0.0777Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 70
Table 4.10 shows the marginal eﬀects resulting from the ordered probit
regression analysis of model (4.2); using dummies for the number of children
per household. According to Table 4.10, if a household has a limited num-
ber of children (i.e. no more than two), the likelihood of being in the higher
categories of happiness levels (i.e. 2, 3 and 4) decreases and at the same
time it is more likely to be observed in the lowest category of happiness. The
same applies to health. Households reﬂecting a low health satisfaction index
(i.e. 0 or 1) are most likely to fall in the lowest category of happiness (i.e.
1) against the higher categories. Similarly, if a respondent is unemployed
or in case of a male-headed family, the risk of being in the lowest happi-
ness category increases, while it diminishes the highest possible outcome.
Furthermore, happiness favours the more educated households as shown in
Table 4.10. With the increase in educational attainment, the probability
of belonging to higher happiness outcomes increases, while it decreases for
lower happiness outcomes. However, we may argue that the marginal ef-
fects of education are considerably small in either case. Lastly, happiness
is sensitive to the regional background. Households for instance belonging
to Punjab are more likely to be observed in the higher level categories of
happiness, relative to those who belong to Sind.
While our baseline results are in keeping with economic intuition, only
gender, education, number of children, unemployment, health and region
turn out to be of some statistical meaning. In particular, a large family size
seems to be vital. On the other hand, a higher nominal income (both in
absolute and relative terms) does not seem to signiﬁcantly improve house-
holds’ perceived well-being. A result which seems at odds with economic
reasoning, as one would expect households in developing countries to feel
strongly about monetary factors.13 This seems to suggest that in order to
capture poverty in monetary terms, we should resort to direct poverty mea-
sures, for instance, satisfaction with income or expenditure. We therefore
consider in the remainder two issues in turn. First, we analyse the inter-
play between having children and household’s speciﬁc features in improving
the family’s overall subjective well-being, using model (4.3). Second, we
employ the baseline model (4.1) for other response variables (i.e. direct
poverty measures) for the sake of comparison with the baseline results.
13Our results suggest that happiness is the broader measure which seems to capture
reasonably well other important aspects of poverty such as health and level of education
matter most in economic and econometric terms using this well-being metric. With
income being insigniﬁcant, happiness here encompasses the idea of capabilities poverty,
but it is more general than this approach. It moreover incorporates important and often
neglected socio-economic factors.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 71
4.4.3 Children and household’s speciﬁc characteristics
The regression analysis so far (see Tables 4.4 and 4.7) has treated the entire
sample as homogeneous unit. This implicitly assumes that having children
at home aﬀects respondents in a similar vein, irrespective of their age, mar-
ital status, gender, income level or educational background. We shall relax
this and assess in this Section whether household-speciﬁc characteristics
signiﬁcantly impact on the experience of having children, using regression
model (4.3).14
Table C.2 distinguishes diﬀerent experiences of parenthood according to
marital status. The ﬁrst column produces the aggregate ﬁndings for all 600
families which is then broken down according to diﬀerent family structures.
Four out of ﬁve families are of the “traditional” dual type. The remaining
20% are single-parent families, i.e. spearated/divorced or widowed parents.
It appears the basic picture is robust across dual-parent families. The more
children dual-parent families have, the greater is the probability of being
happy. Single-parent families suﬀer fom the task of rearing children, and are
unhappy with the increasing number of children; yet they are unhappiest
in absolute terms with just one child which reﬂects the idea of children
being supportive for general family matters. To take a comparison from
a developed country, a similar study by Frey and Stutzer (2000) based on
Swiss survey data for the year 1992 also suggests that single-parent families
are unhappier than dual-parent families with children.
In order to test for model speciﬁcation, we use the linktest command
in STATA. Results are reported in Table C.2. The linktest based on the
variable _hatsq is statistically insigniﬁcant which shows that we do not have
an omitted variable bias in the model and the link function of the model is
correctly speciﬁed. We use the test command provided by STATA to test
for the joint signiﬁcance of the dummies used for the number of children; as
shown in Table C.2. The test statistic suggests that the dummies used for
the number of children is statistically signiﬁcant in each set-up, i.e. for the
case of modelling all the families together or for modeling/grouping them
separately as dual and single parent family, as we have to reject the null
hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being equal to zero in each case.
Table C.3 shows the marginal eﬀects of the number of children on the
probability of happiness outcomes based on family types. In case of all
(pooled) families or dual parent families, having a single child decreases the
14Given the nature of this question, it seems most natural to only consider happiness
as broad subjective poverty measure.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 72
probability for the higher happiness outcomes (2, 3 and 4), while it increases
the likelihood of being in the lowest outcome (1). On the other hand, for
single parent families, having one child decreases the probability for the
highest happiness outcome (4) and reveals an increased chance to end up
in the lowest outcome (1).
Overall, a particular family type in itself may not suﬃciently capture
feelings of parenthood and their perceived eﬀects on subjective well-being
poverty. The age structure of the parents may matter. Parents may feel
diﬀerently about having children depending on their age. This question is
addressed by Table C.4.
Table C.4 shows diﬀerences in experiences about having children at home
between individuals of diﬀerent age groups. Columns two and three separate
individuals into those who are aged 40 or less and those who are aged
above 40, respectively. We shall call the former group “younger group” and
identify the latter as “older group”. Well-being of older group households
overall increases by having more children. However, looking more closely,
clear diﬀerences emerge. The results show that as people get older and
older, they feel relatively happier than before about having even the same
number of children at home. In contrast, in the younger age group, any
additional child may imply an extra burden for the young parents who still
struggle for achieving their life goals and most probably the gap between
the goals and actual achievements is relatively larger for younger individuals
compared to older persons.
In the younger group which comprises individuals aged 40 years or less,
people are moreover more likely to be unhappy by having two children as
compared to the older individuals. However, on pure statistical grounds,
we found no evidence for children inﬂuencing happiness of the younger par-
ents.15
As for the older groups, the probability of happiness is clearly increasing
with the number of children up till seven (or more) children. Considering all
individuals together, this high number of children yields the largest increase
in the probability of household’s happiness. One may conjecture that young
individuals may also want to establish a similarly large family but having
so many children in such a young age is quite rare. Moreover, peer pressure
may be lower as there is still a fairly large time span to increase the size of
the family.
15No family of the 40 or less years of age group reported having seven or more children
at home; hence the excluded reference category corresponds to households having one
child in total.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 73
We also test for an appropriate model speciﬁcation using the linktest.
As Table C.4 shows, the variable _hatsq is statistically insigniﬁcant which
implies that based on the linktest there is no evidence for an omitted variable
bias inherent in the model and that the model is well-speciﬁed properly as
the link function is correctly speciﬁed. Furthermore, in order to test for
the joint signiﬁcance of the dummies used for the number of children, we
use the test command in STATA as shown in Table C.4. The reported
chi-square for the dummies used for the number of children is statistically
insigniﬁcant in case of individuals aged 40 or below; and we may accept
the null hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being equal to zero. On the other
hand, for all individuals or for individuals aged above 40, the resulting
test statistics are highly signiﬁcant which gives us reason to reject the null
hypothesis and accept the alternative that at least one of the coeﬃcients is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Table C.5 shows the marginal eﬀects of the number of children on the
probability of achieving happiness outcomes based on age-groups of the in-
dividuals. Compared to the reference category (7 or more children), having
one child decreases the probability for the higher happiness outcomes (2, 3
and 4), while it increases the likelihood of being in the lowest outcome (1)
in case of all individuals or individuals aged above 40. On the other hand,
for households aged 40 or less, no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the number of children
on household’s happiness has been detected.
The happiness model (4.3) is comprehensive enough to allow for further
clusterings. While the poverty-reducing eﬀect of children seems to hinge on
family type and the parents’ age, one may also expect that the “meaning”
of a child diﬀers across households depending on their level of income and
education. With respect to the former dimension we separate families into
two groups: those whose income exceeds average income and those whose
income falls short of this benchmark. Results indeed diﬀer among these
groups as shown in Table C.6.
Table C.6 implies that households in the upper income group are less
likely to be happy with increasing number of children as compared to the
lower income group. Not surprisingly, the lower income group is the larger
of the two and estimates for that group most closely resemble those of
the population at large: well-being is increasing in the number of children
living in the household. Results for column (2) suggest that as income rises,
parents preferences shift more towards the attainment of personal goals and
career enhancement. In other words, we may speculate that as income goes
up, the “demand” (or desire) for children drops as the opportunity costChapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 74
of raising a child rises.16 In relatively poor families, on the other hand,
the demand for children is higher because the higher the number of children
around, the more helping hands are available. This supportive role is crucial
to the functioning of the household given that in such lower income classes,
marked by extreme poverty, children start working (inside and outside the
home) at the age of 12 or even below and also need to look after the elders
in their family. In that sense, children are more productive and “beneﬁcial”
for the relatively poor group. Indeed, column (3) reports a statistically
signiﬁcant and negative estimate for one child against a large number of
children (7 or more).
As before, in an attempt to assess the appropriateness of the speciﬁed
model, we use the linktest command. Results reported in Table C.6 provide
evidence for the absence of an omitted variable bias in the model suggesting
that the link function of the model is correctly speciﬁed. To test for the
joint signiﬁcance of the dummies used for the number of children, we use
the test command in STATA as shown in Table C.6. Test statistics for the
dummies used for the number of children are statistically signiﬁcant in all
the three cases, i.e. regardless of modeling all the households together or
grouping them separately as households having above average income and
households having below average income. We therefore have to reject the
null hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being equal to zero and accept the
alternative that at least one of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for each of the given cases.
Table C.7 summarises the marginal eﬀects of the number of children on
the likelihood of happiness outcome(s) based on the income of the house-
holds. Results suggest that, compared to the reference category (7 or more
children), having one child decreases the probability for the higher happi-
ness outcomes (2, 3 and 4), while it increases the likelihood of being in the
lowest outcome (1) in case of all individuals or for individuals whose income
is less than the average income. On the other hand, for households whose
income exceeds average, an additional child reduces the likelihood for the
higher happiness outcomes (2, 3 and 4) and at the same time it increases
the chance of being in the lowest happiness outcome (1).
The level of education is a further important socio-economic feature for
the role of children in reported poverty assessments. Similar to the income
variable, we split the respondents in two major groups, choosing 10 years
16Considering the upper income group, no family reported having seven or more chil-
dren at home; hence the excluded/reference category corresponds to households having
one child in total.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 75
of schooling as the relevant benchmark. Individuals with such a complete
level of high school education are summarised in column (2). Individuals
who did not complete the 10 years of schooling are grouped together in the
last column of Table C.8.
This classiﬁcation allows us to analyse the eﬀects of children on house-
holds’ happiness with diﬀerent levels of education. We ﬁnd that education
does matter in this regard. Less educated individuals are relatively less
likely to be happy with increasing number of children compared to the
more educated ones.17
The results of the model speciﬁcation testing are reported in Table C.8
and show that the linktest or at least the variable _hatsq are statistically
insigniﬁcant. Thus, there is no evidence for an omitted variable bias problem
and the link function of the model is correctly speciﬁed. In order to test for
the joint signiﬁcance of the dummies used for the number of children, we
employ the test STATA command as shown in Table C.8. The test results
imply that the dummies used for the number of children are statistically
insigniﬁcant in case of individuals having less than full school education.
We therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being
equal to zero. On the other hand, for all individuals or for individuals having
full school education, the chi-square test statistics are highly signiﬁcant and
we have to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative that at least
one of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in that case.
Research in this area has shown that parental education plays a positive
role in the child’s care and outcome. Guryan et al. (2008), for instance,
observes that higher-educated parents spend more time with their children.
This relationship is striking, given that higher-educated parents also spend
more time working outside the home. This relationship is robust and holds
across all subgroups examined, including both non-working and working
parents. It also holds across all four subcategories of child care: basic,
educational, recreational, and travel related to child care.18
17Though, we didn’t ﬁnd any statistical evidence for less educated households being
aﬀected by having children at home.
18“Total child care” is deﬁned as the sum of those four primary time use components.
“Basic” child care is time spent on the basic needs of children, including breast feeding,
rocking a child to sleep, general feeding, changing diapers, providing medical care (ei-
ther directly or indirectly), grooming, and so on. “Educational” child care is time spent
reading to children, teaching children, helping children with homework, attending meet-
ings at a child’s school, and similar activities. “Recreational” child care involves playing
games with children, playing outdoors with children, attending a child’s sporting event,
going to the zoo and taking walks with children. “Travel” child care is any travel related
to any of the three categories of child care. For example, driving a child to school, to aChapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 76
From an economic perspective, this positive education gradient in child
care can be viewed as surprising, given that the opportunity cost of time is
higher for higher-educated parents. Yamauchi (2009) departs from previous
research by providing evidence on the relationship between parental educa-
tion and children’s outcomes. His results suggest that educated and men-
tally healthier parents are likely to have children with better outcomes. Ed-
ucated parents are more frequently engaged in education-oriented activities
with their children and mentally healthier parents exhibit more favourable
parenting practices relating to children’s behavioural and socio-emotional
outcomes.
Table C.9 provides an overview of the marginal eﬀects of the number
of children on the likelihood of the diﬀerent happiness outcomes based on
educational background of the households. The presence of only one child
decreases the probability for the higher happiness outcomes (2, 3 and 4),
while it increases the likelihood of being in the lowest outcome (1) in case
of all individuals or for individuals having full school education. These
ﬁndings are statistically signiﬁcant. Considering individuals with less than
full school education, ﬁve to six may be the ideal number of children, but
on pure statistical grounds we fail to provide conclusive evidence.
Overall, the results obtained are in line with the cited literature. We
may conclude based on Table C.8 that parental education is important to
the children’s outcomes. For instance, the higher-educated parents may put
a lot of eﬀorts in bettering their children in terms of education, food, health
etc. and thus reap higher both monetary and non-monetary rewards in re-
turn. Less-educated parents, in contrast, may lack parental skills for taking
good care of their children in those dimensions which might adversely aﬀect
their children’s outcomes. In addition, the chances of infants’ mortality are
also higher in less educated families as a consequence of poor health care.
Parental characteristics may therefore well aﬀect children’s outcomes which
in turn will have a bearing on the household’s subjective poverty.
4.5 Alternative measures
To test whether income remains insigniﬁcant for alternative poverty mea-
surement approaches we moreover employ model (4.2) for the other response
variables. Since happiness is a rather “soft” concept, it seems more straight-
forward to use subjective categories which focus more on ﬁnancial terms.
doctor, or to sports practise are all included in “travel” child care.C
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Table 4.11: Results by ﬁnancial satisfaction.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. Figure in brackets[ ] are p values.
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with
income expenditure
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Male -0.5428*** 0.2116 -0.5736*** 0.2307
Age -0.0554 0.0665 -0.0890 0.0683
AgeSquared 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007
Years of Education 0.0327* 0.0197 0.0255 0.0195
No. Of children:
1 -1.3544*** 0.3910 -1.2625*** 0.4075
2 -0.9664** 0.4285 -1.1644** 0.5467
3 -0.7074* 0.3808 -0.7840** 0.4063
4 -0.4815 0.3763 -0.5477 0.4036
5 -0.4180 0.3809 -0.4836 0.4000
6 -0.5291 0.3891 -0.5070 0.4207
7 or more Reference Group
Unemployed -0.1556 0.1665 -0.0840 0.1717
Log of household’s income 0.3272* 0.1718 0.4261*** 0.1687C
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Table 4.11: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with
income expenditure
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Log of relative income 0.4816 0.6905 0.5014 0.6951
Couple 0.0978 0.1741 0.0600 0.1816
Health Satisfaction index:
4 Reference Group
3 -0.2383 0.1902 -0.2678 0.1824
2 -0.1207 0.1967 -0.0231 0.1953
1 -0.1651 0.2213 -0.0987 0.2178
0 -1.5871*** 0.3416 -1.4108*** 0.3177
Region:
Punjab 1.3073*** 0.1444 1.3593*** 0.1484
NWFP -0.2809* 0.1604 -0.1118 0.1501
Sind (dropped)
Baluchistan Reference Group
/cut1 -2.4251 2.2049 -2.1088 2.2152
/cut2 1.0449 2.1940 0.8925 2.2007
/cut3 2.8372 2.2031 2.9559 2.2169C
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Table 4.11: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with
income expenditure
Log pseudolikelihood -446.98337 -432.94983
Obs 600 600
Wald χ2(12) 382.10 340.14
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1866 0.1907
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with
income expenditure
.linktest Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err.
-hat 0.8943*** 0.1595 0.9116*** 0.1454
[0.000] [0.000]
-hatsq 0.0597 0.0866 0.0603 0.0928
[0.491] [0.516]
/cut1 -2.3990 0.1329 -2.0829 0.1260
/cut2 1.0312 0.0834 0.8931 0.0803
/cut3 2.8298 0.1484 2.9661 0.1684C
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Table 4.11: (continued)
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with
income expenditure
.linktest
Log pseudolikelihood -446.80168 -432.76776
Obs 600 600
Wald χ2(12) 170.43 164.82
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1869 0.1911
. test χ2(6) 27.92 χ2(6) 25.13
(using dummies for No. of children) prob>χ2 0.0001 prob>chi2 0.0003C
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Table 4.12: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit; results by ﬁ-
nancial satisfaction.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Outcome: Satisfaction with income
. mfx, predict(p outcome())
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Satisfaction with income==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.00032308
y = Pr(Satisfaction with income==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.52300195
y = Pr(Satisfaction with income==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.444576
y = Pr(Satisfaction with income==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.03209897
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
Male* 0.0003* 0.0002 0.2105*** 0.0773 -0.1513*** 0.0467 -0.0595* 0.0338
Age 0.0001 0.0001 0.0220 0.0264 -0.0181 0.0217 -0.0040 0.0049
AgeSquared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001
Education 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0130* 0.0078 0.0107* 0.0065 0.0024 0.0015C
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Table 4.12: (continued)
Outcome: Satisfaction with income
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.0195 0.0194 0.3787*** 0.0450 -0.3667*** 0.0601 -0.0315*** 0.0082
2* 0.0066 0.0085 0.3199*** 0.0969 -0.2958*** 0.1007 -0.0307*** 0.0088
3* 0.0021 0.0025 0.2639** 0.1267 -0.2310** 0.1166 -0.0350** 0.0150
4* 0.0007 0.0008 0.1886 0.1438 -0.1564 0.1200 -0.0329 0.0257
5* 0.0008 0.0012 0.1622 0.1421 -0.1386 0.1255 -0.0244 0.0187
6* 0.0013 0.0018 0.2012 0.1372 -0.1752 0.1249 -0.0273* 0.0155
Unemployed* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0616 0.0656 -0.0512 0.0554 -0.0106 0.0107
Log of household’s income -0.0004 0.0003 -0.1299** 0.0683 0.1068* 0.0563 0.0235* 0.0134
Log of relative income -0.0006 0.0009 -0.1912 0.2742 0.1572 0.2250 0.0347 0.0506
Couple* -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0387 0.0687 0.0322 0.0576 0.0067 0.0115
Health Satisfaction Index:
3* 0.0003 0.0004 0.0940 0.0743 -0.0785 0.0630 -0.0159 0.0121
2* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0478 0.0776 -0.0396 0.0651 -0.0084 0.0129
1* 0.0002 0.0004 0.0652 0.0867 -0.0545 0.0740 -0.0110 0.0134
0* 0.0319 0.0247 0.4021*** 0.0294 -0.4004*** 0.0442 -0.0336*** 0.0086
Region:
Punjab* -0.0044** 0.0021 -0.4737*** 0.0461 0.3922*** 0.0414 0.0859*** 0.0194
NWFP* 0.0005 0.0004 0.1099* 0.0613 -0.0934* 0.0539 -0.0169** 0.0088C
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Table 4.12: (continued)
Outcome: Satisfaction with expenditure
. mfx, predict(p outcome())
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Satisfaction with expenditure==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.00161063
y = Pr(Satisfaction with expenditure==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.52052488
y = Pr(Satisfaction with expenditure==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.46081717
y = Pr(Satisfaction with expenditure==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.01704732
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std.Err. dy/dx Std.Err. dy/dx Std.Err. dy/dx Std.Err.
Male* 0.0016** 0.0007 0.2202*** 0.0829 -0.1810*** 0.0595 -0.0409 0.0268
Age 0.0005 0.0004 0.0350 0.0269 -0.0317 0.0243 -0.0038 0.0032
AgeSquared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Education -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0100 0.0077 0.0091 0.0070 0.0011 0.0009
No. of children:
1* 0.0444 0.0405 0.3400*** 0.0377 -0.3677*** 0.0704 -0.0167*** 0.0058
2* 0.0344 0.0440 0.3362*** 0.0679 -0.3533*** 0.1075 -0.0173*** 0.0061
3* 0.0096 0.0101 0.2822** 0.1241 -0.2706** 0.1265 -0.0212** 0.0098
4* 0.0036 0.0037 0.2112 0.1502 -0.1928 0.1380 -0.0219 0.0171C
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Table 4.12: (continued)
Outcome: Satisfaction with expenditure
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std.Err. dy/dx Std.Err. dy/dx Std.Err. dy/dx Std.Err.
5* 0.0040 0.0053 0.1835 0.1430 -0.1719 0.1382 -0.0156 0.0111
6* 0.0048 0.0067 0.1899 0.1452 -0.1797 0.1429 -0.0150 0.0099
Unemployed* 0.0005 0.0010 0.0330 0.0672 -0.0300 0.0617 -0.0034 0.0066
Log of household’s income -0.0022* 0.0013 -0.1675*** 0.0664 0.1517*** 0.0604 0.0180** 0.0089
Log of relative income -0.0026 0.0038 -0.1971 0.2733 0.1785 0.2475 0.0212 0.0302
Couple* -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0235 0.0711 0.0214 0.0649 0.0024 0.0073
Health Satisfaction Index:
3* 0.0016 0.0015 0.1043 0.0701 -0.0956 0.0651 -0.0103 0.0070
2* 0.0001 0.0011 0.0091 0.0767 -0.0082 0.0697 -0.0010 0.0081
1* 0.0006 0.0014 0.0387 0.0850 -0.0353 0.0784 -0.0040 0.0080
0* 0.0582 0.0375 0.3541*** 0.0285 -0.3946*** 0.0505 -0.0178*** 0.0061
Region:
Punjab* -0.0169*** 0.0061 -0.4774*** 0.0450 0.4399*** 0.0439 0.0545*** 0.0160
NWFP* 0.0007 0.0010 0.0437 0.0584 -0.0400 0.0539 -0.0044 0.0056Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 85
Table 4.11 shows the results of the oprobit regressions that can be com-
pared with the baseline results. According to Table 4.11, male are less likely
to be satisﬁed with their ﬁnances (income/expenditure) compared to female
households. Education increases the probability of ﬁnancial satisfaction,
particularly in terms of satisfaction with income. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial
satisfaction is a positive function of education; however, the estimate is
signiﬁcantly positively associated with the income measure. Furthermore,
households having more children are more likely to be ﬁnancially satisﬁed
compared to households with less or fewer children. As expected, a higher
income increases the likelihood of ﬁnancial satisfaction and vice versa. Sim-
ilarly, a higher level of health satisfaction increases the probability of the
household’s ﬁnancial satisfaction. Regarding regional eﬀects, people in Pun-
jab are most likely to be satisﬁed with their income/expenditure compared
to the other provinces.
As far as the model speciﬁcation is concerned, our model has been prop-
erly speciﬁed as shown in Table 4.11. The linktest is statistically insignif-
icant. The variable _hat is highly signiﬁcant in either case, which indi-
cates that the model is properly speciﬁed. The variable _hatsq appears to
be statistically insigniﬁcant, which suggests that all the relevant variables
have been included in the model and the link function is correctly speciﬁed.
We also test the joint signiﬁcance of the dummies used for the number of
children (per household) by applying the test command in STATA as re-
ported in Table 4.11. The higher chi-square values and the correspondingly
lower p-values indicate that the estimates are not jointly signiﬁcant; and
thus we reject the null hypothesis of all the coeﬃcients being equal to zero
and accept the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the coeﬃcients is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Table 4.12 shows marginal eﬀects after applying an ordered probit re-
gression model to (4.2), using ﬁnancial satisfaction (satisfaction with in-
come/expenditure) as response variable. According to Table 4.12, being a
male increases the probability to be observed in the lower categories (1 and
2) of ﬁnancial satisfaction; and decreases the probability to be in the higher
ﬁnancial satisfaction categories (3 and 4). A large family size is beneﬁcial
in terms of ﬁnancial satisfaction of a household. Compared to the reference
category of seven or more children, a small family of one to three children re-
duces the chances of a household of being in the higher ﬁnancial satisfaction
categories (3 and 4), whilst increasing the likelihood of being in the lower
outcome category (2). Similarly, households with lower health outcomes
have an increased chance to be observed in the lower category (2) of ﬁnan-Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 86
cial satisfaction while it lowers the chances of being in the higher response
categories (3 and 4). Higher income leads to higher ﬁnancial outcomes even
on pure subjective grounds. For instance, higher income increases the likeli-
hood of being in the higher categories (3 and 4) of ﬁnancial satisfaction and
at the same time decreases the probability of being in the lower response
categories (i.e. 1 or 2). Similarly, higher education ensures higher income
satisfaction; for instance, education increases the likelihood of being in the
higher category (3) of income satisfaction and decreases the probability to
be observed in the lower category (2) of income satisfaction. However, we
cannot conﬁrm such a pattern in case of satisfaction with expenditure on
pure statistical grounds. As far as regional eﬀects are concerned, we ﬁnd
that compared to other provinces, being in Punjab increases the chances to
be observed in the categories of higher ﬁnancial satisfaction (i.e. 3 and 4),
whereas it reduces the chances of being in the lower categories of ﬁnancial
satisfaction (i.e. 1 and 2). In other words, we may say that people in Punjab
are most likely to be satisﬁed with their income or expenditure compared
to the people belonging to the rest of the given provinces.
Summing up, we see that using this more direct approach, income does
matter also on subjective grounds. Estimates are signiﬁcantly positively as-
sociated with the corresponding measure. Closely related to higher income
levels is the degree of schooling in the developing world. Indeed, the vari-
able capturing years of education is signiﬁcantly positively associated with
the subjective poverty measures, all other things held constant. Similarly, a
higher health index and an increased number of children also seem to be pos-
itively associated with the household’s reported ﬁnancial well-being (that
is satisfaction with income/expenditure).19 Unlike our baseline results, ﬁ-
nancial satisfaction appears to be U-shaped in age. The estimated turning
point corresponds to the age of 55 years. This is similar to Easterlin (2006)
who also reports evidence of a U-shaped relationship between ﬁnancial sat-
isfaction and age in the US. Such a pattern, however, cannot be conﬁrmed
for the case at hand in purely statistical terms. Given the limited public
provision of social security (for instance, pensions, old age beneﬁts, etc.)
in Pakistan, one would expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between
these two variables.
Comparing all three measures of subjective well-being poverty (both di-
rect and indirect measures), a somewhat consistent picture seems to emerge:
We may conclude that the level of education, health and the number of chil-
19The expenditure or income approach can be considered as two sides of the same
coin here. We elaborate on this idea in section 4.2.Chapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 87
dren matter the most both in econometric and economic terms. In particu-
lar, a large family size of at least 7 children seems to be vital. Our ﬁndings
thus support the notion of children as insurance mechanism in developing
countries. In areas such as rural Pakistan children are integrated in the
family life early on. Many of them contribute considerably to the over-
all household income already at a young age. Our results suggest that the
number of children is one of the major determinants of subjective well-being
poverty in rural Pakistan.
4.6 Conclusion
We use in this Chapter the dataset for rural Pakistan to shed light on is-
sues associated with subjective well-being. This is to our knowledge the
ﬁrst study of life satisfaction in this part of the developing world. We not
only provide a good deal of descriptive information but also test various
measures in relation to overall and ﬁnancial well-being using a regression
model with categorical variables. Our main contributions are the following.
First, we link the emerging ﬁeld of the economics of happiness with devel-
opment studies. In particular, we construct subjective well-being measures
to evaluate poverty, highlighting their diﬀerences but also similarities. Sec-
ond, we intend to challenge the view of poverty being a purely macro-level
phenomenon which is based on a conventional nominal (either absolute or
relative) metric. We demonstrate that analysing the issue on a more micro-
level allows for a much richer analysis and more diﬀerentiated insights.
Based on data for rural Pakistan, we employ diﬀerent ways of measuring
subjective well-being: overall satisfaction with socio-economic status (hap-
piness), satisfaction with income and satisfaction with expenditure. Our
results suggest that happiness is the broader measure which seems to cap-
ture reasonably well other important components of poverty. In particular
health and the level of education matter most in economic and economet-
ric terms using this well-being metric. With income being insigniﬁcant,
the notion of happiness in this context encompasses the idea of capabilities
poverty. However, the approach here is more general than this as it also
incorporates important and often neglected socio-economic factors such as
the number of children in a household.
On the other hand, alternative approaches to well-being are found to be
more appropriate in capturing the conventional notion of income poverty;
with income being highly signiﬁcant in either case. We ﬁnd that both overallChapter 4. Well-being and poverty in rural Pakistan: a subjective approach 88
and ﬁnancial satisfaction are positive functions of income.
Our model is general enough to be mapped onto diﬀerent categorical
variables capturing subjective poverty: more indirect but comprehensive
measures such as happiness but also reported satisfaction with income and
expenditure.
The baseline results moreover conﬁrm ﬁndings common in the well-being
literature: Happiness increases among females, married couples, educated
and healthy individuals. Unlike other studies, particularly for industrialised
nations, an inverted (as opposed to a conventional) U-shaped pattern char-
acterises the age-happiness proﬁle. While this ﬁnding matches theoretical
considerations, the jury is still out to provide convincing empirical evidence
for either shape.
Pakistan shares distinct demographic features with many other devel-
oping countries: It is characterised by a large population as well as high
population growth and fertility rates. As expected, the socio-economic en-
vironment is crucial for explaining perceived poverty. Our analysis suggests
a positive eﬀect of the number of children on individual household’s life sat-
isfaction – a result which has not yet been established in such a framework.
Elaborating on the children eﬀect, our analysis furthermore suggests
that children increase well-being among elderly, highly educated and those
with low income. This may be attributed to the rural environment in which
children typically are integrated in domestic activities early on; yet given the
generally low level of education, children become increasingly less productive
and rather create an additional ﬁnancial burden for the family. A large
family size only seems to be associated with happiness in educated families.
The economics of happiness is still in its infancy, yet it seems to oﬀer
promising approaches for development studies. This Chapter is a further
contribution to linking these two ﬁelds. Ultimately, further ground is to
be established from which also other development issues may be analysed
from a more psychological perspective in conjunction with solid economic
underpinnings.Chapter 5
Socio-economic determinants of
health in rural Pakistan: relative
or absolute standards?
Chapter Summary
This Chapter addresses key aspects of health inequality. We anal-
yse in particular to what extent income determines household-speciﬁc
health outcomes in rural Pakistan using our survey data. Controlling
for various socio-economic characteristics, we investigate the validity
of three income-health hypotheses: the Absolute Income Hypothe-
sis (AIH), the Relative Income Hypothesis (RIH) and the Income
Inequality Hypothesis (IIH). Whilst these hypotheses crucially dif-
fer in their exact substance, broadly speaking, those refer to the idea
that a household’s health status might be linked to the existing socio-
economic environment. Households with a more favourable income
position (either in absolute, relative or distributional terms) might
enjoy a better health status. We employ a general empirical spec-
iﬁcation that nests diﬀerent health functions as special cases. This
permits testing the income-health hypotheses separately and jointly.
To ensure robustness of our results, we moreover employ diﬀerent es-
timation techniques which allow for alternative health measures. We
ﬁnd that in rural Pakistan especially relative income (with respect to
the relevant community) is a major determinant of health. This is in
contrast to results typically reported for developed countries, where
in particular the household’s absolute income position appears to
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matter. The study provides two important insights into the causes
of health inequalities. Firstly, higher relative income improves health
directly because of higher social support and other psychosocial rea-
sons. Secondly, in reference to the IIH, higher income inequality
improves health outcomes, speciﬁcally, of the households with higher
relative income in a community.
5.1 Introduction
It has become increasingly acknowledged in both social and health sciences
that a range of socio-economic factors contribute to inequalities in health.
If this was the case, individual health outcomes would more and more hinge
on the household’s wealth and income status rather than purely immaterial
determinants such as genetics or luck. In this Chapter we aim to investigate
the link between income and health in rural Pakistan. Against the backdrop
of a relatively underdeveloped public health system there, we seek to anal-
yse in particular several key income-health hypotheses that are commonly
considered in the health economics literature. We do so using diﬀerent
econometric modelling strategies and by comparing our results with other
both developed and emerging economies.
The relationship between health and income tends to be framed in terms
of three related hypotheses. The Absolute Income Hypothesis (AIH) states
that a household’s health depends on its own level of income, independent
of the ﬁnancial situation of its peers. In other words, the AIH suggests that
the higher an individual’s income, the lower the risk of being unhealthy.
The Relative Income Hypothesis (RIH), on the other hand, claims that at
any given level of income, the household’s health depends on its income
in relation to society. This implies that a higher social status provides
increasing psychosocial satisfaction and thus ensures better health. For the
RIH the distribution of income matters such that living in an environment
characterised by a relatively unequal income distribution is hypothesised to
cause psycho-social stress, leading to a worsening of health outcomes. This
is captured by the related Income Inequlity Hypothesis (IIH). One may argue
that living in a place with an unequal income distribution leads to social or
ethnic inequalities such that relatively deprived people do not have access
to a proper and eﬃcient health care system (which might explain social
and ethnic inequalities in health), and are prone to get sick and thus visit
doctors more frequently. Relative income as well as the income distribution
are often labelled as “psychosocial determinants” of health, even thoughChapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 91
they are triggered by material standards such as income.
From a policy maker’s perspective, it is therefore essential to disentan-
gle the empirical importance of each of these hypotheses. Does relative
income dominate over absolute one? In which form does the distribution of
income matter at all? Diﬀerent policy recommendations would obviously
arise depending on the estimation outcomes. We therefore employ diﬀer-
ent estimators to robustify our ﬁndings. In particular, we resort to OLS
estimations, ordered probit as well as Poisson regression models.
The majority of the studies for developed countries thus far tends to
provide evidence in favour of the AIH in comparison to the RIH with only
a few exceptions. Results on the validity of the IIH are mixed, however.
Studies based on US population data, overall, tend to favour the AIH, re-
jecting the RIH and providing little or no support for the IIH (Wagstaﬀ and
Doorslaer, 2000). Similarly, Lindley and Lorgelly (2005) used data for the
UK provided by the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to test for and
to distinguish between the AIH vis-à-vis the RIH. The longitudinal nature
of their data moreover allowed them to investigate the dynamic evolution
of the given hypotheses. They provide strong evidence to support the AIH,
and found that the RIH does not seem to hold over time within the UK.
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) analysed Swedish panel data comprising
more that 40,000 adults who were followed over 10-17 years. Whilst their
results are consistent with the AIH, they fail to conﬁrm either the RIH or
IIH. Marmot et al. (1991), on the other hand, analysing health inequalities
among British Civil Servants (Whitehall II study) found that in lower ad-
ministrative ranks, it is indeed relative rather than absolute income that is
important for health such that a low relative income has a detrimental eﬀect
on the health status. Lobmayer and Wilkinson (2000) conducted a multi-
country study based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).1 Overall, the
results cannot conﬁrm the idea of more egalitarian societies reporting better
health suggesting that the IIH does not hold.
Amid the inconclusive evidence on the IIH, Mellor and Milyo (2002)
suggest investigating this postulated health-income relationship from two
angles (i.e. in the strong or weak form). The strong version of the IIH
implies that inequality adversely aﬀects all members in a society equally,
regardless of their ﬁnancial status. The weak version states that income in-
1Their analysis covered the following 14 OECD countries in alphabetical order: Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (former West) Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US; excluding Luxembourg given its
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equality is harmful to the health of only the least well oﬀ in a society. Mellor
and Milyo (2002)’s analysis is based on the US Current Population Survey
(CPS) data from 1995-1999 and examines the eﬀect of income inequality on
individual health status for both the general individuals and those individ-
uals living in poverty. However, they fail to establish consistent evidence of
the IIH in either form. On the other hand, Li and Zhu (2006) tested the
two versions of the IIH for China. They used China Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS) data for ﬁve years (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000). Over-
all, their results provide evidence supporting the strong version but failed
to conﬁrm the IIH in its weak form.
Research has shown that micro data rather than macro data appears to
be more appropriate to discriminate between the competing income-health
hypotheses. For instance, Smith (1999) using aggregate data for interna-
tional comparisons found that a distinction between the eﬀects of (absolute
and relative) income and income inequality on health can hardly be drawn.
This is due to a potential concave association between income and indi-
vidual health. This form of non-linearity in the income-health relationship
causes income inequality and health to move in opposite directions on an
aggregate level. Wagstaﬀ and Doorslaer (2000), therefore, favour the use of
micro data over macro data as well.
Our study is based on micro survey data and comprises 600 represen-
tative households of rural Pakistan. We test the three income-health hy-
potheses (AIH, RIH, IIH), while controlling for individual socio-economic
characteristics of the households like gender, age, education, marital status
and family size. There is a considerable literature investigating these hy-
potheses using individual-level data. Those studies are typically based on
self-assessed health, infant health or mortality rates as proxies of health out-
comes. In particular, Meara (1999) focused on infant health (i.e. low birth
weight), Mellor and Milyo (2002) used the self-reported health status and
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) considered mortality as relevant health
measure. In contrast to those studies, we use as health variable the number
of visits to a doctor (DocV isits) made at the household level during the
given year. Our study is particularly in line with the paper by Gerdtham
and Johannesson (2004), who were the ﬁrst to explicitly discriminate be-
tween the three health-income hypotheses in a coherent setting. Further
studies to test the hypotheses jointly are Fiscella and Franks (1997); Daly
et al. (1998); Meara (1999) and Mellor and Milyo (2002). However, most
of them tend to focus on the IIH without in some cases even reporting re-
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we consider it is important to realise the links and associations among the
diﬀerent health-income hypothesis. We therefore strive to set up a frame-
work that is general enough to permit testing all three key hypotheses in a
coherent setting.
Despite these unique strengths (micro data, simultaneous testing set-
up, robustness checks), our analysis and dataset also carry some limitations
which need to be mentioned. First, it should be noted that Pakistan is
an agrarian economy with 70% of its population living in rural areas that
are engaged in subsistence agriculture. Income is as a result more equally
distributed because most workers have very low levels of income. In other
words, incomes are concentrated at low levels and that concentration dom-
inates the overall distribution of income. This may make the rural side
of Pakistan not an ideal laboratory to test the IIH. However, it may be
the case that apart from the level of income inequality, the variations in
income inequality across geographical regions also matter. In such a case,
there is suﬃcient variations in income inequality across the sample districts.
That is, 97% of the total income inequality in rural Pakistan is explained
by inequality between the districts. The remaining 3% are explained by in-
equality within the districts.2 A further limitation is that we have measured
relative income and income inequality only at the district level rather than
considering the sample as a whole. It might be the case, however, that it is
important to test the given hypotheses at the country level as well – which
is not supported by the available data.3 Furthermore, we assume that the
association between health and socio-economic status (SES), whether mea-
sured by education, gender, or income is largely due to the eﬀects of SES on
health, not vice versa following (Doornbos and Kromhout, 1990; Fox et al.,
1985; Power et al., 1990; Wilkinson, 1986). This one-way causality is in line
with the most part of the health economics literature.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. We ﬁrst provide
in Section 5.2 general background information on the relationship between
healthcare systems and their impact on health inequalities with special ref-
erence to Pakistan to motivate our health measure. Section 5.3 summarises
the data and describes the empirical speciﬁcation. Section 5.4 presents and
discusses our empirical results. The Chapter ends with concluding remarks
and policy recommendations in Section 5.5.
2See Chapter 3 for details.
3Recall that our dataset considers cross-sections and focuses on rural Pakistan only.Chapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 94
5.2 Inequalities in health and the healthcare sys-
tem
Health depends on a number of factors, including biological factors, envi-
ronmental factors, nutrition, and the standard of living. In other words,
health can be seen as a function of welfare. Few of the issues which cause
ill health are dealt with directly by ‘health services’; they are, rather, is-
sues in the ‘welfare state’ as a whole. When in the 19th century, Chadwick
identiﬁed poor health as a major cause of pauperism, his response was to
improve sanitation, not to introduce more extensive medical care. Most
of the world’s diseases are attributable to poor water supply or nutrition.
‘Health services’ are thus better described as medical services.
There are clear diﬀerences in the incidence of ill health by social class.
All studies cited above show a close link between health and social inequal-
ity. People in lower social classes, including children, are more likely to
suﬀer from infective and parasitic diseases, pneumonia, poisonings or vio-
lence. Adults in lower social classes are more likely, in addition, to suﬀer
from cancer, heart disease and respiratory disease. Lower class people have
more time oﬀ work, pay more visits to the doctor and are likely to be
chronically ill. As part of 1999 General Household Survey, ONS statisti-
cians looked at 1,200 workless households, containing at least one person
of working age. They found that 32% of the members of workless house-
holds reported chronic illnesses, compared with 12.5% of those in working
household.4
There are several possible explanations for these inequalities. For in-
stance, poverty leads to ill health through nutrition, housing and environ-
ment. Another explanation may lie in cultural and behavioural aspects.
There are, for example, diﬀerences in the diet and ﬁtness of diﬀerent social
classes and in certain habits like smoking. There are moreover often major
inequalities in access to health care according to social class. The problem
becomes what Tudor Hart once called an ’inverse care law’ implying that
those individuals in the worst health condition receive the least services.
The inverse care law proposed by Julian Tudor Hart in 1971 states that
‘the availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need
4The General Household Survey (GHS) is a survey conducted on an annual basis
by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) and collects data about private households
in Great Britain. The aim of this survey is to provide government departments and
organisation with information on a range of topics concerning private households for
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for it in the population served’. The law explains the fact that poor people
with chronic illness and diseases actually need and deserve good medical
care but they cannot aﬀord it and vice-versa. Apart from income, location,
race/ethnicity and gender may also explain health inequalities in general.
Before proceeding with testing all the three income-health hypotheses
in rural Pakistan, it may be helpful to obtain a better understanding of the
existing healthcare system in Pakistan. In Pakistan, the public health ser-
vices and hospitals are relatively cheap compared to the private ones, but the
standard they provide is not satisfactory. It involves a lot of administrative
delays and poor health facilities. The public hospitals are very ineﬃcient
compared to the private clinics/hospitals in providing proper treatments
to their patients and on proper time. This leads to prolonged and chronic
sickness and diseases and the patients have to suﬀer rather strongly and
for long and need to pay as a result more visits to doctors. However, the
majority of the people still go to these hospitals because they cannot aﬀord
the private doctors. Those who are relatively better-oﬀ ﬁnancially, on the
other hand, can visit the private doctors and receive the proper treatment
within good time, and are thus able to avoid frequent visits to a doctor.
Based on those features inherent in the healthcare system in Pakistan, it
thus appears plausible to use the number of times a household visits to a
doctor as a variable in order to evaluate the household’s health as well as
its ﬁnancial status within society.
5.3 Data and methodology
Our survey data provides household-level data on health and diﬀerent socio-
economic variables like income, family size, education, marital status, age
and sex of the household’s head. The household’s health status is deter-
mined by the number of visits to a doctor. The following question has
been asked from the household head: “During the last 12 months, how
many times has someone in your household visited a doctor?”. The answers
included: none, once, twice, three times, four times (or more). In the fol-
lowing, we deﬁne a health satisfaction index (h) that is considered here as
continuous variable. The index is inferred from the number of visits to a
doctor (DocVisits). More speciﬁcally, households are ranked according to
the number of visits. A higher rank (4, 3, 2, 1, 0) corresponds to a lower
frequency of visits. This implies that a lower health index index reﬂects a
lower health status (captured by a relatively higher number of doctor visits).Chapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 96
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics
No. of doctor visits Health index
(DocVisits) (h)
Mean 2 -
Standard deviation 1.25 -
Frequency of visits:
0 11.33% 4
1 31.50% 3
2 30.33% 2
3 25.17% 1
4 or more times 1.67% 0
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for household’s health variables.
Source: Survey 2008.
Table 5.1 illustrates the concept and provides some descriptive statistics.
The health distribution is skewed towards the lower health scales with the
mass of the distribution being concentrated on that side. For instance, the
given distribution shows that 11.33% and 31.50% of the observations are
reporting higher health indices i.e. 4 and 3, respectively. While more than
half of the population (nearly 60%) ﬁnds itselt at the lower health scales.
This suggests a overall fairly unequal distribution of health.
Inequalities in health can arise for various reasons. Most countries iden-
tify diﬀerences in health status by social grouping and economic status.
To single out the eﬀects of income on health inequalities, we investigate
in particular the AIH, RIH and IIH. We ﬁrst want to ensure that such a
proposed link between income and health exists for our data. We therefore
calculate the correlation coeﬃcient between health and the rank of a house-
hold within the income distribution (used as proxy of relative income).5 We
use relative income to capture the socio-economic status which is said to
aﬀect the health status (see e.g. Wagstaﬀ et al. (1989); Humphries and
van Doorslaer (2000); Gerdtham and Johanneson (2000); Doorslaer et al.
(1997); Doorslaer and Koolman (2000) and Bommier and Stecklov (2002)).
5See Li and Zhu (2006) for further methodological details.Chapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 97
This can be computed as follows:
Ch,R =
cov(hi,Ri)
q
var(h)var(R)
= 0.224, (i = 1,2,3.....600) (5.1)
where hi is the health variable of a household, Ri is the ith household’s
fractional rank in the income distribution, cov is the covariance between
the two and var measures the variance of the given variables.6 Equation
(5.1) suggests that health is positively correlated with the income ranking
of a household in the given income distribution such that higher income
groups are relatively better-oﬀ in terms of health and vice versa.
The household’s relative income in social comparisons is assessed with
respect to the average income of the overall society or community.7 The
average income, however, may vary across a certain group, community or
region (Wagstaﬀ and Doorslaer, 2000). Economists therefore prefer to mea-
sure relative household income at the community level for cross-sectional
data. In our case, the community might be considered to correspond to a
district.8 Thus, the relative income at community/district level is given by
(yr)ij =
yi
yj
,
where (yr)ij is the relative income of ith household in district j, yi denotes
absolute income of the ith household and yj represents the average income
of the jth district.
In analysing the relationship between income and health, we consider in
particular two key hypotheses: the AIH and the RIH. The AIH seeks to in-
vestigate a relationship between the household’s income and health status,
whereas according to the RIH, health is rather aﬀected by relative income
diﬀerentials. The RIH builds upon the claim that low relative income in-
creases psychosocial stress which may lead to physical illness (Cohen et al.
(1991); Cohen et al. (1997)).9 Similarly, several studies suggest that it is in
6In fractional ranking, items that compare equal receive the same ranking number,
which is the mean of what they would have under ordinal rankings. Furthermore, in
ordinal ranking, all items receive distinct ordinal numbers (1, 2, 3, and so on..), including
items that compare equal.
7This implies that relative incomes with positive or negative values indicate the house-
hold’s income to be greater than or less than the average income of society, respectively.
8We are using the words “community” and “district” interchangeably in the remain-
der.
9Low social status/prestige and lack of control and awareness are often labelled as
psychosocial determinants of health, even though they may be triggered by material
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fact an individual’s relative income instead of absolute income that matters
(Marmot et al. (1991); Wilkinson (1997); Wilkinson (1998)). If this were
the case, a doubling of everyone’s income would have no eﬀect on health.
Such arguments explain income eﬀects psycho-socially, rather than in mate-
rialistic terms and have lead to a model of health in which social coherence
plays an important role. Additionally, the individual’s health is also at-
tributed to the distribution of income within a society. For instance, living
in a region with an unequal distribution of income by itself aﬄicts health
(Wilkinson, 1996), which is related to psychosocial mechanisms rather than
material deprivation.
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics of material and psychosocial de-
terminants of health for our sample.10 Income inequality is measured here
in terms of the Gini coeﬃcient. This is arguably the most commonly used
measure of income inequality in testing the IIH in an attempt to establish
a relationship between income inequality and health (see, amongst others,
Kennedy et al. (1998); Mellor and Milyo (2001); Soobader and LeClere
(1999)).
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Absolute income yi 600 3515.58 1207.88 1596 6938
Relative income(yr)ij 600 1.00 0.08 0.79 1.24
Income inequality of district Gj% 10 4.42 2.19 1.6 8.1
Table 5.2: Material and psychosocial determinants of health.
Source: Survey 2008.
Note: All income ﬁgures are related to the households’ monthly incomes in
Pakistani currency (PKR).
In our survey, individuals are grouped into 10 districts. We estimated
the inequality index Gij at the household level such that households living
within the same district have been assigned the same index. Inequality
hence diﬀers across districts but not across households within any given
district.11
10See Kawachi et al. (2002) for further methodological details.
11Gij is a contextual variable that varies across districts but has the same value for
all the households within a district. A similar idea has been presented by (Blalock, 1984)
and (Lindley and Lorgelly, 2005) in order to explain individual-level variables by using
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hi yi (yr)ij
hi 1
yi 0.1865*** 1
(yr)ij 0.7045*** 0.2148*** 1
Table 5.3: Correlation matrix between health and income variables.
N = 600 households. *, **, *** indicates signiﬁcance level of 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
Table 5.3 reports the correlations between health and the income vari-
ables. According to Table 5.3, health is positively correlated to income in
general. But the correlation is much stronger in case of relative income
((yr)ij) compared to the absolute income (yi) of the household.
5.3.2 Empirical speciﬁcation
The measure of health that we use as endogenous variable throughout the
Chapter is the health h of ith household, hi. Health is measured on a
numerical scale ranging from 0 to 4, derived from the answer to the question:
“During the last 12 months, how many times has someone in your household
visited a doctor?”. As discussed above, answers include: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or
greater.
Our regressions include a list of control variables relating to the house-
holds whose eﬀects on health have been shown to be important in the lit-
erature. These control variables are in particular: age, sex, income (both
absolute and relative), district-speciﬁc income inequality, marital status,
kids, family size and education. More speciﬁcally, to capture age we use
the household’s head age. We create two dummies for sex of the household’s
head such that if female = 1 otherwise 0. The household’s absolute income
and relative income (with respect to the district) are expressed in logarith-
mic terms. Similarly, the variable measuring the degree of income inequal-
ity in the districts will be considered in percentage terms in our regressions.
For marital status and kids we create dummies. If it is a couple = 1 (dual
parent family) or otherwise 0. Similarly, the case of the household having
kids (aged less than 16 years and living with their parents) is assigned 1
or 0 otherwise. The total number of household members determines the
familysize. The education variable is measured by the number of yearsChapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 100
of education of the household’s head. Table D.1 presents the correlations
between the given controls that we use as socio-economic determinants of
health in our regressions. Our discussion focuses on the two relationships
that are found to be statistically signiﬁcant. According to Table D.1, age
is negatively correlated with being a female (r = -0.1264), while the signiﬁ-
cance of the estimated coeﬃcient conﬁrms that life-expectancy of females is
lower compared to males in developing countries like Pakistan. In line with
Pakistan’s demographic features (Pakistan is the sixth most populous coun-
try in the world with an average birth rate is 27.52 births/1,000 population
(CIA, 2008)), this negative relationship is in line with intuition: women give
birth to a relatively high number of children which adversely aﬀects their
health and life expectancy. The correlation between family size and kids is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant (r = 0.1592). This positive relationship
conﬁrms our initial conjecture because having kids at home obviously adds
to the family size.
Following much of the literature, the baseline empirical speciﬁcation that
we use for studying the determinants of health is as follows
hi = α + β1log(yi) + β2log(yr)ij + γ(G)ij + B(X)i + i, (5.2)
where the subscripts i and j in (5.2) refer to households and districts, re-
spectively. The household’s absolute income is denoted by yi; (yr)ij and Gij
represent district-speciﬁc measures of relative incomes and income inequal-
ity. Xi denotes the remaining controls mentioned.
Model (5.2) can be considered as the empirical counterpart of a health
function of the general form h(y,yr,G,X) which we ﬁrst estimate using OLS.
This speciﬁcation will serve in the remainder as our benchmark model to
investigate the three income hypotheses. As additional robustness check,
we shall estimate the model with alternative procedures; more speciﬁcally
ordered probit and using Poisson regressions.
5.4 Empirical results
5.4.1 OLS estimation
5.4.1.1 Absolute and Relative Income Hypotheses: separate and joint
tests
Assuming for now that it is absolute rather than relative levels of income
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y measures absolute income and X represents the given set of control vari-
ables. We estimate this health function with the following empirical speci-
ﬁcation in order to test the AIH:
hi = α + βlog(yi) + B(X)i + i. (5.3)
Alternatively, we may also consider that it is not absolute but rather
relative levels of income that aﬀect health. This would suggest a health
function of the form h(yr,X), where yr represents the relative income of
the household with respect to the given district and X represents the set of
control variables. For testing the RIH, we estimate the health function as
follows:
hi = α + βlog(yr)ij + B(X)i + i. (5.4)
We may moreover assume that people care about both absolute and
relative levels of income. This implies a combined health function of the
form h(y,yr,X), with y, yr and X deﬁned as above. This can be translated
in econometric terms as follows to test the income hypotheses jointly in
absolute and relative terms:
hi = α + β1log(yi) + β2log(yr)ij + B(X)i + i. (5.5)
According to the RIH, however, the household’s health is additionally
aﬀected by the distribution of income (Gij) within a society so that living
in a place with an unequal income distribution is anticipated to lead to a
worsening of the health experience. This would suggest a health function
of the form h(y,yr,G,X), which could be expressed in econometric terms
as follows:
hi = α + β1log(yi) + β2log(yr)ij + γ1(G)ij + B(X)i + i. (5.6)
Since health is usually assumed to be curvilinear in income inequality,
we introduce a squared inequality term (G2) to allow for such potential
non-linearities in health outcomes. This would imply accordingly a health
function of the form h(y,yr,G,G2,X), which can be speciﬁed as:
hi = α + β1log(yi) + β2log(yr)ij + γ1(G)ij + γ2(G)
2
ij + B(X)i + i. (5.7)
The estimation strategy is as follows. First, we use (5.3) and (5.4)
to investigate the AIH as well as the RIH in turn. Having estimated both
models separately, we use in a next step (5.5) to test both hypotheses jointly.
Model (5.6) will then be used to test all three hypotheses (i.e. including
the IIH) simultaneously. Finally, (5.7) is estimated to capture any potential
non-linearity in health with respect to the distribution of income within a
district.C
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Table 5.4: AIH and RIH: separate and joint tests using
OLS.
Note: regression coeﬃcients are in bold and standard
errors appear below them. *,**,*** denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
OLS regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 1.3229 5.5201 1.5811 1.0614 0.4843
1.7395 1.4566 1.7568 1.8542 1.9429
Age -0.0820* -0.0866* -0.0853* -0.0844* -0.0766
0.0465 0.0490 0.0471 0.0469 0.0474
Age Squared 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008* 0.0008* 0.0007
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Female -0.2081 -0.2490 -0.2130 -0.2203 -0.2144
0.1777 0.1767 0.1759 0.1753 0.1759C
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Table 5.4: (continued)
OLS regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Absolute income 0.4948*** 0.4853*** 0.5382*** 0.5604***
0.1308 0.1289 0.1431 0.1455
Relative income 1.2525** 1.1818** 1.1713** 1.1728**
0.5631 0.5431 0.5392 0.5399
Income-inequality 0.0314 0.1762
0.0266 0.1228
(Income-inequality)2 -0.0134
0.0114
Couple 0.1343 0.1437 0.1302 0.1203 0.1157
0.1032 0.1043 0.1034 0.1037 0.1038
Kids -0.6438 -0.7824 -0.7212 -0.7019 -0.7481
0.5553 0.5977 0.5699 0.5647 0.5881C
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Table 5.4: (continued)
OLS regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Familysize -0.0723 -0.0729 -0.0774* -0.0773* -0.0742*
0.0448 0.0449 0.0447 0.0449 0.0447
Education -0.0070 0.0002 -0.0063 -0.0068 -0.0077
0.0133 0.0136 0.0132 0.0132 0.0132
Region:
Punjab 0.1831 0.1982 0.1916 0.0718 -0.0553
0.1514 0.1495 0.1477 0.1831 0.2020
NWFP -0.0311 -0.0324 -0.0296 -0.0723 -0.1566
0.1594 0.1594 0.1563 0.1601 0.1743
Sind -0.0111 0.0190 -0.0043 -0.0758 -0.1271
0.1525 0.1519 0.1492 0.1607 0.1652
Baluchistan Reference GroupC
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Table 5.4: (continued)
OLS regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Number of obs 600 600 600 600 600
F( k, n) F( 11, 588) F( 11, 588) F( 12, 587) F( 13, 586) F( 14, 585)
= 3.06 = 2.01 = 3.30 = 3.10 = 2.94
Prob > F 0.0005 0.0258 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
R2 0.0597 0.0394 0.0695 0.0718 0.0739
Root MSE 0.99376 1.0044 0.98937 0.98902 0.98874
.ovtest F(3, 585) F(3, 585) F(3, 584) F(3, 583) F(3, 582)
(Ho: Model has no omitted = 2.4 = 2.79 = 1.25 = 1.74 = 1.95
variables) Prob > F Prob > F Prob > F Prob > F Prob > F
= 0.0668 = 0.0398 = 0.2908 = 0.1573 = 0.1200Chapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 106
Table 5.4 summarises the benchmark results of estimating the various
models using OLS. In addition, we test for a potential omitted-variable bias
in each model resorting to the ovtest in STATA, the equivalent of the well-
known Ramsey RESET test. The ﬁrst column of Table 5.4 provides the
test results for the AIH. We ﬁnd a positive and strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect
of absolute income. The second column reports in a similar vein results for
the separate estimation of the relative income measure. Relative income
has a sizable positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on health.
In column three of Table 5.4, we present a joint picture of the two
income hypotheses. Results suggest evidence in favour of both the AIH
as well as the RIH. Unlike Li and Zhu (2006) who failed to establish a
signiﬁcant impact of relative income on health, we ﬁnd that both measures
are statistically signiﬁcant and of positive signs. However, as expected,
compared to the eﬀect of absolute income, the eﬀect of relative income on
household’s health is more than twice as high. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005)
use German data to empirically analyse the importance relative income for
individual well-being. He ﬁnds that absolute income has a very small and
not signiﬁcant coeﬃcient when included alongside relative income. It is
also interesting to note that once we control for both absolute and relative
income, the eﬀects of the relative and absolute incomes remain unaﬀected
and statistically signiﬁcant as well.
We test additionally for the eﬀects of income inequality in linear (col-
umn 4) and quadratic (column 5) terms. The positive coeﬃcient of “income-
inequality linear” and the negative coeﬃcient of “income-inequality squared”
suggest an inverted U-shaped pattern between health and income inequality.
The maximum corresponds to an income inequality of 6.57%. This suggests
that any increase in income inequality is beneﬁcial for health till reach-
ing the 6.57% threshold after which higher income inequality poses threats
to health. We may therefore conclude that the IIH is only supported by
districts with high income inequalities – with “high” being pinned down to
about 7% in this context. However, on pure statistical grounds this relation-
ship does not exist at all. A similar story applies to China as for instance
suggested by Li and Zhu (2006) who found an inverted U-shaped (and sta-
tistically siginiﬁcant) association between individual health and community
level income inequality.
As far as the model speciﬁcation is concerned, the ovtest is statistically
signiﬁcant for the two separate tests for the AIH and the RIH and we reject
the null hypothesis that the models do not have an omitted-variable bias.
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insigniﬁcant with higher p-values than the conventional threshold of 0.05
(95% signiﬁcance). Thus, we fail to reject the null and conclude that we
do not need to consider additional variables in our model speciﬁcation.
The test results reported in Table 5.4 suggest that both the (absolute and
relative) income variables signiﬁcantly inﬂuence household’s health and so
should remain in the model.
The Table 5.4 reveals that, apart from the income variables, all the other
controls are found to be statistically insigniﬁcant for all the models consid-
ered. Age and the family size of the interviewed households, however, are
negatively related to the household’s health in some cases. The relationship
between age and the household’s health is found to be U-shaped (and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant) with a minimum age of around 53 years. This suggests
that the household’s health is lowest around an age of 53. In other words,
young and the old individuals are capable of having healthier families than
the middle-aged group. Several reasons may be adduced to explain the
observed U-shaped relationship between age and the household’s health.
For instance, many young people tend to be very successful in their lives,
but with increasing age and family size their ﬁnancial burden potentially
increases which may adversely aﬀect the health status of a household.
Older people, on the other hand, have developed skills to adjust their
work situations to their needs. Moreover, they learn how to cope with
negative life events and how to absorb negative shocks more eﬀectively.
Similarly, family size is negatively related to the household’s health and
does appear to describe a statistically meaningful relationship.
5.4.2 Robustness tests
We evaluate in this Section the robustness of our results employing alter-
native model speciﬁcations. In particular, we amend the deﬁnition of the
dependent variable which thus far has been framed in rather crude terms
(see Table 5.1). Rather than considering an index number, we deﬁne health
in terms of a categorical variable using an ordered probit model (OPM) in
Section 5.4.2.1. As further robustness check, we use a Poisson regression
model in Section 5.4.2.2. This permits using the raw data (i.e. the number
of doctor visits) directly without the need for mapping this information into
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5.4.2.1 Ordered probit modelling
Given that we want to re-estimate (5.2) in terms of health categories, we
resort to an OPM. The OPM is a regression model that incorporates ordinal
dependent variables. It can be thought of as an extension of the probit
regression model for dichotomous dependent variables, allowing for more
than two (ordered) response categories. The model is usually estimated
using maximum likelihood.
In our case, the response variable health is treated as a latent variable
ranging from −∞ to +∞ given that the exact level of health is unobserved
and is denoted by ˜ h. The variable has been distributed into the following
ﬁve ordinal health categories (c) conditional on the reported number of doc-
tor visits (DocV isits):
h =

       
       
0 ⇒ V eryPoor if τ0 = −∞ ≤ ˜ h < τ1
1 ⇒ Poor if τ1 ≤ ˜ h < τ2
2 ⇒ Fair if τ2 ≤ ˜ h < τ3
3 ⇒ Good if τ3 ≤ ˜ h < τ4
4 ⇒ Excellent if τ4 ≤ ˜ h < τ5 = +∞
Thus the latent ˜ h is divided into J=5 ordinal categories,
h = c if τc−1 ≤ ˜ h < τc for c = 0 to J
When the latent variable ˜ h crosses a cut point, the observed category
changes, where the cut points τ1 through τJ−1 are estimated. Some authors
refer to these as thresholds. Ordered probit model results from modeling
the probit of the cumulative response probabilities as a linear function of
the covariates.
The resulting OPM in structural form is as follows:
˜ hi = α + β1log(yi) + β2log(yr)ij + γ(G)ij + B(X)i + i. (5.8)
Table D.2 catalogues the coeﬃcient estimates of ﬁve diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of the ordered probit regression in order test for the three income-
health hypotheses, separately as well as jointly. Ensuring well-speciﬁed
models throughout, we also conducted the linktest. The idea of this test
is that if the model is properly speciﬁed, one should not be able to ﬁnd
any additional predictors that are statistically signiﬁcant except by chance.
The variable _hat should thus be a statistically signiﬁcant predictor since
it is the predicted value from the model. This will be the case unless the
model is misspeciﬁed. On the other hand, if our model is properly speciﬁed,
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Therefore, the linktest is signiﬁcant for a signiﬁcant _hatsq. Such a test
outcome would usually suggest that either we have an omitted-variable bias
or it might be the case that the link function is not correctly speciﬁed.
According to Table D.2, the variable _hatsq appears to be statistically in-
signiﬁcant for all the given speciﬁcations of the ordered probit model for
health. The main aspect to consider in this context is the signiﬁcance of
_hat. This basically checks whether we need more variables in our model
by running a new regression with the observed outcome variable. In our
case, the _hat is signiﬁcant only for the joint test of the AIH and the RIH
as shown in Table D.2, column (3), which means that our ordered probit
model for health is correctly speciﬁed and we therefore do not require any
additional variables that signiﬁcantly determine the health outcome. The
corresponding marginal eﬀects for the joint test of the AIH and the RIH
are reported in Table D.3.
The results of the ordered probit regression in Table D.2 are consistent
with the results obtained by OLS in Table 5.4. In the ordered probit re-
gression, a positive coeﬃcient indicates an increased chance that a subject
with a higher score on the independent variable will be observed in a higher
health category. Similarly, a negative coeﬃcient implies a relatively greater
chance that a subject with a higher score on the independent variable will
be observed in a lower health category. For instance, as shown in Table D.2,
higher income increases the chances of being in a higher health category and
the result obtained is statistically signiﬁcant. However, since the protective
eﬀect of absolute income on health is relatively uncontested (compared with
the eﬀect of relative income and income inequality), we do not place very
much emphasis on it.
Similarly, the results in Table D.2 show a positive association between
relative income and the household’s health, which means higher relative
income brightens the chances of being in a higher health category. Further-
more, this association is found to be stronger and statistically signiﬁcant in
case of relative income compared to absolute income. In addition, we ob-
tain a signiﬁcant and negative relationship between family size and health,
which indicates that households with larger families are most likely to be
observed in a lower health category and vice versa. Health appears to be
U-shaped in age – the estimated turning point corresponds to the age of
53 years. Such a pattern might explain the mid-age crises as young par-
ents with children struggle relatively strongly for their career and ﬁnancial
management. As they turn old and their children grow up, however, their
lives normally become more stable which positively aﬀects the overall healthChapter 5. Socio-economic determinants of health in rural Pakistan 110
status of a household. The remaining controls included in the model are
found to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
As far as the ancillary parameters (or cut points) are concerned, Cut1 is
the estimated cut point of the latent variable ˜ h (which is a continuous and
unobservable response variable) used to diﬀerentiate very poor health from
higher health categories (i.e. poor, fair, good and excellent). For example,
households that had a value of -1.7035 or less on the underlying latent
variable that gave rise to our health category variable would be classiﬁed
as very poor. Cut2 is the estimated cut point used to diﬀerentiate very
poor and poor health categories from higher health categories (fair, good
and excellent). This means that households that had a value of -0.2750
or greater on the latent variable would be classiﬁed in the higher health
categories. Cut3 diﬀerentiates very-poor, poor and fair health categories
versus higher health categories like good and excellent such that households
that had a value of 0.5775 or greater on the given latent variable would be
classiﬁed in those higher health categories. Cut4 distinguishes very poor,
poor, fair and good health categories from the highest category; excellent.
Cut4 which is equal to 6.262 indicates that households that had a value
1.6451 or greater on health variable would fall in the excellent category for
health.
The corresponding marginal eﬀects are presented in Table D.3. Accord-
ing to these marginal calculations, health appears to be inverted U-shaped
in age for the lower health category (1), the estimated turning point is
around 56 years. In contrast, health is U-shaped in age for the higher
health categories (3) and (4) with estimated tipping points of 54 to 56
years, respectively. We may conclude that before 54-56 years (middle-age)
with each year increase in the age of the household, the probability to be
in the lower health category (1) increases by 2.59% and at the same time
the likelihood to be observed in the higher health categories (3) and (4)
decreases by 1.96% and 1.80%, respectively. Conversely, after crossing the
middle-age, the probability of being in the lower health category (1) de-
creases by 0.023% and at the same time the chance to be in the higher
health categories (3) and (4) increases by 0.018% and 0.016%, respectively.
Overall, we may conclude that age has a non-linear (U-shaped) eﬀect on
household’s health status. Before the age of around mid-ﬁfties households
are more likely to be observed in lower health categories but after cross-
ing that age they are most probably to lie in the higher health categories.
Furthermore, the likelihood of being in the lower health categories (0) and
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kids in their homes. These ﬁndings are in line with initial conjectures as
households with kids potentially have more health problems related with
kids compared to the households without children. Similarly, a larger fam-
ily size is inversely related to the health of a household. For instance, a
unit increase in the family size of a household increases its chance to lie
in the lower health categories (0), (1) and (2) at the rate of 0.35%, 2.27%
and 0.68%, respectively. At the same time, it lowers its chance to be ob-
served in the higher health categories (3) and (4) by the amount 1.72% and
1.58%, respectively. As far as household’s absolute and relative incomes are
concerned, those have a positive inﬂuence on household’s health. If, for ex-
ample, the household income increases by 1%, its probabilty to be observed
in the lower health categories (0), (1) and (2) decreases, while at the same
time it is more likely to be observed in the higher health categories such
as (3) and (4). However, as expected, compared to the marginal eﬀects of
absolute income, the marginal eﬀects of relative income on health are more
than twice as high.
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence supporting both the AIH and the RIH. How-
ever, the eﬀect of the hypothesis in relative terms appears more pronounced
than in absolute form. We may conclude that being in better health in-
volves more psychosocial factors rather than absolute material standards.
This means that wealthier households’ health is positively inﬂuenced by
their higher incomes relative to their reference group. On the other hand,
lower relative income weakens one’s power in the allocation of eﬃcient local
health-related resources and thus leads to a poor health status, stress and
potential depression.12
5.4.2.2 Poisson regression modelling
Thus far, we have been measuring the health of a household based on the
number of visits to a doctor. Given that our collected data refers to a count
variable (DocV isits), we additionally resort to a Poisson model that uses
this information directly. We therefore ﬁt a Poisson model to the count
data that expresses the log outcome rate as a linear function of a set of
predictors as follows:13
12See the discussion by Deaton (2003).
13The observed counts follow a Poisson distribution with probability P, where the
Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution. The probability distribution
of a Poisson random variable X (in our case the number of doctor visits per household
DocV isits), represents the number of successes occurring in a given time interval or a
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log(DocV isits) = α + β1log(yi) + β2log(yr)ij + γ1(G)ij + B(X)i (5.9)
In interpreting the results of our model (5.9), we present both the re-
gression coeﬃcients as well as the corresponding marginal eﬀects in Table
D.4 and Table D.5, respectively. The marginal eﬀects are conventionally
calculated at the mean of the independent variables. The number of doctor
visits serves here as a proxy for household health such that higher number
of visits reﬂects poorer health of a household and vice-versa. In addition,
we tested for the appropriateness of the Poisson regression model (5.9) us-
ing the linktest. The variable _hat is statistically signiﬁcant which implies
that the model is properly speciﬁed; the variables included are appropriate
and the functional form of the model or the variables included is correct.
Furthermore, the variable _hatsq is statistically insigniﬁcant which usu-
ally means that either we have no omitted relevant variable(s) or our link
function is correctly speciﬁed.14
Table D.4 and Table D.5, respectively, report the coeﬃcient estimates
and corresponding marginal eﬀects of the Poisson model (5.9) of doctor
visits. The age of the interviewed household head, which is speciﬁed as a
quadratic function, has a nonlinear eﬀect on number of doctor visits, peak-
ing at an age of around 55 years and falling thereafter. This is in line with
intuition as younger parents of childbearing age have young children and
more health issues compared to old parents with grown up children. While,
as expected, the household size is positively associated with the number of
doctor visits by a household, household incomes in absolute as well as in
relative terms have negative eﬀects on the number of doctor visits. This
indicates that higher income has a positive inﬂuence on household’s health.
However, the eﬀect of relative income is about four times larger compared
to absolute income. This result appears plausible for a developing country
P(X) =
e−µµx
x!
,
where x= 0,1,2,3,4...., e= 2.71828, µ= mean number of successes in the given time
interval or region of space. If µ is the average number of successes occurring in a given
time interval or region in the Poisson distribution, then the mean and the variance of
the Poisson distribution are both equal to µ. E(X) = µ and V(X) = σ2 = µ. Note that
in a Poisson distribution only one parameter, µ, is needed to determine the probability
of an event. In our case, µ, or the average number of doctor visits per household is equal
to 1.8.
14In a Poisson regression model, we consider a logarithmic link function of the outcome
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like Pakistan, where the majority of the people are poor and it is in fact
the relative terms that matter. Income inequality is negatively associated
with the number of doctor visits. Similarly, the interaction term between
income inequality and relative income (II*RI) is also negative (Table D.4,
column(6)) which suggests that income inequality favors the richer people
in a community in terms of their health. The other controls are found to
be statistically insigniﬁcant and are thus not discussed further.
Summing up, the poisson regression model (5.9) conﬁrms both the AIH
and RIH as shown in Table D.4 and Table D.5. However, the implications
surrounding the RIH are much stronger than those for the AIH. The RIH
suggests that people in less advantaged circumstances are prone to get sick
and visit a doctor more frequently amid their relatively unhealthy life style.
However, we failed to conﬁrm the hypothesis that more egalitarian societies
are characterised by better health. Hence, we cannot provide evidence for
the IIH. This ﬁnding is in line with Lobmayer and Wilkinson (2000) who,
using data on 14 OECD countries, failed to accept the IIH either suggesting
that income inequality is rather beneﬁcial for health.
5.5 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter we have sought to investigate the validity of three key
income-health hypotheses: the AIH, the RIH and the IIH using OLS, or-
dered probit and Poisson regression modelling. The analysis is based on
household survey data (Survey 2008) for rural Pakistan. We specify a health
function that is general enough to permit a separate as well as simultaneous
investigation. We ﬁnd that all estimation techniques, controlling for var-
ious socio-economic characteristics, provide a stronger evidence in favour
of the RIH compared to AIH and no support for the IIH. Relative income
appears to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on health outcomes in rural
Pakistan. This ﬁnding is in contrast to the general view established for
developed countries according to which incomes in absolute terms seem to
be the main driver of a household’s health status. As robustness check, we
employ alternative health measures. Given that the ordered probit model
captures the exact (but unobserved) level of health with respect to the num-
ber of doctor visits, we prefer this model over OLS estimations or Poisson
speciﬁcations.
Conventional economic models tend to assume that absolute income lev-
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not conﬁrmed by our analysis. Rather, we ﬁnd that if everyone’s income is
roughly the same (thus narrowing income inequalities), well-being remains
nearly unaﬀected. Relative income seems to be a better predictor of well-
being in rural Pakistan. Contrary to IIH, we ﬁnd that rising inequality
improves health and favors the richer segment of the society. Understand-
ing the relationship between income and health is of obvious relevance to
policymakers. In a “ﬁrst-best” world, health diﬀerentials should not hinge
on material factors after all. The relationship between the socio-economic
environment and health outcomes may be particularly relevant for regions
with weak public health provision such as rural Pakistan. The Pakistani
government should therefore take note of this issue in areas, where relatively
poor health care system exists. Thus, policymakers concerned about health
would be well advised to improve the quality as well as the number of public
health care units and hospitals, especially in areas which are considerably
far away from the major cities like Islambad in Punjab, Karachi in Sind,
Peshawar in NWFP and Quetta in Baluchistan.
The scope of our analysis is conﬁned to the rural parts of Pakistan.
Our results apply to those districts and should not simply be generalised
to Pakistan as a whole. Further research on the urban and more modern
sectors would greatly inform the debate and indeed our analysis proposed
here may serve as blueprint in that regard.Chapter 6
General conclusions and
directions for future research
Income inequality and poverty have always been at the core of policy debates
in the developing world. The common way of trying to tackle these issues
lies in redistributing income from the rich to the poor either within society
or even across countries. It is hoped that the mere ﬂow of funds would
serve as panacea to all the problems faced by households even in remote
areas. However, as we seek to argue in this monograph, more nuanced policy
responses might be available, once main sources and drivers of inequalities
have been identiﬁed and understood. This dissertation intends to advance
that knowledge in particular for rural Pakistan using our unique survey data
(Survey 2008) that has been especially collected to seek answers to these
issues.
We investigate diﬀerent forms of material and immaterial inequalities
and their relationship to well-being. We decompose in Chapter 3 income
inequality by its root sources. This is crucial for policymakers as it allows
them to better understand the potential repercussions of negative shocks
such as natural disasters or household members’ illness on income inequality
and poverty. In contrast to previous studies, we do not only conﬁne poverty
to the monetary dimension but also consider immaterial factors such as
subjective well-being and health. Indeed, the crossover between happiness
economics and development studies introduces a subjective approach to
poverty measurement which we investigate in more detail in Chapter 4.
The relationship between health (i.e. physical well-being) and income (i.e.
material well-being) is analysed in absolute, relative as well distributional
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terms in Chapter 5.
Following is an overall conclusion of the monograph, summarising the
thesis’ main ﬁndings, highlighting important contributions to the literature
and providing further policy implications as well as pointing out avenues of
future research.
Main ﬁndings
In relation to the issue of income inequality, we ﬁnd that transfer income in
the rural sector contributes the largest share of total household income and
tends to decrease overall inequality in that sector. A decrease in the share
of transfer income would imply an increase in inequality within the rural
sector, whereas there appears to be a positive relationship between the share
of non-farm income and income inequality. Our results contradict most of
the other studies on rural Pakistan that in particular highlight agricultural
income as important driver of inequalities.
The dissertation moreover contributes to the novel ﬁeld of happiness
studies, particularly in relationship with development economics. We distin-
guish among various well-being measures to assess poverty in rural Pakistan.
The estimated subjective well-being functions contain variables pertaining
to both the income as well as the capabilities approach to poverty measure-
ment. For instance, our well-being metric for satisfaction with income or
expenditure captures important explanatory variables like sex, education,
children, income and health. It is interesting to note that income matters
to poverty also on subjective grounds. However, we have failed to estab-
lish statistically signiﬁcant evidence for income using alternative well-being
measures such as overall satisfaction of a household. This ﬁnding seems to
challenge the conventional approach according to which happiness (or over-
all satisfaction) is often used for poverty measurement. Our data for rural
Pakistan suggest that ﬁnancial well-being (i.e. satisfaction with income or
expenditure) contains more socio-economic information of a household than
the conventional approach. We conclude that it is possible to view ﬁnancial
well-being as an encompassing concept that corresponds not only to the
income approach but also to the physical functioning approach as well as
the social functioning approach to poverty.
We establish further key ﬁndings regarding the relationship between
income and health. This is a topical issue because there is compelling
empirical evidence to suggest that there is indeed an association between
these two variables. Unlike much of the literature for developed countries,
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supports the RIH but provides little support for the AIH and no support
for the IIH. Our study moreover reveals that income inequality has positive
eﬀects on health in rural Pakistan generally and in particular favours those
households with higher relative income.
Contributions to the literature
Our analysis tackles novel aspects in the literature, seeking to strengthen
links between (sub-)disciplines of economics. In doing so, we ﬁll an im-
portant gap in the literature, particularly by considering the rural parts of
Pakistan that have typically been neglected in the literature. Our results
are largely in line with other studies on developing economies, whilst at the
same making further distinct contributions.
A number of empirical studies in developing countries have identiﬁed
the contribution of diﬀerent sources of income to total income inequality.
Glewwe (1986)’s decomposition analysis, for example, simply diﬀerentiates
between labour and non-labour income, while the work by Nugent and
Walther (1982) is based on only three sources (agricultural, nonagricultural,
and transfer). Chinn (1979) includes rental income in nonfarm income,
while Matlon (1979) includes livestock income in nonfarm income. The
present dissertation adds to this as it uses data in more disaggregated form
to show the contribution of ﬁve diﬀerent sources of income (i.e. transfer,
agricultural, nonfarm, livestock and rental) to total income inequality.
While income inequality may eﬀect a society and its economic devel-
opment in many ways, we focus in this thesis on a particular aspect of
the socio-economic eﬀects of inequality, namely its impact on health. The
relationship between income inequality and health is an issue which has
attracted the attention of a variety of social science disciplines such as eco-
nomics, sociology and public health. We are amongst the ﬁrst to provide
evidence that rising income inequality leads to increasing inequalities in
health in developing countries as diverging incomes favour the relatively
richer segments of society and improves their provision of health services.
Little research has been done on the relationship between well-being and
the notion of poverty in general and in particular for poor countries. Our
analysis also makes a contribution to the literature in that regard by pro-
viding three diﬀerent well-being measures: (i) overall satisfaction (life satis-
faction), (ii) satisfaction with income and (iii) satisfaction with expenditure
in order to capture so-called subjective well-being poverty. We investigate
to what extent these concepts are competing and to what extent they are
complementary to encompass poverty. We conclude that it is possible toChapter 6. General conclusions and directions for future research 118
view subjective well-being as an encompassing concept, which permits us to
quantify the relevance and importance of the other approaches and of their
various components. Thus, our methodology eﬀectively provides weights of
the relative importance of these various measures of poverty. Our deﬁni-
tion of poverty involves the household’s own perception of well-being as to
what constitutes a good quality of life or a bad one. We moreover develop
a methodology for using subjective well-being as the criterion for evaluat-
ing poverty, and illustrate its use by reference to the survey data for rural
Pakistan containing detailed socio-economic information on the individual
and the household, as well as information on reported subjective well-being.
Finally, we inquire how the insights gained from the study of households’
happiness or well-being in economics helps policymakers to alleviate poverty.
For instance, our results seem to suggest that higher income satisfaction is
closely related to higher educational achievement. All of these constitute
important contributions to the literature.
Policy implications and directions for further research
Overall, the ﬁndings derived from this thesis may provide important policy
insights on reducing income inequalities and poverty in rural Pakistan. We
ﬁnd that in the rural areas of Pakistan transfer income appears to be an
eﬀective way to help poor households out of poverty, hereby lowering in-
come inequalities at the same time. The local government should consider
encouraging policies that provide access to credit for the poor, education
and job training opportunities for formal sector employment in order to
increase income opportunities for low income groups in the urban sector.
Rural migrants to urban centres (especially to industrial zones) are usually
members of low income households that lack employment and/or agricul-
tural land. Therefore, if these migrants were employed in the urban sector,
their remittances (i.e. transfer income) to their rural households would help
increase income of the poorer rural households. Such a practice will help to
reduce income disparities in the rural areas of Pakistan. However, further
research on this proposed mechanism is required to identify the sources of
income inequality within the urban sector. This would help in analysing and
comparing the urban and rural dimensions of income inequality in Pakistan.
Furthermore, the thesis indicates that income inequality favours the
richer households in terms of their health status. This justiﬁes a stronger
spatial and ethnic dimension of redistribution practices to counter the im-
pacts of this imbalance. Rural and more disadvantaged areas need to ex-
perience a greater level of investment in infrastructure and human capitalChapter 6. General conclusions and directions for future research 119
(for instance, hospitals and schools etc.) in order to change their resources,
which may improve their living standard in general.
In addition to income inequality, poverty deserves more attention as it
could cease future economic development. Our results suggest that apart
from income, education and health are other important tools for poverty al-
leviation programmes in rural Pakistan. Policymakers interested in poverty
reduction should broaden income, education and health opportunities in
rural Pakistan in general and particularly for the low income households.Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 2
2006 2007
GDP per capita (average annual growth) 4.7 4.2
Inﬂation (CPI) 7.9 7.7
Unemployment rate (% of total labour force) 6.0 5.3
Table A.1: Overview of selected main economic indicators in Pakistan.
Source: World Bank
Country Poverty measure Income inequality measure
Pakistan 13.4 33.0
India 34.7 32.5
Bangladesh 36.0 31.8
Table A.2: Overview of poverty and income inequality measures of neigh-
bouring countries.
Note: Poverty measure is the percentage of population living below $1 per
day. Inequality is measured by the Gini coeﬃcient (%) for each country.
Source: World Bank (2005)
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Province District Village/Chak
Punjab Attock Village Behboodi
Village Ghorghushti
Layyah Village Kotsultan
Village Jakhar
Rahimyar Khan Village Trinda Ali Murad Khan
Village Bapraula
Sahiwal Ayub’s village
Arifabad village
Sind Badin Village Allah Dino soomro
Village Muhammad Suleman Thebo
MirpurKhas Village Khudabad
Village FakerGhulam Ali Lighari
Thatta Village Jati
Village Chato Chand
NWFP Dir Village Karo
Village Toormang
Malakand Village Landakay
Village Brikot
Baluchistan Kalat Village Takht
Village Mastang
Table A.3: List of selected villagesAppendix B
Sample Questionnaire
INCOME INEQUALITIES AND WELL-BEING IN RURAL
PAKISTAN: A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
This questionnaire is especially designed for the comparative analysis of
socio-economic conditions of diﬀerent districts of rural Pakistan. It is meant
for academic purposes only. The information provided here will not be
disclosed to any public authority and will be treated strictly conﬁdential.
We therefore ask the interviewee to give actual data about their income and
other socio-economic proﬁles.
Cover Page
Province:————–
Total rural population of the province: ——————
District:———————
Village:———————-
Surveyor:———————
Supervisor:——————-
Period of Survey:————-
Interview Schedule
SECTION 1: RESPONDENTS CHARACTERISTICS
1. Name of the Household Head (If applicable):———————–
2. Sex: i. Male————– ii. Female——————-
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3. Age:———————–
4.(a) Family size (with complete information about the age and sex of
each household, starting with the household head and end at young
children):————————————————————————————
—————————————
—————————————————–
(b)Earners in the Family—————————–
(c) Number of working adults in the family————————–
(d) Family Structure——————————–
5. What is the highest grade you have completed in school? In which
level?
(a) None—————
(b) "5 Years" School (Primary)————
(c) "8 Years" School (Middle)————-
(d) Secondary General———————
(e) Intermediate————————–
(f) Graduate——————————
(g) Post Graduate————————-
(h) Higher Education———————-
(i) Other Please Specify——————
6. Marital Status:
(a) Couple————
(b) Widow/Widower———–
(c) Divorced———–
(d) Seperated———–
7. Current Work Status of the Household Head?
(a) Employed——————–
(b) Unemployed——————
SECTION 2: INCOME
8. Daily family income (in Pak .Rs) ———————–
9. Total Monthly Income (in Pak. Rs) —————
10. Total annual Income(in Pak. Rs)——————
11. Distribution of income:
Monthly distribution of income
(a) Non Farm income—————
(b) Farm income——————-
(c) Transfer income—————
(d) Livestock income————–
(e) Rental income—————–Appendix B. Sample Questionnaire 124
(f)Total monthly income———–
Annual distribution of income
(a) Non Farm income—————
(b) Farm income——————-
(c) Transfer income—————
(d) Livestock income————–
(e) Rental income—————–
(f)Total annual income————
SECTION 3: SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING POVERTY
12. How satisﬁed are you with your current socio-economic status?
(a) Not at all satisﬁed———————–
(b) Less than satisﬁed———————–
(c) Rather satisﬁed———————
(d) Fully satisﬁed——————-
13. How satisﬁed are you with your current income?
(a) Not at all satisﬁed———————–
(b) Less than satisﬁed———————–
(c) Rather satisﬁed———————
(d) Fully satisﬁed——————-
14. How satisﬁed are you with your current expenditure?
(a) Not at all satisﬁed———————–
(b) Less than satisﬁed———————–
(c) Rather satisﬁed———————
(d) Fully satisﬁed——————-
SECTION 4: HEALTH
15. During the last 12 months, how many times has someone in your
household visited a doctor?
(a) None———————-
(b) Once———————-
(c) Twice———————
(d) Three Times—————-
(e) Four Times or More———-Appendix C
Appendix Chapter 4
Overall satisfaction Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan
4 57.08 25 15 3.33
3 10.83 1.11 3.33 1.67
2 5.83 0 0.83 15
1 26.25 73.89 80.83 80
Total(%) 100 100 100 100
Average overall satisfaction 2.99 1.77 1.53 1.28
Satisfaction with income Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan
4 11.67 0 0 0
3 57.5 22.22 12.5 0
2 30.83 77.78 87.5 83.33
1 0 0 0 16.67
Total(%) 100 100 100 100
Average satisfaction with income 2.81 2.22 2.13 1.83
Satisfaction with expenditure Punjab Sind NWFP Baluchistan
4 6.25 0 0 0
3 62.92 22.22 12.5 0
2 30.83 72.78 87.5 90
1 0 5 0 10
total(%) 100 100 100 100
Average satisfaction with expenditure 2.75 2.17 2.13 1.90
Table C.1: Alternative measures of subjective poverty across provinces.
Note: N = 600. Source: Survey 2008.
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Table C.2: Results by family type.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. Figure in brackets [ ] are p-values.
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All families Dual parent family Single parent family
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Education 0.0362** 0.0184 0.0365* 0.0209 0.0196 0.0373
Unemployed -0.3857*** 0.1365 -0.3658** 0.1803 0.0344 0.3332
Log of relative income 0.3841 0.7359 0.3971 0.8025 -0.5452 1.9942
No. Of children:
1 -7.2185*** 0.4046 -7.6688*** 0.4539 (dropped)
2 -0.2984 0.4255 -0.0130 0.4991 -1.1416* 0.6605
3 -0.4199 0.3692 -0.2742 0.4311 -1.2334* 0.7332
4 -0.3868 0.3562 -0.2606 0.4059 -1.2904* 0.7390
5 -0.2603 0.3658 -0.2218 0.4157 -0.6127 0.7482
6 -0.1653 0.3869 -0.1821 0.4330 0.1286 0.7676
7 or more Reference Group (NaN)A
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Table C.2: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All families Dual parent family Single parent family
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Region:
Punjab 1.4575*** 0.1843 1.5522*** 0.2068 1.3293*** 0.4420
NWFP 0.1050 0.2121 0.2028 0.2313 -0.3103 0.5509
Sind 0.4920** 0.2014 0.5332** 0.2272 0.3217 0.4710
Baluchistan Reference Group
/cut1 0.7568 0.4138 0.9303 0.4723 0.1285 0.8037
/cut2 0.8750 0.4134 1.0395 0.4721 0.2905 0.8019
/cut3 1.1170 0.4173 1.2703 0.4764 0.6040 0.8030
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8310 -433.8928 -115.8851
Obs 600 471 129
Wald χ2(12) 2597.23 3181.27 47.47
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1130 0.1498A
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Table C.2: (continued)
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All families Dual parent family Single parent family
.linktest Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
-hat 0.9450*** 0.2383 1.1921*** 0.4286 1.0198*** 0.1878
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000]
-hatsq 0.0371 0.1684 -0.1003 0.2337 0.2491 0.1576
[0.826] [0.668] [0.114]
/cut1 0.7507 0.0856 0.9844 0.1471 0.2355 0.1738
/cut2 0.8689 0.0890 1.0937 0.1506 0.3972 0.1775
/cut3 1.1110 0.0960 1.3246 0.1539 0.7143 0.1737
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8045 -433.7863 -114.9549
Obs 600 471 129
Wald χ2(12) 121.07 96.66 29.49
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1132 0.1567
. test χ2(6) 1041.04 χ2(6) 1163.64 χ2(5) 13.82
(using dummies for No. of children) prob>χ2 0.0000 prob>χ2 0.0000 prob>χ2 0.0168A
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Table C.3: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit; results by fam-
ily type. Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1.
All families
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.46258935
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.04708689
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.09532151
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.39500225
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5403*** 0.0254 -0.0471*** 0.0126 -0.0954*** 0.0180 -0.3978*** 0.0260
2* 0.1185 0.1665 -0.0015 0.0049 -0.0079 0.0161 -0.1091 0.1457
3* 0.1662 0.1432 -0.0019 0.0041 -0.0106 0.0133 -0.1537 0.1265
4* 0.1531 0.1395 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0064 0.0072 -0.1468 0.1323
5* 0.1035 0.1449 -0.0005 0.0021 -0.0053 0.0100 -0.0977 0.1331
6* 0.0658 0.1541 -0.0002 0.0016 -0.0032 0.0095 -0.0625 0.1431A
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Table C.3: (continued)
Dual parent family
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.43675021
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.0432888
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= .09169836
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.42826263
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5670*** 0.0282 -0.0432*** 0.0145 -.0918*** 0.0193 -0.4320*** 0.0297
2* 0.0051 0.1961 0.0001 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0036 -0.0051 0.1954
3* 0.1088 0.1710 0.0001 0.0018 -0.0039 0.0097 -0.1051 0.1601
4* 0.1027 0.1594 0.0001 0.0014 -0.0020 0.0042 -0.1016 0.1569
5* 0.0879 0.1651 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0026 0.0074 -0.0857 0.1576
6* 0.0722 0.1722 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0021 0.0075 -0.0704 0.1645A
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Table C.3: (continued)
Single parent family
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.56578813
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.06260246
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.11088915
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.26072027
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* (dropped)
2* 0.3427*** 0.1268 -0.0376 0.0272 -0.0773 0.0510 -0.2278*** 0.0702
3* 0.4241** 0.2016 -0.0306 0.0232 -0.0748 0.0505 -0.3187** 0.1469
4* 0.4606** 0.2230 -0.0251 0.0181 -0.0694 0.0440 -0.3660** 0.1812
5* 0.2274 0.2549 -0.0146 0.0234 -0.0387 0.0532 -0.1741 0.1829
6* -0.0509 0.3055 0.0016 0.0070 0.0062 0.0336 0.0431 0.2652A
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Table C.4: Results by age.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. Figure in brackets[ ] are p values.
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals aged Individuals aged
individuals 40 or below above 40
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Education 0.0362** 0.0184 0.1234*** 0.0285 0.0050 0.0233
Unemployed -0.3857*** 0.1365 -0.7060*** 0.2465 -0.2805* 0.1651
Log of relative income 0.3841 0.7359 0.1400 1.2600 0.4267 0.9438
No. Of children:
1 -7.2185*** 0.4046 (dropped) -7.0798*** 0.4574
2 -0.2984 0.4255 -0.6267 0.7467 -0.1175 0.5480
3 -0.4199 0.3692 -0.2096 0.7460 -0.4671 0.4248
4 -0.3868 0.3562 -0.4317 0.7293 -0.3146 0.3970
5 -0.2603 0.3658 -0.4446 0.7363 -0.1002 0.4106
6 -0.1653 0.3869 -0.5668 0.7458 -0.0730 0.4448
7 or more Reference GroupA
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Table C.4: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals aged Individuals aged
individuals 40 or below above 40
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Region:
Punjab 1.4575*** 0.1843 1.8123*** 0.4491 1.3218*** 0.2283
NWFP 0.1050 0.2121 0.1265 0.5105 0.0825 0.2502
Sind 0.4920** 0.2014 0.8080* 0.4790 0.3228 0.2381
Baluchistan Reference Group
/cut1 0.7568 0.4138 1.5162 0.8684 0.5024 0.4682
/cut2 0.8750 0.4134 1.6815 0.8720 0.6042 0.4672
/cut3 1.1170 0.4173 2.0964 0.8773 0.7763 0.4737
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8310 -191.6650 -349.9552
Obs 600 206 394
Wald χ2(12) 2597.23 75.88 2336.42
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1762 0.1099A
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Table C.4: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals aged Individuals aged
individuals 40 or below above 40
.linktest Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
-hat 0.9450*** 0.2383 0.5221* 0.3167 1.1026*** 0.2697
[0.000] [0.090] [0.000]
-hatsq 0.0371 0.1684 0.1511 0.1038 -0.1102 0.2882
[0.826] [0.145] [0.702]
/cut1 0.7507 0.0856 1.2248 0.2418 0.4874 0.1051
/cut2 0.8689 0.0890 1.3900 0.2435 0.5893 0.1075
/cut3 1.1110 0.0960 1.8074 0.2638 0.7615 0.1124
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8045 -190.9327 -349.8696
Obs 600 206 394
Wald χ2(12) 121.07 66.90 69.90
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1793 0.1101
. test χ2(6) 1041.04 χ2(5) 2.32 χ2(6) 790.39
(using dummies for No. of children) prob>χ2 0.0000 prob>χ2 0.8034 prob>χ2 0.0000A
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Table C.5: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit; results by age.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and
1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1.
All individuals
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.46258935
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.04708689
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.09532151
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.39500225
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5403*** 0.0254 -0.0471*** 0.0126 -0.0954*** 0.0180 -0.3978*** 0.0260
2* 0.1185 0.1665 -0.0015 0.0049 -0.0079 0.0161 -0.1091 0.1457
3* 0.1662 0.1432 -0.0019 0.0041 -0.0106 0.0133 -0.1537 0.1265
4* 0.1531 0.1395 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0064 0.0072 -0.1468 0.1323
5* 0.1035 0.1449 -0.0005 0.0021 -0.0053 0.0100 -0.0977 0.1331
6* 0.0658 0.1541 -0.0002 0.0016 -0.0032 0.0095 -0.0625 0.1431A
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Table C.5: (continued)
Individuals aged 40 or below
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.43232246
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.06563723
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.16104829
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.34099202
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* (dropped)
2* 0.2443 0.2725 -0.0078 0.0211 -0.0424 0.0701 -0.1942 0.1839
3* 0.0830 0.2962 0.0004 0.0022 -0.0086 0.0372 -0.0747 0.2575
4* 0.1696 0.2838 0.0011 0.0029 -0.0166 0.0328 -0.1542 0.2518
5* 0.1757 0.2879 -0.0011 0.0083 -0.0220 0.0482 -0.1526 0.2330
6* 0.2230 0.2832 -0.0044 0.0153 -0.0336 0.0611 -0.1850 0.2090A
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Table C.5: (continued)
Individuals aged above 40
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.47398748
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.040592
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.0680626
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.41735791
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5303*** 0.0317 -0.0406*** 0.0137 -0.0681*** 0.0191 -0.4216*** 0.0322
2* 0.0468 0.2183 -0.0002 0.0023 -0.0014 0.0087 -0.0452 0.2075
3* 0.1840 0.1620 -0.0025 0.0051 -0.0083 0.0113 -0.1732 0.1464
4* 0.1249 0.1565 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0030 0.0047 -0.1217 0.1516
5* 0.0399 0.1637 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0050 -0.0388 0.1579
6* 0.0291 0.1774 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0052 -0.0283 0.1715A
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Table C.6: Results by income.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. Figure in brackets [ ] are p-values.
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals Individuals
individuals above below
average average
income income
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Education 0.0362** 0.0184 0.0678*** 0.0270 0.0173 0.0242
Unemployed -0.3857*** 0.1365 -0.1771 0.2153 -0.4611*** 0.1760
Log of relative income 0.3841 0.7359 0.5866 1.0349 0.0105 1.0360
No. Of children:
1 -7.2185*** 0.4046 (dropped) -6.9450*** 0.4687
2 -0.2984 0.4255 -0.8636 0.7245 -0.2712 0.4852
3 -0.4199 0.3692 -1.5465** 0.6552 0.0948 0.4341
4 -0.3868 0.3562 -1.1201* 0.6410 -0.1488 0.4114
5 -0.2603 0.3658 -0.7487 0.6364 -0.3398 0.4544
6 -0.1653 0.3869 -0.7518 0.6699 0.0539 0.4547
7 or more Reference GroupA
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Table C.6: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals Individuals
individuals above below
average average
income income
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Region:
Punjab 1.4575*** 0.1843 0.8901*** 0.1904 1.5897*** 0.2081
NWFP 0.1050 0.2121 0.1254 0.3814 0.1081 0.2232
Sind 0.4920** 0.2014 (dropped) 0.2016 0.2768
Baluchisatn Reference Group
/cut1 0.7568 0.4138 -0.1976 0.6584 0.9242 0.4818
/cut2 0.8750 0.4134 -0.0810 0.6550 1.0509 0.4822
/cut3 1.1170 0.4173 0.1553 0.6548 1.3125 0.4871
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8310 -209.12822 -332.59519
Obs 600 228 372
Wald χ2(12) 2597.23 51.12 2377.05
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1217 0.1493A
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Table C.6: (continued)
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals Individuals
individuals above below
average average
income income
.linktest Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
-hat 0.9450*** 0.2383 0.9990*** 0.1479 1.0590*** 0.3118
[0.000] [0.000] [ 0.001 ]
-hatsq 0.0371 0.1684 0.2914 0.2220 -0.0369 0.1994
[0.826] [0.189] [0.853]
/cut1 0.7507 0.0856 -0.0928439 0.1319251 0.9283 0.1104
/cut2 0.8689 0.0890 0.0241273 0.1265235 1.0551 0.1147
/cut3 1.1110 0.0960 0.2617294 0.1268558 1.3166 0.1280
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8045 -208.16165 -332.57497
Obs 600 228 372
Wald χ2(12) 121.07 47.06 91.33
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1258 0.1493
. test χ2(6) 1041.04 χ2(5) 12.25 χ2(6) 800.62
(using dummies for No. of children) prob>χ2 0.0000 prob>χ2 0.0315 prob>χ2 0.0000A
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Table C.7: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit; results by in-
come. Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1.
All individuals
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.46258935
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.04708689
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.09532151
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.39500225
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5403*** 0.0254 -0.0471*** 0.0126 -0.0954*** 0.0180 -0.3978*** 0.0260
2* 0.1185 0.1665 -0.0015 0.0049 -0.0079 0.0161 -0.1091 0.1457
3* 0.1662 0.1432 -0.0019 0.0041 -0.0106 0.0133 -0.1537 0.1265
4* 0.1531 0.1395 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0064 0.0072 -0.1468 0.1323
5* 0.1035 0.1449 -0.0005 0.0021 -0.0053 0.0100 -0.0977 0.1331
6* 0.0658 0.1541 -0.0002 0.0016 -0.0032 0.0095 -0.0625 0.1431A
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Table C.7: (continued)
Individuals
above
average income
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.41757285
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.04596276
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.09400195
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.44246244
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* (dropped)
2* 0.3276 0.2378 -0.0093 0.0179 -0.0296 0.0406 -0.2886 0.1819
3* 0.5377*** 0.1598 -0.0190 0.0162 -0.0527* 0.0310 -0.4660*** 0.1227
4* 0.4239** 0.2201 0.0000 0.0054 -0.0156 0.0162 -0.4083** 0.2038
5* 0.2916 0.2380 -0.0007 0.0058 -0.0126 0.0193 -0.2784 0.2153
6* 0.2926 0.2452 -0.0036 0.0108 -0.0182 0.0287 -0.2708 0.2077A
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Table C.7: (continued)
Individuals
below
average income
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.49286505
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.05045866
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.10111774
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.35555855
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5119*** 0.0350 -0.0505*** 0.0166 -0.1014*** 0.0261 -0.3601*** 0.0340
2* 0.1072 0.1878 -0.0024 0.0073 -0.0096 0.0225 -0.0951 0.1584
3* -0.0378 0.1726 0.0001 0.0005 0.0020 0.0081 0.0357 0.1648
4* 0.0593 0.1637 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.0037 0.0106 -0.0553 0.1520
5* 0.1343 0.1758 -0.0027 0.0063 -0.0115 0.0200 -0.1201 0.1502
6* -0.0215 0.1811 0.0001 0.0003 0.0012 0.0092 0.0202 0.1717A
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Table C.8: Results by education.
Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. Figure in brackets [ ] are p-values.
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals Individuals
individuals with with less than
full school full school
education education
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Education 0.0362** 0.0184 -0.0431 0.0536 0.1122*** 0.0434
Unemployed -0.3857*** 0.1365 -0.5083** 0.2406 -0.2611 0.1698
Log of relative income 0.3841 0.7359 -0.5756 1.2257 0.7207 0.9136
No. Of children:
1 -7.2185*** 0.4046 -6.7719*** 0.3401 (dropped)
2 -0.2984 0.4255 0.4699 0.5970 -0.3720 0.4713
3 -0.4199 0.3692 -0.2031 0.3275 -0.0616 0.4510
4 -0.3868 0.3562 0.2368 0.2852 -0.2291 0.4279
5 -0.2603 0.3658 (dropped) 0.2092 0.4441
6 -0.1653 0.3869 -0.0091 0.3182 0.2772 0.4818
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Table C.8: (continued)
ordered probit regression
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals Individuals
individuals with with less than
full school full school
education education
Independent variable Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
Region:
Punjab 1.4575*** 0.1843 1.1989*** 0.3623 1.5735*** 0.2215
NWFP 0.1050 0.2121 -0.3330 0.4136 0.1829 0.2534
Sind 0.4920** 0.2014 0.0777 0.3964 0.5135 0.2355
Baluchistan Reference Group
/cut1 0.7568 0.4138 -0.1140 0.7530 1.5643 0.5767
/cut2 0.8750 0.4134 -0.0391 0.7524 1.7101 0.5779
/cut3 1.1170 0.4173 0.1698 0.7590 1.9822 0.5861
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8310 -168.69566 -377.4454
Obs 600 198 402
Wald χ2(12) 2597.23 2114.75 101.23
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1320 0.1252A
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Table C.8: (continued)
Dependent Variable: Overall satisfaction
All Individuals Individuals
individuals with with less than
full school full school
education education
.linktest Coef. Robust Coef. Robust Coef. Robust
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
-hat 0.9450*** 0.2383 0.9974*** 0.1614 1.3836*** 0.4558
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
-hatsq 0.0371 0.1684 0.0719 0.1613 -0.1248 0.1540
[0.826] [0.656] [0.418]
/cut1 0.7507 0.0856 -0.0845 0.1304 1.8093 0.2982
/cut2 0.8689 0.0890 -0.0096 0.1343 1.9556 0.3009
/cut3 1.1110 0.0960 0.1994 0.1357 2.2277 0.3071
Log pseudolikelihood -555.8045 -168.64825 -377.12979
Obs 600 198 402
Wald χ2(12) 121.07 40.18 89.10
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1174 0.1322 0.1259
. test χ2(6) 1041.04 χ2(5) 595.35 χ2(5) 8.63
(using dummies for No. of children) prob>chi2 0.0000 prob>chi2 0.0000 prob>chi2 0.1250A
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Table C.9: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit; results by ed-
ucation. Note: 1. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels. 2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1.
All individuals
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.46258935
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.04708689
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.09532151
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.39500225
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.5403*** 0.0254 -0.0471*** 0.0126 -0.0954*** 0.0180 -0.3978*** 0.0260
2* 0.1185 0.1665 -0.0015 0.0049 -0.0079 0.0161 -0.1091 0.1457
3* 0.1662 0.1432 -0.0019 0.0041 -0.0106 0.0133 -0.1537 0.1265
4* 0.1531 0.1395 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0064 0.0072 -0.1468 0.1323
5* 0.1035 0.1449 -0.0005 0.0021 -0.0053 0.0100 -0.0977 0.1331
6* 0.0658 0.1541 -0.0002 0.0016 -0.0032 0.0095 -0.0625 0.1431A
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Table C.9: (continued)
Individuals
with
full school education
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.39305323
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.02907138
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.082819
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.49505639
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* 0.6141*** 0.0430 -0.0289* 0.0172 -0.0827*** 0.0260 -0.5025*** 0.0447
2* -0.1646 0.1846 -0.0057 0.0104 -0.0115 0.0227 0.1817 0.2164
3* 0.0793 0.1292 0.0010 0.0012 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0806 0.1289
4* -0.0901 0.1069 -0.0018 0.0028 -0.0023 0.0042 0.0942 0.1129
5* (dropped)
6* 0.0035 0.1226 0.0001 0.0021 0.0001 0.0023 -0.0036 0.1269A
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Table C.9: (continued)
Individuals
with less than
full school education
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.49947521
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.05799063
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.10406146
y = Pr(Overall satisfaction==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.3384727
Outcome: Overall satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err. dy/dx Std. Err.
No. of children:
1* (dropped)
2* 0.1452 0.1763 -0.0052 0.0109 -0.0163 0.0264 -0.1237 0.1398
3* 0.0246 0.1798 -0.0003 0.0029 -0.0019 0.0146 -0.0223 0.1623
4* 0.0912 0.1696 -0.0011 0.0027 -0.0069 0.0134 -0.0831 0.1539
5* -0.0831 0.1750 0.0001 0.0019 0.0047 0.0073 0.0784 0.1696
6* -0.1097 0.1873 -0.0005 0.0040 0.0052 0.0046 0.1050 0.1873Appendix D
Appendix Chapter 5
Age Female Absolute Relative Income Couple Kids Family Edu-
income income inequality size cation
Age 1
Female -0.1264*** 1
Absolute income 0.0105 -0.0577 1
Relative income 0.0191 0.0001 0.0428 1
Income inequality -0.0535 0.0344 -0.2529 0.0002 1
Couple 0.0033 -0.0313 0.0171 0.0066 0.0734 1
Kids -0.0003 0.0225 -0.0148 0.0527 0.0165 -0.0429 1
Family size 0.0153 -0.2476 0.0555 0.0378 0.1356 0.0536 0.1592*** 1
Education -0.0058 0.0119 0.1161 -0.0157 0.0503 0.0199 -0.0615 0.0560 1
Table D.1: Correlation matrix between health determinants.
N = 600 households. *, **, *** indicates signiﬁcance level of 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
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Table D.2: AIH and RIH: separate and joint tests using
ordered probit regression.
Note: regression coeﬃcients are in bold and standard er-
rors appear below them. *,**,*** denote statistical sig-
niﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Figure in brackets[]
are p values.
Oprobit regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Age -0.0913* -0.0943* -0.0953* -0.0943* -0.0863*
0.0502 0.0522 0.0511 0.0510 0.0514
Age Squared 0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0008* 0.0008
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Female -0.2338 -0.2736 -0.2401 -0.2485 -0.2432
0.1881 0.1841 0.1871 0.1866 0.1873A
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Table D.2: (continued)
Oprobit regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Absolute income 0.5202*** 0.5134*** 0.5715*** 0.5956***
0.1480 0.1467 0.1624 0.1660
Relative income 1.3936** 1.3458** 1.3362** 1.3398**
0.5830 0.5713 0.5679 0.5683
Income-inequality 0.0340 0.1839
0.0281 0.1303
(Income-inequality)2 -0.0139
0.0120
Couple 0.1475 0.1549 0.1441 0.1334 0.1289
0.1092 0.1091 0.1100 0.1105 0.1105
Kids -0.8694 -0.9962 -0.9507 -0.9320 -0.9717
0.7676 0.7983 0.7809 0.7757 0.7943A
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Table D.2: (continued)
Oprobit regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
Familysize -0.0779 -0.0776* -0.0836* -0.0836* -0.0806*
0.0474 0.0468 0.0476 0.0477 0.0476
Years of Education -0.0079 -0.0002 -0.0072 -0.0078 -0.0088
0.0144 0.0145 0.0143 0.0143 0.0143
Region:
Punjab 0.1861 0.1988 0.1965 0.0667 -0.0647
0.1589 0.1553 0.1557 0.1928 0.2126
NWFP -0.0378 -0.0387 -0.0361 -0.0823 -0.1695
0.1662 0.1646 0.1638 0.1678 0.1834
Sind -0.0133 0.0180 -0.0065 -0.0841 -0.1375
0.1591 0.1570 0.1564 0.1685 0.1737
Baluchistan Reference GroupA
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Table D.2: (continued)
Oprobit regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
\cut1 -1.4137 -5.7580 -1.6970 -1.1352 -0.5236
1.9256 1.6332 1.9473 2.0520 2.1524
\cut2 -0.0074 -4.3379 -0.2677 0.2976 0.9074
1.9381 1.6281 1.9605 2.0645 2.1695
\cut3 0.8404 -3.5019 0.5849 1.1518 1.7625
1.9418 1.6272 1.9642 2.0685 2.1744
\cut4 1.9055 -2.4557 1.6522 2.2194 2.8327
1.9483 1.6273 1.9709 2.0763 2.1827
Log pseudolikelihood -821.229 -826.863 -817.727 -816.992 -816.367
Number of obs 600 600 600 600 600
Wald χ2(k) Wald χ2(11) Wald χ2(11) Wald χ2(12) Wald χ2(13) Wald χ2(14)
= 28.49 = 22.02 = 34.67 = 35.30 = 35.86
Prob > χ2 0.0027 0.0242 0.0005 0.0008 0.0011
Pseudo R2 0.0217 0.0150 0.0258 0.0267 0.0275A
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Table D.2: (continued)
Oprobit regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
.linktest
_hat 0.6224[0.329] 0.7526[0.842] 0.9568**[0.029] 0.9298[0.319] 1.2930[0.378]
0.6262 3.7695 0.4370 0.9329 1.4672
_hatsq 0.2457[0.529] -0.0346[0.947] 0.0425[0.912] 0.0324[0.937] -0.0859[0.839]
0.3904 0.5245 0.3826 0.4130 0.4214
\cut1 -1.5376 -5.3180 -1.7035 -1.1696 -0.2836
0.2460 6.7612 0.1517 0.4918 1.2288
\cut2 -0.1342 -3.8977 -0.2750 0.2627 1.1490
0.2397 6.7715 0.1119 0.4992 1.2463
\cut3 0.7132 -3.0616 0.5775 1.1168 2.0044
0.2435 6.7719 0.1165 0.5049 1.2518
\cut4 1.7800 -2.0155 1.6451 2.1846 3.0740
0.2505 6.7662 0.1294 0.5095 1.2547A
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Table D.2: (continued)
Oprobit regression Dependent Variable: Health (h)
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5
.linktest
Log pseudolikelihood -821.028 -826.8599 -817.7186 -816.9880 -816.3364
Number of obs 600 600 600 600 600
Wald χ2(2) 27.18 21.46 33.43 34.26 33.85
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0219 0.0150 0.0259 0.0267 0.0275A
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Table D.3: Marginal eﬀects after oprobit using AIH and
RIH joint test.
Note: 1. marginal eﬀects are in bold and standard er-
rors appear below them. 2. *,**,*** denote statistical
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 3. (*) dy/dx is
for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Marginal eﬀects after oprobit
y = Pr(Health category==0) (predict, p outcome(0))
= 0.01680492
y = Pr(Health category==1) (predict, p outcome(1))
= 0.22656655
y = Pr(Health category==2) (predict, p outcome(2))
= 0.31904463
y = Pr(Health category==3) (predict, p outcome(3))
= 0.32718251
y = Pr(Health category==4) (predict, p outcome(4))
= 0.1104014
Outcome (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Age 0.0040* 0.0259* 0.0077* -0.0196* -0.0180*
0.0024 0.0139 0.0045 0.0106 0.0098
Age Squared -0.00004 -0.00023* -0.00007 0.00018* 0.00016*
0.00002 0.00013 0.00004 0.00010 0.00010A
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Table D.3: (continued)
Outcome (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Female* 0.0125 0.0677 0.0122** -0.0526 -0.0398
0.0124 0.0545 0.0051 0.0427 0.0275
Absolute income -0.0214*** -0.1394*** -0.0415*** 0.1055*** 0.0968***
0.0075 0.0414 0.0149 0.0324 0.0277
Relative income -0.0562* -0.3654** -0.1088** 0.2766** 0.2537**
0.0315 0.1548 0.0486 0.1205 0.1084
Couple* -0.0066 -0.0398 -0.0099 0.0305 0.0258
0.0058 0.0310 0.0066 0.0240 0.0188
Kids* 0.0160*** 0.1787** 0.1546 -0.0686 -0.2807
0.0062 0.0794 0.1475 0.0721 0.2990
Family size 0.0035* 0.0227* 0.0068* -0.0172* -0.0158*
0.0021 0.0131 0.0041 0.0098 0.0091
Years of Education 0.0003 0.0020 0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0014
0.0006 0.0039 0.0012 0.0029 0.0027A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
D
.
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
5
1
5
9
Table D.3: (continued)
Outcome (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Region:
Punjab* -0.0084 -0.0535 -0.0152 0.0406 0.0366
0.0068 0.0426 0.0124 0.0321 0.0292
NWFP* 0.0016 0.0099 0.0028 -0.0075 -0.0067
0.0073 0.0450 0.0120 0.0344 0.0298
Sind* 0.0003 0.0018 0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0012
0.0066 0.0425 0.0125 0.0322 0.0294A
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Table D.4: AIH and RIH: separate and joint tests using
Poisson regression.
Note: regression coeﬃcients are in bold and standard er-
rors appear below them. *,**,*** denote statistical sig-
niﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Figure in brackets[]
are p values. II and RI stands for Income-inequality and
RI relative income at district level, respectively.
Poisson regression Dependent Variable: Docvisits
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.0269 -2.2334* -0.2490 0.2311 0.4670 -0.1816
1.4562 1.1596 1.5004 1.5479 1.6980 1.5031
Age 0.0723** 0.0772** 0.0773** 0.0764** 0.0734** 0.0751**
0.0325 0.0347 0.0338 0.0335 0.0341 0.0335
Age Squared -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0007**
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Female 0.2181 0.2441 0.2240 0.2316 0.2287 0.2203
0.1851 0.1754 0.1839 0.1842 0.1864 0.1840A
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Table D.4: (continued)
Poisson regression Dependent Variable: Docvisits
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Absolute income -0.2541** -0.2461** -0.2950** -0.3055** -0.2472**
0.1186 0.1171 0.1263 0.1341 0.1173
Relative income -1.1626*** -1.1320*** -1.1189*** -1.1259***
0.4188 0.4168 0.4124 0.4114
Income-inequality -0.0279* -0.0826
0.0167 0.0883
(Income-inequality)2 0.0051
0.0082
(II * RI) -0.1768**
0.0762
Couple -0.0879 -0.0899 -0.0843 -0.0752 -0.0732 -0.0826
0.0694 0.0701 0.0700 0.0699 0.0694 0.0699A
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Table D.4: (continued)
Poisson regression Dependent Variable: Docvisits
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Kids 0.5630 0.6660 0.6319 0.6156 0.6328 0.6314
0.6458 0.6761 0.6596 0.6520 0.6607 0.6780
Familysize 0.0471 0.0488 0.0516* 0.0511* 0.0501* 0.0520*
0.0293 0.0300 0.0298 0.0299 0.0298 0.0298
Education 0.0012 -0.0027 0.0005 0.0008 0.0012 0.0008
0.0100 0.0098 0.0098 0.0098 0.0099 0.0098
Region:
Punjab -0.0507 -0.0605 -0.0634 0.0411 0.0877 -0.0637
0.0956 0.0907 0.0904 0.1119 0.1195 0.0926
NWFP 0.0498 0.0494 0.0475 0.0842 0.1142 0.0468
0.0948 0.1594 0.0918 0.0946 0.1051 0.0938
Sind 0.0289 0.0131 0.0203 0.0868 0.1047 0.0210
0.0873 0.0857 0.0840 0.0933 0.0963 0.0862
Baluchistan Reference GroupA
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Table D.4: (continued)
Poisson regression Dependent Variable: Docvisits
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log pseudolikelihood -263.42706 -263.2062 -262.03188 -261.75132 -261.70438 -262.45038
Number of obs 600 600 600 600 600 600
Wald χ2(k) Wald χ2(11) Wald χ2(11) Wald χ2(12) Wald χ2(13) Wald χ2(14) Wald χ2(12)
=24.47 =22.38 =32.96 =33.22 =33.41 =30.71
Prob > χ2 0.0109 0.0216 0.0010 0.0016 0.0025 0.0022
.linktest
_hat 2.1468** 0.7588 1.3199* 1.2717* 1.2283* 1.4500*
[0.024] [0.398] [0.072] [0.082] [0.095] [0.068]
0.9544 0.8978 0.7336 0.7304 0.7355 0.7942
_hatsq -1.0339 0.2175 -0.2873 -0.2451 -0.2075 -0.4026
[0.196] [0.794] [0.652] [0.710] [0.756] [0.555]
0.8001 0.8341 0.6361 0.6600 0.6692 0.6812
-cons -0.2964 0.0618 -0.0803 -0.0673 -0.0559 -0.1146
[0.305] [0.805] [0.706] [0.740] [0.782] [0.622]
0.2892 0.2500 0.2127 0.2029 0.2024 0.2324A
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Table D.4: (continued)
Poisson regression Dependent Variable: Docvisits
Separate tests Joint tests
Speciﬁcation: 1 2 3 4 5 6
.linktest
Log pseudolikelihood -263.21061 -263.19398 -262.0028 -261.72914 -261.68847 -262.40046
Number of obs 600 600 600 600 600 600
Wald χ2(2) 19.36 17.23 28.36 29.64 29.89 26.16
Prob > χ2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000Appendix D. Appendix Chapter 5 165
Marginal eﬀects after poisson
Y= predicted number of DocVisits (predict)
= 1.7523524
Variable dy/dx X
Age 0.1338** 52.8567
0.0591
Age Squared -0.0012** 2874.4
0.0006
Female* 0.4492 0.071868
0.3979
Absolute income -0.5169** 8.11056
0.2165
Relative income -1.9606*** -0.00366
0.7426
Income-inequality -0.0489* 4.80887
0.0294
Couple* -0.1347 0.791253
0.1276
Kids* 0.8084 0.994149
0.6216
Familysize 0.0896* 4.30496
0.0523
Years of Education 0.0014 7.79433
0.0172
Region:
Punjab* 0.0718 0.553191
0.1961
NWFP* 0.1525 0.113475
0.1773
Sind* 0.1552 0.265957
0.1712
Table D.5: Marginal eﬀects for poisson regression: a joint test of the Income-
hypotheses. Note: marginal eﬀects are in bold and standard errors appear
below them. *,**,*** denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%
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